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2Abstract
This practice-based project examines mediated performative relationality in
videoperformance by means of five artworks and a dissertation. I argue that
videoperformance has the potential to contribute to wider debates on relationality, to
examine the addressee and the dynamics of relationality through the mediated
encounter between performer and viewer, and to produce an account of relationality
that manifests the specific ethical and political valence of this practice. I focus on
videoperformances in which artists address viewers via video camera and screen,
with the result of activating mediated relationality. The term relationality conveys the
emergence of intersubjective relationships. Mediation refers to the relay of
performativity from performer to camera, screen and viewer, and acknowledges the
transformations introduced by technology.
My videoperformances experiment with aspects of mediated relationality: Before
You Now (2013) explores the desire for authenticity and unmediated relationality.
Regardless (2007) experiments with visual strategies to suggest that the screen is
permeable. The Other Person (2010) explores intimacy, trust and zones of
proximity. Are You Talking to Me? (2010) denies relationality by focusing on a
dialogue internal to the performer. Wish You Were Here (2011) suggests and mocks
idealised conviviality, and plays with ideas of liveness.
The dissertation is divided into two parts: part one contextualises the project in the
framework of theoretical approaches and practices. It maps Lacanian concepts of
subjectivity and the gaze; Butler’s concept of performativity; film, performance and
new media studies; relational and distributed aesthetics. It also reviews the history
of videoperformance from a contemporary relational perspective. Part two examines
the interplay of relationality and subjectivity in three videoperformances by way of
performative writing and critical analysis. This combination of different research
methodologies achieves a thorough analysis of performative mediated relationality
in videoperformance and contributes to a wider discourse on relationality.
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This disk contains five videoperformances produced and exhibited as part of this
research project:
1. Regardless, 2007, 17’ (also, a 5’ extract)
2. The Other Person, 2010, 29’30” (also, a 5’ extract)
3. Wish You Were Here, 2011, 3’
4. Before You Now, 2013, 5’30”
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2. Documentation of live performance for an audience.
3. Recording of the work performed at the same time for an audience
and for the video camera.
4. Videoperformance performed for the video camera.
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Introduction
This research project examines mediated performative relationality in
videoperformance art practices and its implications through my videoperformance
practice, performative writing and critical analysis. A series of five
videoperformances and this dissertation complement each other to analyse the
processes and significance of relationality as it emerges in videoperformance.
The research stems from my interest in art practices that investigate and initiate
intersubjective relationships. This project focuses on videoperformances that offer
an opportunity to relate and invite viewers to become active interlocutors. My recent
body of work experiments with performance and video to produce and explore
relationality. I developed a series of intimate videoperformances in parallel with the
research and writing for this dissertation, constructing a coherent whole under the
shared title Intimations.
Exploring the literature that focuses on videoperformance reveals that subjectivity
and the embodied experience of performer and viewer are the key perspectives that
shape existing analyses (see for example, Jones, 1998, 2006; Warr, 2000).
Psychoanalytic concepts of gaze, identification and narcissism are applied to
interrogate processes internal to performer and spectator in response to the
camera, the screen and to narrative structures (Mulvey, 1975; Krauss, 1976). More
recent analyses attempt to integrate these approaches by focusing on the affective
and embodied intersubjective exchanges between performer – even when mediated
by screen and camera, or materialised in a photograph – and viewer, but they
deliberately underplay the role of language and do not focus on the constructed
nature of subjectivity (Marks, 2002; Shobchack, 1994; Seigworth and Gregg, 2010;
Ettinger, 2006). The recent attention paid to relationality in art practices is mostly
limited to situations in which artists and participants are all physically present,
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focusing on the social dynamics of collective encounters and groups of participants,
generally avoiding to question how these processes engage subjectivity (Bourriaud,
2002). Moreover, these contiguous approaches do not overlap to offer an analysis
of the processes of relationality in videoperformance, leaving open a series of
relevant questions:
• How do videoperformance art practices contribute to debates on
relationality?
• Whom does videoperformance address relationally, and what are the
dynamics of this address?
• What account of relationality emerges from the analysis of these practices?
What is their ethical and political relevance?
These questions drive this research, and to expound them I analyse and query the
processes of the gaze in videoperformance to challenge definitions of relationality
that rely on exclusively psychoanalytic, post-psychoanalytic, aesthetic, political or
social definitions, and propose an inflection of the concept that spans, encompasses
and adopts relevant features from these accounts.
The term videoperformance is used as defined by Liza Bear in 1974 – the ‘interface
of video and live performance’ (Bear and Sharp, 1974, p.3). The terms performance
to camera and body art are also used to describe art practices that combine
performance, video camera and screen (Jones, 1998; Warr, 2000). This project
concentrates on videoperformances in which artists address viewers via video
camera and screen with their eyes, speech and body language, indicating an offer
of personal relationships, with the result of activating mediated relationality. It
interrogates the potential of these practices to produce relationality as a
performative in the encounter between videoperformance and viewer. My
videoperformance work tests some strategies that activate performative relationality,
while this dissertation maps the conceptual and historical frameworks of
12
videoperformance, and analyses how relationality emerges performatively in the
combination of performer, video camera, screen and viewer.
The term relationality describes the emergence of relationships between subject
and other (performer and viewer, representation and body, temporary subject and
imagined other, etc.) and analyses its psychic, ethical and cultural implications. The
purpose of this project is not to delineate categories of relationality, label instances
or define modalities, but to investigate the emergence, dynamics and implications of
relationality in videoperformance art practices. The concept is examined in the
context of videoperformance art practice and in its ramifications for intersubjective
relationships. It is contextualised in art practice more generally as in dialogue with
relational accounts from Nicholas Bourriaud’s (2002) Relational Aesthetics and
successive elaborations of ‘distributed’ and ‘dialogical’ practices, and ‘associations’
(Munster and Lovink, 2005; Kester, 2004; Latour, 2007). Whilst participatory and
interactive art practices attempt to materialise and make visible relationality,
videoperformance relies on performative relationality emerging in the encounter of
performer represented on screen and viewer. In this framework, relationality is not
the form of the work (Bourriaud, 2002), but an emergent phenomenon that remains
invisible and unmarked (Phelan, 1993). Phenomenological and psychoanalytic
theories examine relationality from the perspective of the subject to explain the
formation of the subject itself. Yet, relationality does not reside within subjectivities
but between subjects, and emerges as a performative that constitutes the subjects
themselves.
Following the approach of Judith Butler, this project recasts the role of the subject –
understood as fragmented, unstable and formed in language – as continuously
produced by and in relationality, and therefore challenges the dominance of the
gaze in intersubjective relationships. Butler (2005) repositions the power of the gaze
and unconscious desires within a political discourse that acknowledges that ethical
responsibility emerges out of the relative incapacity of the subject to see itself:
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‘it may be possible to show that the question of ethics emerges precisely
at the limits of our schemes of intelligibility, the site where we ask
ourselves what it might mean to continue in a dialogue where no
common ground can be assumed, where one is, as it were, at the limits
of what one knows yet still under the demand to offer and receive
acknowledgment: to someone else who is there to be addressed and
whose address is there to be received.’ (Butler, 2005, pp.21-22).
In other words, the subjects who address each other in ‘the interlocutory scene’ are
in turn produced by the relationality that emerges from their encounter, and the
limits of awareness constitute the source of ethics and a transformative opportunity
for ethical reflection (Butler, 2005, p.64). This approach to the ethics of relationality
informs my analysis of the mediated relationships that emerge performatively in
videoperformance practices. Throughout this project, ethics is approached from the
perspective of Judith Butler’s social and political critical theory and does not extend
into moral philosophy. Butler elaborates on Adorno’s, Foucault’s and Levinas’
approaches to ethics and individual responsibility in the context of the nebulous
boundaries of subjects that emerge within networks of relationships, many of which
precede and exceed the subjects themselves (Butler, 2005).
Although Butler offers an eloquent critique of psychoanalytic theories, in the context
of this project it is important to clarify some Lacanian concepts that remain relevant.
Each encounter between videoperformance and viewer produces different and
unique combinations of relationality and fragments of subjectivity. The use of the
term encounter in this context references Lacan’s tuché – the primary encounter
with the real, which can be described as missed since its memory and legacy
continue to activate desire and to bring the real to the surface (Lacan, 1998). This
oscillation describes the continuous appearance and disappearance of the
unconscious (consequently of the real and of desire) to consciousness. The
encounter with the mediated other of videoperformance elicits partial recognition as
it evokes unconscious desires and ethical responsibility, as well as provoking
moments of self-reflection. Besides encounter and subject, other Lacanian
theoretical constructs are fundamental to this project:  other/Other, desire,
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unconscious, the real, repetition, extimacy and, most importantly, the gaze. On the
other hand, Lacanian definitions and positioning of gender are not adopted as part
of this analysis, which examines instead feminist discourses that have already
critically engaged with those constructs (Mulvey, 1975 and 1989; Gaines, 1988;
Grosz, 1991; Wright, 2000; Ettinger, 2006 and particularly Judith Butler, 1990, 1993,
1997a, 1997b and 2004b). In general, this project does not limit the analysis of
practice to a single dominant methodology or theoretical perspective.
The scenes of address activated in videoperformance construct recognisable
dynamics of closeness, trust, seduction, familiarity, complicity and intimate
relationality. In this context, the term intimate resonates both as an adjective
referencing intimacy, and as a verb in its meaning of ‘to signify, indicate; to imply, to
suggest, to hint’, but also ‘to make known formally, to notify, announce, state’
(Oxford English Dictionary, 2014). This set of meanings inherent to intimacy itself is
reflected in the title of this project – Intimations – as well as in the works chosen for
analysis and in my series of videoperformances (Regardless, 2007; The Other
Person, 2009; Are You Talking to Me, 2010; Wish You Were Here, 2011; Before
You Now, 2013). The practice of videoperformance and the mediated relationality
that emerges in its encounters reflect and make explicit the paradoxes of intimacy –
affect and thought; normativity and performativity; past and present; subject and
other/Other; relationality and subjectivity; immediacy and remediation;
representation and performativity; unconscious and awareness; fragmentation and
continuity. Some of these contradictions remain open in the Lacanian concept of
extimacy, which suggests that intimacy already contains the other/Other and makes
the distinction between inside and outside superfluous.
Lauren Berlant writes about the ‘institutions of intimacy’ and of how ‘the inwardness
of the intimate is met by a corresponding publicness’ (Berlant, 2000, p.1). In this
context, intimacy is the ultimate interface of normativity and performativity – subjects
perform their own versions of the institutions of monogamy, marriage and
parenthood as they confront prescribed versions of their roles within them. Intimacy
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is an opportunity to test the incompatibilities within the subjects’ ‘history of
identifications’ (Butler, 1990, p.331). By inviting viewers to immerse themselves in
mediated intimacy with an absent stranger, videoperformances produce safe
conditions within which subjects can observe and test their own internalised models
of behaviour. The videoperformances examined in this dissertation and my own
work directly aim to offer opportunities for mediated intimacy. Analyzing this strategy
through the lens of Lacan and Butler maintains the focus on the inseparable
complex of affects and cognition, and on the formative power of language and
discourse. In this framework, intimacy remains firmly rooted in normativity and the
concept of relationality retains clarity and rigour. Extending this analytical approach
to the mediation of the screen affords a more precise understanding of the
dynamics of repetition without reproduction (encounter with the real): as subjects
are not co-present, the unconscious responses do not engender illusory reciprocity
and do not reproduce past relationship in a neurotic pattern (Lacan, 1998). The
mediated intimate encounter mobilises all the qualities of the tuché – evoking the
real, but deflecting the gaze towards awareness. Viewers who participate in this
performative intimacy can then carry this partial awareness into their life outside the
screen.
The terms performative and performativity are used from the perspective of Judith
Butler in the double meaning of 'dramatic' and 'non-referential' (Butler, 1988,
pp.521-522). In their stratification of meanings, the terms intimate both the
ephemeral event of a performance and the power of discourse to constitute and
continually modify subjectivity. Performativity is always impure, based on
citationality and iterability, ‘conventional and relational’ (Derrida, 1988; Gade and
Jerslev, 2005, p.9, emphasis in original). In this context, relationality is performative
as it produces the subjects that are supposed to precede it and carries
consequences beyond the momentary encounter and the field of art practice. In
other words, this key term defines relationality as always emerging and formative of
the subjects relating, as well as fundamentally transformative.
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Butler mobilises performativity and interpellation as complementary relational
dynamics always at work between subjects. Althusser states that ‘individuals are
always-already interpellated by ideology as subjects’: the act of calling out you or a
name and the response that this elicits confirm the relative positions of subjects in
the context of the social norms and ideology (Althusser, 1971, p.119). Whereas
Althusser implies the subject’s inevitable acceptance of the call and its effects,
Butler reformulates interpellation as ‘a scene of address’ in which subjects
reciprocally and performatively negotiate relative positions within available models
(Butler, 2005, p.50). This is a key element for the analysis of relationality in
videoperformances that address a you via camera and screen. Read in connection
with psychoanalytic theories of the unconscious (Freud and Lacan), the
complementary dynamics of performativity and interpellation found the possibility of
an ethics of the encounter with the other: ‘[a]n ability to affirm what is contingent and
incoherent in oneself may allow one to affirm others who may or may not “mirror”
one’s own constitution.’ (Butler, 2005, p.41). Butler seeks to establish the ethical
and political implications of a theory of the formation of the subject that precedes the
subject itself and its consciousness, and goes beyond its perceived coherence.
Performativity and ethical responsibility are rooted in normativity and in the
unconscious, but they also constantly transform subjects, relationality and society.
To research the dynamics of performative relationality directly, I adopt the method of
performative writing. This allows the relay of the ‘living performative encounter with
art’, wherein both viewer and artwork are reconfigured and emerge renewed
(Phelan et al, 2001, p.45). In the encounter between subject and videoperformance,
between subject and writing, and between writer and reader, subjectivity and
relationality emerge performatively together, not in a causal or chronological order.
From this perspective, performative writing reveals intersubjective dynamics that
other methods could only infer and produces knowledge that preserves the shifts of
subjectivity and relationality, therefore evidencing the mechanisms of the gaze, the
emergence of moments of self-awareness and the transformative effects of the
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encounter. By analyzing my encounters with the screen and the video camera of
videoperformance in the first person, I can utilize my own subjectivity as a tool for
experimentation and analysis of mechanisms that would otherwise remain invisible.
As a practitioner, I can unravel the mechanisms of my performance strategies in the
text, exposing working methods, implied knowledge, affects, thoughts and
unconscious dynamics. As a viewer, I can evidence the emergence of performative
mediated relationality and its interplay with subjectivity, addressing the research
questions directly and confirming the relevance of my arguments.
Although the concept of mediation appears with different meanings in the context of
new media studies, psychoanalysis and Marxist theories, in this project it is inflected
by the new media studies concept of remediation (Bolter and Grusin, 2000). It
acknowledges that relationality in videoperformance is already mediated by
language and the codes of performance – the screen therefore performs a re-
mediation. Bolter and Grusin develop the term in the book of the same title to
indicate the reframing through a second medium of already mediatised content. In
this project, mediation refers to the relay of performativity from performer to camera,
to screen and finally to viewer, and it acknowledges the transformations that each
layer of interface introduces for the offer at stake in each work. This use of the term
encompasses Latour’s definition of mediator: ‘Mediators transform, translate, distort
and modify the meaning or the elements they are supposed to carry.’ (Latour, 2007,
p. 39) Therefore, in this context mediated is mainly intended in the first instance as
informed by language, then transformed by the screen medium, and it extends to
remediated through the camera and screen.
The contested expression new media is used to indicate art practices informed by a
focus on recently developed technological tools. Bolter and Grusin do not define the
expression, but use it interchangeably with ‘digital media’ (Bolter and Grusin, 2000,
p.5). Christiane Paul observes that it functions as a ‘shorthand for a range of
practices and names, including “art and technology”, “computer art”, “systems art”,
and so on.’ (Paul, 2008b, p.13). She states that ‘new media art has shifted the focus
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from object to process: as an inherently time-based, dynamic, interactive,
collaborative, customizable and variable art form new media art resists
“objectification” and challenges traditional notions of the art object.’ (Paul, 2008b,
p1). In this context, the influence of these practices on the making and reading of
videoperformance cannot be ignored.
Some of the artworks I produce and examine straddle videoperformance, networked
performance, digital performance and interactive performance. The inclusion of
these practices and theories roots this project in its contemporary context, and
opens it towards future developments: I have started experimenting with
performances mediated via Skype, and foresee that my research and work will shift
towards networked practices. Limiting this project to video and performance allows
me to analyse in depth mechanisms and discourses that extend to networked
practices.
Although I reference instances of screen-based communication and their relevance
to videoperformance, Skype in particular, this dissertation does not reference
communication studies. Skype and other platforms are analysed from the
perspective of emerging technologies and new media in the context of art practice
and critical theory. The videoperformances produced and analysed in this project do
not aim to communicate, but to produce relationality with the participation of
viewers. Therefore, they are not suitable subjects of analyses for communication
and media studies, and analysing mediation from this perspective would not be
productive in this context. Similarly, although some references to film studies are
crucial to a thorough analysis of relationality in videoperformance, these are
peripheral in this discussion, which does not encompass questions of narrative and
processes of identification. The mediation of the screen is explored from the
perspective of the accumulation of connotations in the history of its technological
development and uses. A strictly materialist perspective would isolate each piece of
equipment and technology to analyse its qualities and contribution to the making
and reading of the work. As this project focuses on the emergence of relationality in
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videoperformance, the precise influence of each model of screen is only one
component of the complex interactions of theories and histories outlined in the
dissertation, and not its focus. This project offers a multidisciplinary perspective,
which integrates the implications of the qualities accumulated by screens within the
performative interplay of readings and emergent dynamics.
0.1 The Practice
My artistic working method of addressing the camera in order to evoke an ideal
interlocutor activates a scene of address and initiates a chain of relays that
culminates in a screen-based relational offer to viewers physically present in the
gallery. It mobilises interpellation, the gaze, awareness and performativity to
produce mediated relationality and invite reflection. The videoperformances that are
part of this project have been developed in parallel with the analysis of the theories
and practices explored in this dissertation. They are fundamental to the investigation
of some aspects of the research questions, and contributed to produce some of the
questions themselves. In particular, this practice explores the mechanisms and
strategies of interfacing performer, video camera and screen to produce and
mediate performative relationality in videoperformance. As a result, relationality
emerges as fundamental to the construction of subjectivity. This body of work has
been instrumental to produce an understanding of subjectivity as an ongoing
dialogue with uncountable others, who continue to form the subject (Butler, 1990).
The relational videoperformances that are part of Intimations (2007-2013)
experiment with strategies that simultaneously evoke and perform the active
interlocutor of these different others: I embody my responses to interpellations
active in me and in turn interpellate viewers from those positions. This body of work
does not unravel the web of voices that inform my subjectivity in an exercise in self-
awareness, but invites viewers to engage in this already polyphonic relationality with
their own polyphonies. This offers moments of self-awareness for viewers and artist:
a space to experience and perceive unconscious desires, responses in interaction
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and less evident aspects of one’s own subjectivity. Also, this body of work
constructs a space to become aware of one’s own responsibility to enact
relationality as a consciously ethical and transformative process.
By choosing to perform in my own work, I deploy my subjectivity as a tool to offer
and experiment with the relational dynamics of performance, of the mediation of
video, of the specific qualities of the screen and of the interplay of subjectivity and
relationality. The elements of subjectivity that emerge in my videoperformances are
part of my personal history, and are selected and utilised to activate relational offers
and strategies. Moreover, I confront the question of gendered subjectivity and
representation directly, and acknowledge the legacy of artists and thinkers who
have focused on the politics of representation of the female body (in particular
Martha Rosler, Hannah Wilke, Annie Abrahams and Peggy Phelan). However,
these videoperformances aim to integrate and transcend the direct questioning of
representation towards the activation of performative relationality productive of
moments of reflection. Similarly, they resonate with the theories and discourses that
inform this project and its questions: interpellation, the gaze, performativity and their
ethics.
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Figure 0.1 Cinzia Cremona, Regardless, 2007. Video Still.
Regardless (17’, 2007) in particular is in dialogue with Amelia Jones’ writing on body
art, Peggy Phelan’s work on performance and Judith Butler’s texts on vulnerability
and performativity (Jones, 2006; Phelan, 1993; Butler, 2009 and 1997a). It
interrogates the screen as a membrane that allows some forms of contact whilst
impeding others. As well as adopting a visual ruse – the screen appears to move
towards the viewer as I press my hand on the inside of the glass – I use
performance strategies to offer an ambiguous relationship that plays with seduction,
trust, desire, vulnerability, power and repetition. The title itself evokes the gaze
(regarder), but also the implicit contradiction of mediated relationality: regardless of
the impossibility of touching each other, we will reach out.
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Figure 0.1 Cinzia Cremona, Regardless, 2007. Installation shot at the Nunnery
Gallery, London.
Regardless positions viewers above the performer, challenging them to take
responsibility for their power and for the vulnerability of the woman on screen, but
also to negotiate the manipulation of her address. It confronts the complex ethical
questions proposed by this project in a compressed and dense form. Consequently,
it reveals the need to investigate the components of this questions separately: who
is being addressed? What are the dynamics of this mediated intimacy in a public
space? How does the subjectivity of the performer emerge and how does it position
the viewer?
To investigate these questions directly, I developed the work Before You (2008-
2009) to test the different relational dynamics of performance and video. I adopted
the basic strategy of speaking to viewers as myself, as if I was not performing, by
opening these works with the statement ‘before I start the performance’. This series
of experiments culminates in the work Before You Now (2013).
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Figure 0.2 Cinzia Cremona, Before You, May 2008, live performance at
Nicholls and Clarke Building Gallery, London.
Before You is a series of videoperformances based on addressing viewers as
myself before I start the performance. This strategy builds a relationship that tests
the mediation of video equipment and performance art practice, as well as the
desire for immediacy. At first, I performed Before You by addressing the audience
present and the video camera simultaneously to experiment with the key differences
between these forms of relationality and mediation. To perform for the camera, I had
to focus on evoking a future viewer who would respond to the screen, but there
were also viewers present in front of me, who were responding instantly to my
words and gestures. This suggested the need to experiment separately with the
relationality activated by physical presence in a shared space and by the
relationality emerging between performer on screen and viewer off screen.
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Figure 0.3 Cinzia Cremona, Before You, October 2008, live performance,
Montague Arms, London.
Consequently, I performed exclusively for an audience, and only held a video
camera in my hand to make an observation about the different performances I could
make ‘once I start the performance’. I experimented with making eye contact for
long minutes without speaking and was thrilled by the intensity with which those
present responded. The excitement for the speed and complete absorption of this
exchange was a turning point for this project. I reflected on the dynamics of the
sense of satisfaction I experienced in the immediate response, acceptance and
confirmation of this reciprocal engagement. This suggested that the asynchronous
exchange mediate by video by contrast allows self-awareness and reflection to
emerge both for the performer and for the viewer.
I developed a better understanding of the mediation of video camera and screen in
relation to the mediation of the stage, the different dynamics of power they generate
and the difference in how they mobilise the gaze. It became clear that the focus of
my questions revolves around the opportunities for self reflection offered by the
asynchronous relationality produced by the screen, not the illusory immediacy of the
physical and chronological presence of performer and viewer. The thrill of viewers’
responses to my gaze appeared to close the relational loop with its speed of
reactions and confusion of desires. Conversely, addressing the camera meant
building relational possibilities that would endure beyond the moment, and that are
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open to another who could be embodied in the address and evoked in my absence
by my recorded image. The video equipment could mediate relationships that leave
room for subjects to recognise this other/Other as part of themselves, whilst face-to-
face relationships seemed to awake affects and thoughts that surge and evaporate
without any gap for self-awareness and reflection.
Figure 0.4 Cinzia Cremona, Before You, 2009, live performance, James Taylor
Gallery, London.
Finally, I tested a different combination of performance and video: I performed
behind the audience hidden from view, but within the same space and the screen
was positioned at the other end of the room. Knowing that the viewers were there,
but not being able to perceive their responses or respond to them was quite
confusing. This lead me to intensify the strategy of seduction in order to converge
the performance for the video camera and screen with that for the audience present.
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Figure 0.5 Cinzia Cremona, Before You Now, installation view.
In Before You Now (5’30”, 2013), I took advantage of these experiments and the
insight they produced: in order to become the subject that performs the address to
camera, I distanced myself from the illusion of being a unified and self-sufficient
subject, and allowed the polyphony of voices of my subjectivity to resonate. With
this approach, I was able to deploy the memory of formative relationships that
contributed to my subjectivity in order to offer the opportunity for viewers to do the
same. The relationality already activated by addressing the other beyond the
camera in turn informed my shift into the subject that emerges on screen in the
encounter with viewers. This has had a profound transformative effect on me,
particularly in view of the fact that in Before You Now I perform my authentic self.
The implication of this process are analysed in detail in chapter three. This series of
works raises further questions about the dynamics of intimacy and trust in the public
space of the gallery.
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Figure 0.6 Cinzia Cremona, The Other Person, 2010. Installation view.
The Other Person (29’, 2010) addresses these questions by constructing a situation
in which viewers can choose their position in relation to suggested possibilities. This
videoperformance includes a duvet and pillow with the same pattern in the image
and on the floor. This generates concentric areas of intimacy: the bedding on the
floor invites intimacy and physical proximity, but the public space of the gallery
discourages it. Viewers can choose to look from a distance and encounter my eyes
at the same height as theirs while imagining themselves in the bed. In the
performance, I regularly close my eyes for several minutes to experiment with the
sense of trust generated by the offer of shared intimacy in a public space. The
image is placed at eye-height to balance the power relation between performer and
viewer.
The intimacy invited by this work does not focus on seduction and sexual desire, but
on shared vulnerability and trust. In this case, the projected image does not
reference cinema, but experiments with a screen without a glass surface and a
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frame. The aesthetic choice of projecting the videoperformance suggests that the
performer is not addressing viewers from a separate space, but is softly present in
the same room.
Figure 0.7 Cinzia Cremona, Are You Talking to Me, 2010, video still.
Conversely, Are You Talking to Me (5’, 2010) experiments with the refusal to
engage in relationality with viewers by denying eye contact and focusing on the
internal dialogue of the performer. The split screen shows two images of myself
from two different angles appearing to try and address each other. My face is not
visible, and the high-pitch feedback sound interferes with my words and forms a
barrier for the viewer.
This work explores a situation in which the viewer in front of the screen is not
addressed directly, but evoked in the process of a dialogue internal to the
performer. There is a you, but there is no offer of engaging in a relationship,
although the possibility is evoked. Are You Talking to Me explores the implications
of focusing exclusively on the memories of formative relationships and on the voices
of the other/Other already present in the subject. It experiments with the negation of
relationality performed by a subject absorbed in a dialogue with the past. This work
exposes the dependence of mediated relationality on visual and aural strategies and
the interdependent processes of representation and performativity.
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Figure 0.8 Cinzia Cremona, Wish You Were Here, 2011, installation view at
Gooden Gallery, London.
Wish You Were Here (3’, 2011) explores the components that videoperformance
shares with screen-based communication platforms like Skype. It simulates a Skype
voicemail video message on a flat-screen monitor. This work adopts visual
strategies that address the potential interactivity of the screen, as well as
referencing networked screens and screen-based communication. I perform an
eccentrically optimistic recorded message that reassures the caller about the perfect
encounter we would have, if we were both present. A table set up for a romantic
dinner for two corroborates the promise. Wish You Were Here evokes ideas of
conviviality central to Nicholas Bourriaud’s book Relational Aesthetics (2002) and
mocks their inherent optimism. It bridges traditional videoperformance practice and
networked practices by implying the use of Skype.
This work explores the potential of the screen to evoke liveness, synchronicity and
relationality even when these are not present. It evidences the relevance of this
research project for the analysis of networked screens and interactive
videoperformances that adopt screens already loaded with these connotations. It
also suggests future developments for practice and research that extend into the in
depth analysis of the relational dynamics of those technologies.
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0.2 The Dissertation
The concepts and questions that emerge from this body of work are contextualised
in this dissertation. Writing and making have developed in combination with each
other as a coherent research process. This dissertation is divided into two parts –
the first outlines conceptual and artistic contexts, and the second analyses directly
the relational dynamics of videoperformance. The chapters analyse the theoretical
concepts that underpin a relational approach to videoperformance (chapter one), its
artistic historical and contemporary contexts (chapter two), three case studies of the
encounters between a specific viewer and performer and work (chapter three), and
the transformative potential of this practice in the framework of intersubjective
relationships (chapter four).
Chapter one traces the lineage of concepts and theories that inform the reading of
relationality in videoperformance proposed in this project. It maps the influence of
Lacan’s psychoanalytic theory of subjectivity and the gaze on film, performance and
moving image studies, before outlining the politics of gender, the concept of
performativity and theories of mediated relationality in art practices. Performance
studies (Phelan, 1993), technological materialism (‘digital materialism’, Manovich,
2002; ‘materialist aesthetics’, Cubitt, 1998), theories of the gaze (Lacan, 1977;
Grosz, 1991; Mulvey, 1989), of performativity (Jones, 1998, 2006; Butler, 1993,
1997) and of relationality (Bourriaud, 2002, Butler, 2004b, 2005, 2009) contextualise
and inform my videoperformances and their contemporary context. Similarly,
feminist theoretical approaches are discussed and contribute to an understanding of
the practice without foreclosing its potential multiple resonances. Relationality,
subjectivity, intersubjectivity, intimacy, power, interpellation and performativity are
expounded in the conceptual framework of critical theory. References to ethics are
from the perspective of Judith Butler’s social and political critical theory and do not
extend into moral philosophy.
Mapping psychoanalytic and post-psychoanalytic theories of subjectivity and the
gaze, and their influence on film, performance and moving image studies, this
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survey touches on the politics of gender, the concept of performativity and theories
of mediation in art practices. It aims to trace the debates that inform Intimation as a
practice-based research project in dialogue with performance, new media, moving
image and relational practices, as well as psychoanalytic, post- psychoanalytic and
performativity theories.
Chapter two surveys and examines the history and practices of videoperformance in
light of the contemporary concept of relationality and of the cross-fertilisation of the
frames of reference of video, performance and new media. It explores the shared
technological and conceptual history and convergence of videoperformance
practices with networked and performance practices. In this context, the term screen
refers to a variety of technologies developed and used to relay moving images,
games, communication and data. These uses mark the screen as such with
characteristics and connotations that inform its mediation of performance and
relationality. This chapter traces the common origins of the screen of television and
of telecommunication, and examines historical artworks that focus on their relational
possibilities. It traces the parallel histories of videoperformance and networked
practices, and surveys relevant contemporary approaches and tendencies in this
field.
Chapter three marks a change of register, as it shifts to performative writing and
expounds three videoperformances from a first person perspective. This writing
practice holds open the contradictions produced in videoperformance and
articulates them in forms that remain unstable, but can now be more easily
examined, although not exhausted, by critical analysis (Phelan, 1997; Jones, 2006).
This chapter hinges on the use of my subjectivity as a tool for researching the
interplay of subjectivity and relationality as a viewer of Vito Acconci’s Theme Song
(1973), Annie Abraham’s Theme Song revisited (After Acconci) (2011), and as the
maker of my own work Before You Now (2013), part of the body of work Intimations
(2007-2013). Making explicit how these works affect and produce aspects of
subjectivity from a first person perspective reveals dynamics of the emergence of
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relationality that could not otherwise be researched. Moreover, performative writing
maintains the liveness and performativity of the relational encounter, while re-
performing them in a form that is more easily integrated within critical analysis.
The two works by Acconci and Abrahams have been chosen as case studies
because they engage with key themes and strategies of relationality in
videoperformance – they evoke a viewer as you, intimacy, gendered subjectivity
and desire. Because of the different genders of the two artists, the gap in their
production date and their complementary approaches to relationality and
technology, these two works highlight different facets of the key processes of
mediated relationality. The first person account of the making of my last
videoperformance completes this chapter with insight on my working methodology
and its relational dynamics. Adopting performative writing to analyse my encounters
with relevant videoperformances and with the other beyond the video camera allows
me to approach relationality directly in the body of this text as it emerges and
dissipates with the encounter itself. The combination of these three encounters
reveals some key relational mechanisms: dynamics of the gaze, fragmentation of
subjectivity, transformation, awareness, unconscious desire and ethical questioning.
As these manifest the emergence of mediated performative relationality in
videoperformance and raise ethical questions, they function as material and
catalysts for the in-depth analysis of the last chapter.
Chapter four makes explicit and critically analyses the key processes that emerge in
the previous chapter without reducing them to general statement or foreclosing their
contradictions. The first person performed in chapter three returns as the
grammatical subject and as the object of analysis of chapter four as I examine the
positions I assume by participating in mediated relationships with Acconci and
Abrahams. This analysis focuses first on the psychic dynamics of power that inform
the process of interpellation (Butler, 1997c). It continues by examining aspects of
gender, subjectivity, intimacy, the gaze, performativity and mediation in the context
of the theories outlined in chapter one. This chapter and the conclusion do not
exhaust the gamut of processes, dynamics and affects that are activated in
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relationality, but demonstrate that videoperformance art practices can create
effective opportunities for awareness, reflection and, in some cases, transformation.
To summarise, this project proposes that videoperformance materializes the
relational interdependence of subjects in the framework of asymmetric and
asynchronous intimacy mediated by video camera and screen. This approach is
ethical in the sense proposed by Judith Butler: in my dependence on and
responsiveness to others is the source of my ethical responsibility for their survival
as subjects (Butler, 2009). The five videoperformances, the conceptual, historical
and artistic contextualization, the first person accounts and critical analysis of
encounters with videoperformance evidence the mechanisms of this process,
address the research questions and support the value of my proposition. This
bridges the gap between existing positions and offers an original approach from a
number of perspectives – firstly, it reviews historical videoperformance art practices
through the contemporary notions of relationality and performativity. This historical
analysis examines the shared histories of technologies and practices of broadcast
and telecommunication, and their convergence in the screen. The screen itself is
analyzed directly as an effective mediator, and as the pivotal element for processes
of transparent immediacy and hypermediacy (Bolter and Grusin, 2000). The screen
is also interrogated from the perspective of the continuous shifting of subjectivity
between unconscious desire and awareness. Most importantly, this project focuses
attention on relationality as a performative, and on videoperformance as an effective
transformative practice with political and ethical valence in the context of






From Subjectivity to Relationality
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This first chapter maps the conceptual framework that informs this research project.
It pays particular attention to the screen as the element that, ultimately, mediates
relationality. It is loosely divided into two parts.
First it traces the lineage of concepts and theories interrogated in the five works I
produced as part of Intimations. It delineates relevant Lacanian constructs, and
traces their transformations in Mulvey’s theory of the gendered gaze, in feminist and
postfeminist discourses, and in the post-psychoanalytical writing of Judith Butler and
Peggy Phelan, whose work is fundamental to the methodology of this project. This
theoretical interplay of discourses on subjectivity and relationality underpins the
discussion on mediated relationality in videoperformance in the second part of this
dissertation.
The second part of this chapter outlines relevant critical analyses of art practices,
mediums and concepts relevant to the investigation of mediated relationality in
videoperformance: from Bourriaud’s Relational Aesthetic (2002) to new media
studies, and from simulation to liveness and mediation (Auslander, 1999, and Bolter
and Grusin, 2000). These discourses inform my own work and videoperformance in
general as a practice that integrates technology and performance.
In this project, the terms subjectivity and subject integrate psychoanalytic, post-
psychoanalytic and political discourses in the footsteps of Judith Butler, who
combines a psychoanalytic approach with Foucault’s and Althusser’s analyses of
power and ideology (Butler, 1997c). In Althusser’s formulation of interpellation,
‘individuals are always-already interpellated by ideology as subjects’: the act of
calling out you or a name and the response that this elicits confirm the relative
positions of subjects in the context of the social norms that underpin ideology
(Althusser, 1971, p.119, emphasis in original). Here the subject is more ‘concrete’
than the individual and not just an abstract concept. (p.115). Similarly, Foucault
postulates ‘subjection as the simultaneous subordination and forming of the subject’
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(Butler, 1997c, p.7). In other words, the subject comes into being as an effect of the
dynamics of power and of social norms that are already in existence and precede
the subject itself. Both Althusser and Foucault contend that power is not external to
the subject, but integrated in the subject itself ‘in order that he [sic] shall (freely)
accept his subjection’ (Althusser, 1971, p.123). In Bodies that Matter, Butler
examines interpellation at work in the constitution of the subject at birth, when a
healthcare professional declares that the baby ‘is a girl!’ (Butler, 1993, p.XVII). The
first official calling out that produces the subject is, paradoxically, not directly
addressed to the individual, but produces the subject within interdependent systems
of gender, language, power, class, race, religion, etc. Successive interpellations
contribute to and strengthen this gendered subjectivity, adding to an unceasing
accumulation of identifications. Informed by the contingencies of personal history,
these identifications do not point back to an internal coherence of any kind, but aim
to match the expectations of coherence inscribed in social norms (Butler, 1990).
Whereas Althusser implies that interpellation is received passively, Butler
reformulates interpellation as ‘a scene of address’ that functions as a reciprocal
negotiation of relative positions within available models and tests the limits of
performable variations (Butler, 2005, p.50). From this perspective, subjectivity is
continuously produced as a performative in the act of addressing and being
addressed, although already situated in shared normativity. This implies that the
subject interpellated may accept or reject some aspects of the interpellations to
some extent, and in turn contribute to the emerging subjectivity of the interpellant. In
this framework, how does a subject reject or modify this originary interpellation?
How does ‘the subject constituted through the address of the Other becom[e] then a
subject capable of addressing others’? (Butler, 1997a, p.26).
Butler states that the ‘vulnerability to the Other is never overcome in the assumption
of agency’ (Butler, 1997a, p.26). In this framework, performativity is always impure,
based on citationality and iterability (Derrida, 1988). In other words, Butler bridges
Althusser’s account of interpellation and Austin’s linguistic definition of a
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performative utterance. J. L. Austin defines performativity as the quality of an
utterance that, by being uttered, performs an act, and restricts performativity to a
specific set of utterances under specific circumstances: rituals, ceremonies and
procedures. The words spoken in ‘the necessary conditions’ constitute the actions
verbalized (Austin, 1962, p.14). In the introduction to Performative Realism:
Interdisciplinary studies in art and media, Gade and Jerslev remark that ‘Austin
argues that performative speech acts are conventional and relational’ (Gade and
Jerslev, 2005, p.9, emphasis in original). In other words, language is action within a
set of social relations and conventions. Performative has since become a ubiquitous
term used with a number of associated meanings in relation to performance art
practice, technology and management studies. Jon McKenzie (2001) unravels this
cluster of meanings by mapping the historical and contemporary inflections of the
terms ‘performance’ and ‘performativity’, and their political, technological and
cultural associations.
Butler’s definition balances the formative power of existing and evolving social
relations, models and pressures with the fact that one can ‘[c]onsider gender, for
instance, as a corporeal style, an 'act,' as it were, which is both intentional and
performative, where 'performative' itself carries the double-meaning of 'dramatic'
and 'non-referential.' (Butler, 1988, pp.521-522). Significantly, a signifier (text,
utterance, representation, etc.) is performative in that it informs the subject that is
supposed to precede it. Butler suggests that the constructive power of performativity
lies in the combination of variations of repeat-performances of normative models:
whilst each repetition constitutes a citation of ‘an iterable model’, each different
performance extends the range of iterable models (Butler, 1993, p.XXI). From this
perspective, Butler’s work encompasses and transcends phenomenological and
psychoanalytic models of subjectivity to emphasize the political and cultural
resonances of performativity. Butler maintains that performativity is a practice of
citation of norms, but one which is not prescriptive, on account of its existence in
time and of the instability created by the interdependence of the various frames of
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reference: ‘[n]ormative schemes  are interrupted by one another, they emerge and
fade depending on broader operations of power, and very often come up against
spectral versions of what it is they claim to know.’ (Butler, 2009, p.4). In other words,
unstable subjects perform their subjectivities according to unstable sets of norms
and prohibitions, and in relation to other unstable subjects as they continuously
redefine each other and norms themselves.
Butler mobilises interpellation and performativity as complementary relational
dynamics generative of subjectivity and always at work between subjects. In this
context, performativity is understood as the power of discourse to constitute and
continually modify subjectivity, ‘not as the act by which a subject brings into being
what she/he names, but, rather, as the reiterative power of discourse to produce the
phenomena that it regulates and constrains’ (Butler, 1993, p.XII). Consequently,
subjectivity is a product of relationality – a series of continuously shifting
instantaneous performatives producing ways of being and, at the same time,
restricting them, particularly in relation to gender. The subject materially manifests
this position in active behaviours by repeating and citing appropriate gendered
attributes. Within these processes of repetition and citation, Butler complements the
normative and formative dynamics of power proposed by Althusser and Foucault
with the possibility of resistance and performativity attributed to the psyche by Freud
and Lacan: ‘the psyche, which includes the unconscious, is precisely what exceeds
the imprisoning effects of the discursive demand to inhabit a coherent identity, to
become a coherent subject.’ (Butler, 1997c, p.86). Lacan proposes an incomplete,
fragmented and unstable subject, marred by illusions of wholeness, awareness and
reciprocity, lead by unconscious desires and formed in relations mediated by
language. (Lacan, 2006). By merging psychoanalytic and political discourses, Butler
proposes a theory of ethical responsibility that informs equally intersubjective
relationships and social relations (Butler, 1997c; 2004a):
I speak as an “I”, but do not make the mistake of thinking that I know
precisely all that I am doing when I speak in that way. I find that my very
formation implicates the other in me, that my foreignness to myself is,
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paradoxically, the source of my ethical connection with others. Do I
need to know myself in order to act responsibility in social relations?
Surely, to a certain extent, yes. But is there ethical valence to my
unknowingness? … I cannot think the question of responsibility alone, in
isolation from the other. (Butler, 2005, p.84).
This key passage establishes the fragmentation of subjectivity as the condition of
the subject’s ‘responsiveness to others, even a condition of our responsibility for
them’ (p.88, emphasis in original). Butler proposes an ethical and political discourse
founded on the subject’s unknowingness and its ‘unwilled, unchosen’ susceptibility
to others inherent in its own formation (p.87).
Although Butler offers a post-psychoanalytic reading of subjectivity, it is important in
this context to define some Lacanian constructs that have been reinterpreted as part
of a number of theoretical approaches: other/Other, desire, unconscious, extimacy,
the real, encounter, repetition and, most importantly, the gaze. Jacques Lacan is not
the originator of the concept of gaze, but the thinker with whom the term is most
closely associated. Peter Wollen (2007) traces Lacan’s approach back to Hegel’s
distinction between animal and human desire, and highlights the importance of
Kojève’s interpretation of Hegel’s theory of the human gaze in this context. Lacan
states that ‘man’s [sic] desire is the desire of the Other’ (Lacan, 1998, p.38). In other
words, the subject desires to be the object of desire of the Other. The Other with a
capital O indicates the completely separate and different other, which relays the
weight of language and social norms, and which is radically alien. The Other informs
the unconscious and bears the gaze in a movement shaped like a Moebius strip: the
gaze originates in the unconscious desire of the subject and is attributed to the
Other as returning to the subject (Lacan, 1998, p.235). In this approach, subjectivity
is built on a series of relationships that convey social norms and rules (the law). The
Other then precedes the subject and continues to act upon it through language and
in the dynamics of the gaze. When the gaze is at work, the radical alterity of the
Other is reduced to a function of the subject itself and it becomes the other with a
small o, or object petit a.
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The object petit a embodies the function of confirming the symbolic appearance of
wholeness that the subject perceives in its mirror image (the ideal I) (Lacan, 2006,
p.76). Desire re-enacts foundational gender and power relations that Lacan traces
back to the infant’s relationships with its mother, father and its own image in the
mirror. The subject’s reflection in the mirror conveys a sense of totality and plenitude
that does not match present or future states, and that Lacan describes as ‘an
alienating identity’ (p.78). This foundational moment in the development of the
subject also constitutes ‘the threshold of the visible world’, as the subject begins to
perceive itself as part of the scopic field (p.77). Subjects progressively tend to
substitute the attachment to this impossible totality with relationships with others,
except in narcissism, where the subject remains bound by its own unconscious
desires and the gaze stops it from seeing others as subjects (as Other).
From this perspective, in the scopic field subjectivity is informed by its own relation
with the symbolic lack and by its visibility to others. This omnipresent disembodied
gaze carries the power of the Other – laws, rules and prohibitions that shape the
cultural and social environment in and through language, but also shape
unconscious desire itself. Whereas looking physiologically engages images and
appearances, the gaze activates the complex significance of objects and subjects,
engaging desire and language. Language and the Other shape the unconscious
and structure it into three orders – the real, the symbolic and the imaginary (Lacan,
1991). The imaginary is the field of imagination, images and illusions, and it is
structured by the symbolic order in the visual filed. The symbolic is the order of
normativity and the law. The real (or the Thing, from Freud’s 'Das Ding') is
undifferentiated as it cannot be accessed via the symbolic or imaginary orders. It
structures the unconscious and as such it pulsates in and out of consciousness
without being grasped or resolved.
From a relational perspective, Lacan maintains that although subjects can look into
each other’s eyes,
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the level of reciprocity between the gaze and the gazed at is, for the
subject, more open than any other to alibi. That is why we should try to
avoid, by our interventions in the session, allowing the subject to
establish himself on this level. On the contrary, we should cut him [sic]
off from this point of ultimate gaze, which is illusory (Lacan, 1998, p.77).
In this paragraph, reciprocity is qualified as both the ‘ultimate gaze’ and ‘illusory’.
The Latin root of alibi – ‘the old locative case of alius: another’ (Oxford English
Dictionary, 2014) – suggests the possibility that the gaze evokes other others while
appearing to operate in reciprocity with the present Other. The term alibi also
evokes an elsewhere, indicating that the illusion of reciprocity leads the subject to a
destination different from its interlocutor. Nevertheless, the meaning of the term
reciprocity incorporates, as well as mutuality and symmetry, an alternating
movement (Oxford English Dictionary, 2014). In other words, although Lacan
postulates the illusory quality of a contemporary and symmetrical reciprocity of the
gaze, he leaves open the possibility of an asynchronous, asymmetrical alternating
reciprocity.
The term alibi also resonates with Lacan’s definition of the unconscious as ‘another
place’ between perception and consciousness, which is also the place of the Other,
and where the subject is constituted (Lacan 1998, p.56). The primary process that
forms the unconscious and the subject is described here as a first encounter with
the real, which remains unresolved and unrealised. Chance events recall this first
encounter that tends to repeat as the same: ‘the real is that which always comes
back to the same place – to the place where the subject in so far as he [sic] thinks,
where the res cogitans, does not meet it.’ (p.49). In other words, the real always
comes back to the same place where the first missed encounter happened and
where thought (awareness, consciousness) refuses to go. Central to the subject and
to the unconscious is the oscillation (or pulsation, in Lacan’s words) between
‘automaton’ and ‘tuché’ – two terms first proposed by Aristotle and adopted to
indicate respectively the return within a network of signifiers, and the encounter with
the real (Lacan, 1998, p.53). The automaton activates reproduction – ‘a making
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present, in act’ or ‘the return, the coming-back, the insistence of the signs’ (p.50 and
p.53). On the other hand, in the tuché a formative past event that remains
unresolved is repeated, without being reproduced. This primary encounter with the
real gains the quality of being missed as its memory and legacy continue to activate
desire and to bring the real to the surface (Lacan, 1998).
This pulsation describes the continuous appearance and disappearance of the
unconscious (consequently of the real and of desire) to consciousness. Lacan
maintains that ‘[t]he dynamic that is attached to the consciousness as such, the
attention the subject brings to his [sic] own text, remains up to this point, as Freud
has stressed, outside theory and, strictly speaking, not yet articulated’ (Lacan, 1998,
p.83). In this quote, Lacan clarifies that the subject of psychoanalysis is the subject
in the power of the unconscious and of desire. Lacan does not state that it is
impossible for subjects to bring attention to their own speech, actions, or
relationships, but that the dynamic of consciousness has not yet been articulated in
theory. In other words, this theory – psychoanalysis – has not yet articulated the
dynamic of consciousness, but only the dynamic of the unconscious, and of
subjects for whom consciousness and bringing attention to their own text is an ideal
and leads to ‘méconnaissance’: misrecognition.
Within Lacanian analytical theory, the artwork avoids the gaze, which acts as a ‘trap
for the gaze’ (Lacan, 1998, p.101). Lacan suggests that when approaching an
artwork, a viewer is invited to ‘lay down his [sic] gaze there as one lays down one’s
weapons,’ (p.101). In other words, the artwork is incapable of bearing and returning
the gaze of the subject, and viewers are left to look, watch and listen. In
videoperformance, the screen relays the fluctuation between gaze and awareness
of the performer herself, and offers the opportunity for performative reciprocal
relationality to emerge. Thus, the image of the performer on screen oscillates
between the functions of image/artwork and of other/Other, shifting in and out of the
gaze, awareness and the encounter with the real.
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In Lacan’s theories, the dynamics of gaze and desire reflect and perpetuate the
dominant patriarchal structure, particularly in the different relation men and women
have with the phallus (symbolic of power). This has stimulated a number of feminist
thinkers to utilise this approach to expose gender inequalities embedded in
language and culture. This chapter does not aim to present an account of feminist
elaborations of psychoanalysis, but to identify some significant voices that have
influenced the discourses on relationality and intersubjectivity relevant to this
analysis of videoperformance. In this context, Laura Mulvey stands as a seminal
figure for her early investigation of moving image and photographic practices in
relation to psychoanalytic constructs. Mulvey’s examination of the dynamics of the
gaze in classic Hollywood cinema has been influencing the reading of moving image
work and gender relations since the publication of Visual Pleasure and Narrative
Cinema in the journal Screen in 1975. This extensively quoted essay postulates that
the narrative structure of classic Hollywood films perpetuates the patriarchal
phallocentric pattern of passive female and active male roles. In this cinematic
tradition, the different symbolic relations with the phallus (signifier of power) are
reproduced in the narrative positions of characters – female figures are exposed to
be looked at and are punished if they act outside the rules of patriarchy, whilst male
figures drive the narrative. In Mulvey’s view, this fosters in spectators the
association of active gaze with the male gender and of passive ‘to-be-looked-at-
ness’ with the female gender (Mulvey, 1975, p.11).
Despite the precise delimitation of materials in this analysis, these considerations on
viewers’ gaze in relation to gender representation in moving image art practices
cannot be overlooked. Mulvey states her intention to appropriate psychoanalytic
theory ‘as a political weapon, demonstrating the way the unconscious of patriarchal
society has structured film form.’ (p.6). More generally, she combines the
association between the image of woman as lacking the phallus with an analysis of
the representation of woman on screen, aiming to destroy the pleasure in looking
structured in the patriarchal order by analysing its mechanisms ‘in order to conceive
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a new language of desire.’ (p.8). In this analysis of Freudian and Lacanian
concepts, the gendered gaze is examined in relation to the images on screen.
Mulvey identifies the erotic male pleasure of looking at his other (woman) as an
object of his desire (scopophilia) as central to the relationship between spectator
and moving image representation. She also highlights the complementary fear of
castration associated with this gaze (and the association between image of woman
and lack) and the narcissistic gaze of spectators in the misrecognition of the
character on screen as an image of the wholeness of their subjectivity. Also
published in Screen in 1975, Christian Metz’s The Imaginary Signifier sets out a
parallel psychoanalytic approach to cinema. This author analyses ‘the spectator-
screen relationship as a mirror identification’ and a ‘fantasy relation’ (Metz, 1975,
p.18). Both Mulvey and Metz regard the screen of cinema not as a mediator of
relationships, but as an object that spectators adopt for a continuation of their inner
dialogue generated by formative relationships (the objet petit a). Moreover, they
both adopt a transitive concept of the gaze, originating with the spectator and
targeting the character on screen, whilst Lacan proposes a gaze returning to the
subject that originates it.
In the introduction to the collection of essays Visual and Other Pleasures, Mulvey
recontextualises her approach to male and female gaze by commenting that in 1975
‘[t]he priority was to establish the psyche’s political reality and its manifestations in
image and representation.’ (Mulvey, 1989, p. xii). Afterthoughts to Visual Pleasure
(1989), redresses the gender-imbalanced association between active/male and
passive\female by positing that the female spectator can assume a male gaze and
partake of the active identification with the hero in the narrative. This does not
contradict the analysis in the original essay, as it confirms the assumption that the
representation of woman in the moving image signifies lack of the phallus, passivity,
sexuality and to-be-looked-at-ness. A more sophisticated elaboration of the female
gaze appears in Mulvey’s writing of the 1990s: the collection of essays Fetishism
and Curiosity (1996), and the essay Pandora’s Box: Topographies of Curiosity in
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particular, develop what was a passing observation in Visual Pleasure and Narrative
Cinema. The curious gaze – animated by the desire to know – is an active gaze
available to women. Nevertheless, Mulvey does not posit the active feminine
curious gaze (summed up by the concept and dynamics of fetishism), as a
theoretical replacement for the objectifying male gaze, but as an ongoing dialogue
and productive tension. Fetishism allows the paradoxical contemporary presence of
knowledge and belief, which can be seen as parallel to the productive tension
between awareness (consciousness) and the gaze. Tracing the influence of Visual
Pleasure and Narrative Cinema on film criticism and moving image practices, Jane
Gaines (1990) emphasises how focusing on the psychoanalytic power of narrative
and male visual pleasure fostered a limiting modernist counter-culture of aesthetic
disruption of editing, of camera angles and of continuity. But in the essay Cosmetics
and Abjection: Cindy Sherman 1977-87, Mulvey discusses an ‘oscillation effect’ as
an indication of postmodern aesthetics: ‘The viewer looks, recognises a style or
trope, doubts, does a doubletake [sic], recognises the quotation; and meanings shift
and change their reference like shifting perceptions of perspective from an optical
illusion.’ (Mulvey, 1996, p.73).
This shift from modern to postmodern aesthetics echoes the shift from feminism to
postfeminism identified by Elisabeth Wright as a ‘strategic move made by feminism
… to consider more directly what the postmodern notion of the dispersed unstable
subject might bring it.’ (Wright, 2000, pp.4-5). Whilst the Lacanian premise of the
importance of language in the formation of subjectivity remains axiomatic, the
female body becomes a critical source of ‘the subversiveness of writing the
feminine’ (p.7). In Jacques Lacan: A Feminist Introduction, Elizabeth Grosz
sketches the uneasy relationship between feminisms and psychoanalysis, and the
relative positions from which feminist thinkers have dialogued with Lacanian and
Freudian constructs. Her two categories of ‘dutiful daughters’ and ‘defiant women’
are embodied by Julia Kristeva, who accepts ‘Lacan’s conception of an unknowable
feminine jouissance’ that woman experiences in her pre-oedipal connection with the
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real, and Luce Irigaray, who conducts ‘an exploration of a new theoretical space and
language which may be able to undermine patriarchal and phallocentric domination
of the sphere of representations and, more positively, to provide a mode of
representation for women as women.’ (Grosz, 1991, p.163 and p.168).
In this postmodern and poststructuralist context, Peggy Phelan directly addresses
the limitations of discussing the relationship between image and looker on the basis
of representation: ‘[a]s a representation of the real the image is always, partially,
phantasmatic. In doubting the authenticity of the image, one questions as well the
veracity of she who makes and describes it.’ (Phelan, 1993, p.1). In other words, the
image that attempts to represent a dispersed unstable subject cannot relay the
totality of this subject – just like the signifier cannot convey the whole meaning of
the signified – but, also, it is haunted by a supplement evoked by the image itself.
Far from evoking a totality that the fragmented subject cannot match, the image
questions its own referent, and suggests a subject that is, at the same time, not
enough and too much. Phelan advocates a shift from the narcissistic gaze – the
subject seeking confirmation of its own totalising image from the other – to a gaze
that has already accepted its lack of totality, and which can therefore offer and seek
more ethically sound modulations of relationality. This approach re-invests the other
and the gaze with a constructive political purpose by utilising ‘the productive power
of facing the inevitability of annihilation, castration, misrecognition. For if one could
face these features of psychic life, a different order of sociality might be possible.’
(Phelan. 1993, p.25). This post-psychoanalytic ethical stance resonates with
Butler’s position expounded above, and supports this project’s analysis of
videoperformance art practice as capable of intervening in intersubjective
relationships and social relations.
Phelan’s project of reconfiguring the interplay of the politics of representation with
the Lacanian discourse on appearances, and a wider sense of interpersonal
relationality and sociality forms an important part of the methodology of this project.
Phelan proposes to re-examine the productive ‘relationship between the real and
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the representational, between the looker and the given to be seen, [as] a version of
the relation between self and other.’ (Phelan. 1993, p.3). On this basis, the politics
of representation and of the gaze do not dominate the encounter with the other, but
become part of a wider discourse about relationality and sociality:
While there has been much written about the gaze, particularly by
feminist film theorists and art historians, insufficient attention has been
paid to the desire for a reciprocal gaze. The desire to see is a
manifestation of the desire to be seen, in live performance as well as in
the spectator’s relation to inanimate representation. (p.18).
Although Phelan is credited with privileging the encounter of live performance over
that of other art mediums, she also states that ‘[e]xamining the politics of the
exchange of gaze across these diverse representational mediums [photographs,
paintings, films, theatre, political protests, and performance art] leads to an
extended definition of the field of performance.’ (p.4). Within this expanded field, live
performance art practice retains the exclusive quality of being ‘nonreproductive’
(p.148). In this context, the term reproduction references Walter Benjamin’s
discourse on technological reproduction in relation to the original artwork in
industrial production systems and in the exchange economy of capitalism (Phelan,
2001, p.36). But Phelan also comments that ‘[w]hen Benjamin considered the loss
of originality in the work of art in the age of mechanical reproduction, he did not fully
anticipate the role of temporality at the heart of the living performative encounter
with art.’ (Phelan, 2001, p. 45). ‘Temporality’ evokes here the different layers of
meaning that resonate around an artwork at different times, even at short intervals
and for the same subject, as each encounter performatively enacts the subjectivities
and relationships of viewer and work/artist anew.
Amelia Jones’s (2006) notion of performativity complements Phelan’s by focusing
on the body: she analyses the production of subjectivity as a performative in the
encounter between the body of the viewer and the represented body of the artist in
photography, videoperformance, film and digital mediums, but, in contrast to
Phelan, does not extend this analysis to sociality and relationality. As the body is
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itself already representational (for example, as a bearer of symptoms), these
mediated encounters enact the foundational intersubjectivity that informs the
development of embodied subjects in the first instance. Jones maintains that
‘[t]hese projects insistently pose the subject as intersubjective (contingent on the
other) rather than complete within itself.’ (Jones, 2006, p.10). She articulates
our relationship to the photograph of another subject’s body (Aguilar’s,
for example) through what Merleau-Ponty calls intercorporeity: the
“coiling over of the visible upon the visible” which animates other bodies
besides our own; we understand that the screen is profound – that “what
is proper to the visible is … to be the surface of an inexhaustible depth.”
(Jones, 2006, p.68).
It is interesting to compare Jones’s analysis of intersubjectivity in videoperformance
with Rosalind Krauss’s proposition that the raw material of videoperformance is
narcissism. Krauss equates the physical positioning of video camera and monitor
either side of the artist's body to 'an opening and closing parenthesis' that creates a
situation of 'self-encapsulation' (Krauss, 1976, p.52). In other words, the artist turns
his gaze onto himself closing a feedback loop that excludes the viewer. Krauss
applies the psychoanalytic concept of narcissism to the practice of the performer
watching oneself on the monitor whilst producing a videoperformance. She focuses
on the screen in its function of mirror for the performer, ignoring how this use of the
monitor may function for viewers. Whereas Krauss sees performers talking to
themselves and confirming their own self-sufficiency, Jones positions herself as the
addressee of the artist’s gestures and words. Although Jones proposes a
permeable tactile screen, mediator of intersubjective processes, her discourse folds
back onto itself to point at how these dynamics construct subjectivities. By adopting
a phenomenological perspective, Jones re-instates a dominant transitive gaze – an
embodied gaze that encounters the other’s represented and mediated gaze, and
recognises it as also embodied. The representation of the artist’s body absorbs its
own material support so that ‘the video screen becomes the skin/the body’ (Jones,
1998, p.200, emphasis in original). In this phenomenological approach, the
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relationships activated by the encounters between screens and bodies/selves are
instrumental to the emergence of subjects and not the focus of analysis.
Jones assimilates Laura U. Marks’s concept of haptic images as images that ‘do not
invite identification with a figure so much as they encourage a bodily relationship
between the viewer and the image.’ (Marks, 2002, p.3). Whilst Marks proposes a
narrow definition of haptic images as low resolution, fragmented and difficult to read
– as these qualities move viewers’ focus towards the surface of the video as if this
was its skin – she also offers a theoretical premise to articulate the relationality
mediated by the screen. Referring to Sobchack (1992) and her understanding of
‘viewing as an exchange between two bodies’, Marks conceives of an act of viewing
in which ‘both I and the object of my vision constitute each other’ (Marks, 2002,
p.13). Marks and Sobchack develop their argument on the phenomenological
premises of an embodied viewer in-the-world, and conceive of screens and moving
images as relational and active in themselves (Sobchack, 1994). These authors
share with Jones the vision of an embodied subjectivity, whose being-in-the-world is
also informed by ‘televisual bodies’ and by ‘encounters – both direct and indirect –
with the objective phenomena of photography, cinematic, televisual, and computer
technologies and the networks of communication and texts they produce.’ (Jones,
2006 and Sobchack, 2004, p.136, emphasis in original).
These authors deploy embodiment and affects as theoretical positions that
counterpoint the perceived Lacanian emphasis on language. Lacan himself clarifies
that he aims to maintain the indissoluble link between language and affect, without
establishing any artificial separation and hierarchy (Lacan, 1991). A possible
definition of affect as ‘synonymous with force or forces of encounter’ reveals
resonances with concepts of the real and with dynamics of relationality (Seigworth
and Gregg, 2010, p.2, emphasis in original). Although theories of affect vary in focus
and premises, they generally attempt to rebalance the perceived dominance of
language in critical theory by privileging emotions, the body, becomings, and by
postulating the possibility of ‘unmediated relatedness’ (Seigworth and Gregg, 2010,
51
p.4). Conversely, Lacan maintains that ‘[t]he affective is not like a special density
which would escape an intellectual accounting. It is not to be found in a mythical
beyond of the production of the symbol which would precede the discursive
formulation.’ (Lacan, 1991, p.57). In the unconscious, affects are bound to thoughts
and past encounters, and ‘structured like a language’ (Lacan, 1998, p.20, emphasis
in original). Contrary to his deliberate attempts not to separate affect and cognition,
this author has been frequently accused of privileging language over emotions (for
example, Seigworth and Gregg, 2010). To counterpoint this perceived imbalance,
writers like Bracha Ettinger (2006) highlight the affective and embodied component
of encounter, intimacy and events that resist signification. Ettinger proposes an
encounter-event rooted in prebirth bodily and psychic intimate sharing in which
intersubjectivity is co-produced (Ettinger, 2006). This is the framework of what
Ettinger names the matrixial, which offers a complementary feminine symbolic
structure to the Lacanian phallus. Branislava Kuburovic applies Ettinger’s approach
to the encounter-event to examine the ‘space where traumas are redefused’ in the
mediated intimate encounters of performance and videoperformance
(Chatzichristodoulou and Zerihan, 2012, p.40). Kuburovic suggests that affect is the
‘main means of exchange’ of intimacy and, following Ettinger, inverts the position of
some Lacanian terms, proposing, for example, that intimacy provokes a collapse of
the alibi (defined as ‘elsewhere’) (p.41).
Theories of affect resonate with the Lacanian concept of ‘extimacy’ – an
understanding of intimacy with the other as carrier of the Other that defies the
distinction between interiority and exteriority, and that highlights the subject as a
loose, distributed entity (Lacan, 1992, p.139). The Other informs the unconscious of
the subject, and lies at the same time inside and outside the subject, making this
distinction (inside/outside) unnecessary. This understanding of intimacy is
fundamental to a concept of relationality that does not reside in the subject, in the
videoperformance, between subjects or between subject and screen, but that
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emerges as a performative in encounters that are intimate, mediated and
ephemeral.
To maintain these qualities of the encounter with performance in their critical
practice, Phelan and Jones develop the method of ‘performative writing’ (Phelan,
1993, p.148). This methodology evokes subjectivity as and in relation:
Thinking about writing as a material practice, I want to stipulate a more
specific sense of the performative self or subjectivity as the performed
relation between or among subjects, the dynamic engagement of a
contingent and contiguous (rather than continuous) relation between the
writer and his/her subject(s), subject-selves, and/or reader(s) (Pollock,
1998, p.86).
In Mourning Sex, Phelan states that she wants performative writing ‘to enact the
effective force of the performance event again, as it plays itself out in an ongoing
temporality made vivid by the psychic process of distortion’ (Phelan, 1997, p.12). In
more general terms, Della Pollock describes performative writing as ‘evocative’,
‘metonymic’, ‘subjective’, ‘nervous’, ‘citational’ and ‘consequential’. (Pollock, 1998,
p.80). Whilst Phelan relies on these qualities to re-enact in writing the process of
disappearance of live performance, Jones (2006) deploys them to re-enact the
interdependent subjectivity of performer and viewer in her writing on live and
mediated performances.
Amelia Jones focuses closely on the transformations that her subjectivity undergoes
as she fully engages with the embodied subjectivity of the artist, and maintains that
videoperformance puts the subjectivities of artist and viewer in active contact. She
defines body art as a broader and narrower category of practices than performance
art:
[t]he term "body art" thus emphasizes the implication of the body (or
what I call the "body/self," with all of its apparent racial, sexual, gender,
class, and other apparent or unconscious identifications) in the work. …
I am interested in works … that take place through an enactment of the
artist’s body, whether it be in a “performance” setting or in the relative
privacy of the studio (Jones, 1998, p.13).
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Although Jones presupposes ‘a “disintegrated” or “dispersed” self’, she also
positions the body as the ‘“hinge’ between nature and culture’, fixing it as reliable
centre of subjective experience (p.13). Jones’s art critical practice develops in
dialogue with artworks and artists, selectively integrating concepts from the
psychoanalytic tradition into a phenomenological, embodied and affect-centred
approach. The self remains the centre of her analysis and discourse, although she
also acknowledges this embodied self as ’dialectically articulated in relation to
others in a continually negotiated exchange of desires and identifications’ (Jones,
1998, p.3). From this perspective, relationality remains subordinated to the
embodied performing and viewing selves. Conversely, Nicolas Bourriaud succeeds
in focusing attention on the relational processes in participatory and performative art
practices.
Bourriaud adopts Guattari’s ‘polyphonic definition of subjectivity’ as ‘modelled on the
difference which forms it itself, on the principle of otherness’ and approaches the
gaze via film critic Serge Daney: ‘[t]he work tries to catch my gaze, the way the new-
born child “asks for” its mother’s gaze.’ (Bourriaud, 2002, pp.90-91 and p.23). Not
an academic conceptualization of relational processes, but a collection of the
curator’s statements about approaches emerging in contemporary art in the 1990s,
this text nevertheless crystallizes the association of the term relational with a
particular set of contemporary art practices and projects. Developed from a
curatorial perspective, Relational Aesthetics (2002) redeploys concepts from Marxist
theory via Althusser’s late writing (encounter) and from Lacanian psychoanalysis via
film theory (the gaze and desire) to support the proposition that artistic form ‘only
assumes its texture (and only acquires a real existence) when it introduces human
interactions. … The artistic practice thus resides in the invention of relations
between consciousness [sic]’ (Bourriaud, 2002, p.22). Relations are generically
defined as ‘relations outside the field of art (in contrast to relations inside it,
structuring its socio-economic underlay): relations between individuals and groups,
between the artist and the world, and, by way of transitivity, between the beholder
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and the world.’ (p.26). Specifically interested in the interstice and in conviviality as
relational forms, Bourriaud clarifies that
the purpose is not conviviality, but the product of this conviviality.
Otherwise put, a complex form that combines a formal structure, objects
made available to visitors, and the fleeting image issuing from collective
behaviour.’ (Bourriaud, 2002, p.83, emphasis in original).
Approaching relationality in art practice from a different perspective, Grant Kester
(2004) develops the more explicitly political concept of dialogical aesthetics. Based
on ethical principles derived from Bakhtin and Levinas, dialogical practices also
sustain a sense of subjectivity built through face-to-face dialogue. Kester maintains
that this approach ‘requires that we understand the work of art as a process of
communicative exchange rather than a physical object.’ (Kester, 2004, p.90). Whilst
Bourriaud promotes art practices based of convivial relationality, Kester focuses on
overtly political interventions in the process of sociality.
Despite the vague meaning given to ‘relations with the world’ and ‘human
relationships’ throughout the book, Relational Aesthetics makes a strong case for
the performative relational power of the ‘constructed situations’ of performance and
moving image works. The chapter Screen Relations opens with a statement about
the convergence of cinematic, video and computer display devices towards the
screen, which is read as a symptom of a contemporary way of looking. Yet,
Bourriaud fails to analyze and develop the reciprocal influences between moving
image, performance, networked art practices and relational concerns, despite
observing in passing that ‘in the nineties’ art, while interactive technologies
developed at an exponential rate, artists were exploring the arcane mysteries of
sociability and interaction.’ (Bourriaud, 2002, p.70). Josephine Bosma addresses a
similar criticism to Bourriaud based on the observation that new media artists create
a sense of conviviality and hospitality to capture the attention of the audience:
‘These environments develop a personal relationship between artist and audience,
even if this relationship at times represents only a shadow of the concrete realities
of real person to person interactions.’ (Bosma, 2006, p.34). Bosma understands the
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Internet as an intimate space in which anybody can create mediated but close
relationships with anybody else. As the Internet itself splinters into a variety of
personal and mobile media, this becomes an increasingly common experience. In
this context, Bosma fails to note that the screen is the main interface of these
increasingly relational experiences.
Anna Munster (2005) considers relational aesthetics a fad, and proposes instead
networked and distributed aesthetics:
[a] distributed aesthetics, then, might be better characterised as a
continuous emergent project, situated somewhere between the drift
away from coherent form and the drift of aesthetics into relations with
new formations, including social (networked) formations. (Munster and
Lovink, 2005).
In other words, the network is in constant expansion and impossible to capture in an
overview. In this continual process of change, intersubjective and social relations
shift and emerge reconfigured. Relations, artworks and artefacts do not consolidate
in fixed states, media or boundaries; they have no controllable context of end-use,
and are navigated as hypertext, mashed, re-performed and remediated (Munster,
2006). Moreover, ‘[n]ew media are increasingly distributed media and they require a
rethink of aesthetics beyond the twinned concepts of form and medium that
continue to shape analysis of the social and the aesthetic’ (Munster and Lovink,
2005). The expression ‘new media’ functions as a ‘shorthand for a range of
practices and names, including [digital art,] “art and technology”, “computer art”,
“systems art”, and so on’ (Paul, 2008a, p.13). Its meaning changes with the
emergence of new technologies and their possibilities, and it is generally used to
indicate a focused use of recently developed technological tools. Munster and
Lovink propose to shift the focus from new to networked and acknowledge the
distributed relationality of art processes and practices that are inevitably informed by
networked technologies:
New media … require a distributed aesthetics. Distributed aesthetics
must deal simultaneously with the dispersed and the situated, with
asynchronous production and multi-user access to artifacts (both
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material and immaterial) on the one hand, and the highly individuated
and dispensed allotment of information/media, on the other. (Munster
and Lovink, 2005)
Conversely, Lev Manovich (2002) examines the role of technological tools from a
formalist and materialist perspective. He describes his approach as digital
materialism, and proposes to read the shift in the functions of screens from
‘classical’ (Renaissance painting), to ‘dynamic’ (moving image such as cinema and
video), ‘real-time’ (television and radar) and ‘interactive’ (computer) screens
(Manovich, 2002, p.103). His analysis rests on a sense of evolution of the concept
of representation away from static images: as dynamic and real-time screens
display the products of scanning processes, producing, at times, only impressions of
static images, Manovich proposes a ‘new kind of representation for which we do not
yet have a term.’ (p.100). Moreover, interactive screens ‘change our concept of
what an image is – because they turn the viewer into an active user.’ (p.183).
Examining telepresence – ‘being “present” in a real remote physical location via a
live video image’ – telecommunication and teleaction, this writer theorizes an
integrated aesthetics of users interacting with representations, users accessing
information and users telecommunicating with others (p.165).
Surprisingly, Manovich maintains that
‘[d]espite persistent experiments of avant-garde artists with the modern
technologies of real-time communication – radio in the 1920s, video in
the 1970s, the Internet in the 1990s – the ability to communicate over a
physical distance in real time did not seem by itself to inspire
fundamentally new aesthetic principles the way film or tape recording
did.’ (p.162).
This statement seems surprising because it implies that film and tape recording by
themselves inspired ‘… fundamentally new aesthetic principles’. Manovich appears
to exclude from this process the influence of television, and to ignore the fact that
the technologies of photography, film and tape recording developed in parallel with
those that made telecommunication possible (Gere, 2006a). In fact, in the United
States in 1927 the
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[f]irst public transmission of television pictures over telephone lines,
using a prototype two-way television system, Picture Telephone, is
made by American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T) in US
over 200 miles from New Jersey to Washington DC … . Secretary of
Commerce Herbert Hoover and the AT&T president Walter Gifford
speak to each other (Fisher, 2009).
Figure 1.1 AT&T President Walter Gifford leads the first American demonstration
of television in 1927.
The history of the television screen – and, by extension, of the video screen – and
the history of personal communication are tightly woven from their origins. Early
computer screens were based on the same technology used to display television
images (Bellis, 1997-2014). In a sense, the screens of television and computers
have recently re-converged after a variety of intermediate technological phases.
More recently video facilities have become integrated into mobile phones, and have
allowed users to record, watch and share visual messages within small time
intervals. Since smartphones started to converge with videophones and
cameraphones in 2004 (Nokia 7650) the touchscreen has become a common
experience, and has added another relational dimension to the screen itself
(Webdesigner Depot, s.d.). This convergence of technologies and screens has been
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associated with the idea of intermedia, a term developed in the context of the Fluxus
art movement in the 1960s. Yvonne Spielmann understands intermedia as ‘a
concept of merging based on historically separate developments. In the case of
digital media, all different media are integrated; that is to say they merge with each
other within the same technical structure.’ (Spielmann, 2005, pp.133-134). From this
perspective, the screen is re-converging – returning to its original, undifferentiated
use as visual display.
In 1970, Gene Youngblood observed that the intermedia network of television,
cinema and communication technologies were the privileged system for ‘seeing
each other’ and ‘dealing with each other’ – for interpersonal relationships: ‘[a] major
factor in living in an overpopulated world is that we really cannot deal with each
other directly.’ (Youngblood, 1970, p.351, emphasis in original). Youngblood
foresaw the ‘need to realize that we can’t really see each other face to face. We
only see each other through the subconsciousness of some other system.’ (p.351).
The convergence of the power of television, cinema, satellite and
telecommunication technologies suggests to Youngblood the end of mass audience
and the potential for ‘[t]he intermedia network [to] become metabolically and
homeostatically interfaced with each human being.’ (p.128). Youngblood perceives
the potential of ‘expanded cinema’ as an interdisciplinary field of moving images
manifesting human consciousness outside our bodies, and facilitating
communication and relationality at the level of thought – ‘an era of image-exchange
between man and man [sic].’ (p. 49). ‘Image’ is not understood here as
representation, but as simulation, as ‘the reality of a process of perception.’ (p.46).
Consequently, the screens of television, cinema and telecommunication – as the
mediators of simulations – are theorized as the transparent interface of both
relationality and consciousness.
Whereas for Youngblood the reality of simulation consists in its close links with the
processes of perception, for Jean Baudrillard (1981) simulation precedes reality, so
that to appear real an event is forced to approximate its own mediatised simulation.
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As the experience of accessing facts and people through their simulations becomes
ubiquitous and indispensable, it becomes necessary to judge the veracity of a fact
on the basis of how it is reported and represented. This produces the phenomenon
of the hyperreal, which
no longer measures itself against either an ideal or a negative instance.
It is no longer anything but operational. In fact, it is no longer really the
real, because no imaginary envelops it anymore. It is a hyperreal,
produced from a radiating synthesis of combinatory models in a
hyperspace without atmosphere.’ (Baudrillard, 1981, p.2).
Whilst Youngblood optimistically attributes the need for simulation to ‘living in an
overpopulated world’ and not being able to ‘deal with each other directly’,
Baudrillard pessimistically perceives simulation and the hyperreal as products of the
corrosive power of capital, with its vested interest in establishing ‘a radical law of
equivalence and exchange.’ (Baudrillard, 1981, p.22). In other words, the 1970s’
belief that simulation could enhance and foster real interpersonal relationships is
overtaken by the postmodern view that all relationships are already imitating
existing simulations, filtered through the codes of power and capitalism. From this
perspective, not only simulated and mediated relationships have no foundation of
truth, but also real face-to-face relationships are as false as their own simulations in
the pervasive hyperreal.
Conversely, Philip Auslander maintains that a cultural environment shaped by the
overbearing influence of television (and, increasingly, of the Internet) ‘raises for me
the question of whether there really are clear-cut ontological distinctions between
live forms and mediatized ones.’ (Auslander, 1999, p.7). For Auslander, live events
are ‘becoming ever more like mediatized ones’ (p.7). To support this statement, he
remarks that ‘[t]he fact that television can “go live” at any moment to convey sight
and sound at a distance in a way no other medium can remains a crucial part of the
televisual imaginary’ (pp.12-13). Auslander proposes that television is perceived as
relaying a sense of liveness and facticity even when images are known to be
60
recorded or fictional, yet neither author addresses the screen as the mediator of this
liveness.
This indifference to the mediator of these processes could be attributed to the
perceived transparency of the screen itself. Bolter and Grusin theorize this
phenomenon in light of ‘our apparently insatiable desire for immediacy’ (Bolter and
Grusin, 2000, p.5). They discuss the twinned processes of immediacy – or
transparency – and hypermediacy as two interdependent practices that shape our
current immersion in a world saturated by reproduced images so often mediated by
screens. The logic of transparent immediacy manifests a desire for an interface ‘that
erases itself, so that the user is no longer aware of confronting a medium, but
instead stands in an immediate relationship to the contents of that medium.’ (Bolter
and Grusin, 2000, p.24, emphasis added). Applied to videoperformance, this
statement would suggest a desire for an immediate – or unmediated – relationship
between performer and viewer. The logic of hypermediacy on the other hand makes
viewers and users aware of the medium, and ‘expresses the tension between
regarding a visual space as mediated and as a "real” space that lies beyond
mediation.’ (p.41). Media imitate and layer each other’s formal devices, exploiting
established marks of authenticity: ‘Whenever one medium seems to have convinced
viewers of its immediacy, other media try to appropriate that conviction.’ (p.9).
Hypermediacy evokes immediacy, as multiplying the visual references to already
established formal devices makes a less familiar medium more transparent.
Media-literate twenty-first century audiences of screen-mediated moving images are
able to shift between awareness of the medium and a – more or less direct –
relationship with the reality it conveys. The authors quote Lanham’s reading of this
phenomenon as ‘the tension between looking at and looking through’ (Bolter and
Grusin, 2000, p.41, emphasis in original). Bolter and Grusin also draw a parallel
between this dynamic within modern art and within the modes of ‘digital
representation’ analyzed in the book Remediation: ‘What characterizes modern art
is an insistence that the viewer keep coming back to the surface’ (p.41).
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Sherry Turkle also references Lanham, but in relation to computers and
postmodernism:
Lanham puts technology and postmodernism together and concludes
that the computer is a “fulfilment of social thought.” But I believe the
relationship is a two-way process. … Computers embody postmodern
theory and bring it down to earth. (Turkle, 1995, p.18).
Turkle (1995, 2011) examines in the first instance the rapid expansion of computer-
mediated relationality, and later the increasing dependence of relationality on this
mediation. Her analysis encompasses the study of intimate mediated relationships,
for example with virtual therapists and in teenagers’ friendships, but remains rooted
in psychology. Despite the title of her book Life on the Screen (2011), the screen
itself is not analysed, and often the term is used metonymically to indicate the
computer or the Internet. Conversely, Michele White offers a detailed analysis of
Internet and computer spectatorship, integrating psychoanalytic film theory and a
subtle attention to gender differences with sophisticated observations about
technological mediators:
A variety of devices in Internet and computer settings make
representations seem like an extension of the spectator’s lived space.
Referring to the computer screen image even metaphorically as the
“desktop” encourages the spectator to understand the accompanying
images as a continuation of the desk, home office, or workplace. (White,
2006, p.17).
White argues that ‘[s]pectators are encouraged to accept Internet conventions
because the setting is depicted as animate, physical, and unmediated’ (p.19).
Viewers/users are addressed directly as you to imply face-to-face communication,
and features of software are rendered anthropomorphic with faces and expressions.
White’s example, the help system in some versions of Microsoft Office, is ‘a lively
computer that appears to sulk when ignored. These depictions collapse the distance
between spectator and screen and justify the spectator’s conversation with the box’
(p.20). White does not analyse the use of screen-based telecommunication (for
example with Skype), or Internet television, but focuses on women’s uses of
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webcams to control their own image online and the intimate relationships operators
and spectators develop with the screen. This intimacy and closeness stop the
spectator from seeing the other as an object of desire – webcam operators are often
also sitting at a desk, mirroring the position of the body of the viewer. White
concludes that ‘the Internet and computer spectator is literally mirrored, doubled,
and confused with the screen’ (p.84).
Computers – in large corporations at first, then increasingly personal computers –
have been connected into networks since the beginning of the 1970s (Gere, 2006b;
Berghaus, 2005). After the launch of the first satellite by the USSR (Sputnik 01 in
1957), the technology developed primarily in North America. The first European
satellite was Ariel 1, the first UK satellite launched on a US rocket. This was the first
satellite operated by a country other than the United States or Soviet Union
(Satnews Publishers, s.d.). In the early 1960s, television itself became networked in
systems of satellites. The American satellite Echo 1 relayed the first telephone
communication and television broadcast in 1962 (Satnews Publishers, s.d.). Since
1994, a separate network of satellites supports mobile telephony. This has now
become indispensable to distribute the large amount of data accessed via
smartphones (Satnews Publishers, s.d.). Thus, the shared history of
telecommunication and video broadcast technology now includes mobile screen-
based communication and moving image display. This shared history becomes
more relevant as screens become (again) increasingly interchangeable, and a
growing sense of liveness and connectedness re-emerges thanks to Internet based
platforms. The different uses and acquired connotations of screen-based
technologies reciprocally inform the different moving image contexts of broadcast,
videoconferencing, personal videos and contemporary art.
In videoperformances, a number of elements mediate relationality: the space within
which the performance takes place (the studio or the gallery); the video camera
(with its own layering of lenses, charge-coupled devices (CCD) and memory card,
hard drive, disk or tape); the digital transfer through the computer with all its
63
complexity and an intermediate screen; the exhibition disk, tape or hard-drive, in
some cases the player, and, finally, the screen itself in the gallery space (Cubitt,
2010a, 2010b). From this materialist perspective, each element and technology is
not only a distinct medium, but also a different mediator. Sean Cubitt (1991, 2004,
2010a) examines the political impact of all technology on intersubjective and social
relations founding it on a materialist analysis of video and new media art practices,
cinema and mass media. He reflects in his blog that
[e]ach medium is already a dozen technologies arranged in a system.
To label one assemblage “photography” is almost silly: we have to look
a) at the elements from which it is composed and b) the commonalities it
has with other media. The term ‘medium’ would be better reserved for,
say, a type of screen.’ (Cubitt, 2010b).
A detailed materialist analysis of videoperformance based on each element of
technology is beyond the scope of this project, which looks at video camera and
screen as mediators that accumulate connotations in their history of uses.
Proposing a unique perspective, Latour defines mediators and intermediaries in the
framework of the sociological approach called Actor-Network-Theory (ANT): an
intermediary ‘is what transports meaning or force without transformation: defining its
inputs is enough to define its outputs’, whilst ‘[m]ediators transform, translate, distort
and modify the meaning or the elements they are supposed to carry’ (Latour, 2007,
p.39). Latour understands sociology as ‘science of the living together’, and social
bonds as performative, in that they only exist if they are enacted (Latour, 2007, p.2).
In this approach, living and non-living agencies – actors or actants – relay and
translate relationality, or in ANT terms, associations. Latour proposes to trace the
trail of associations and to listen to the actors as they perform coming together and
coming apart. From this perspective, associations are enacted by heterogeneous
elements:
a face-to-face interaction is not a plausible departure point to trace
social connections … because … they are being constantly interfered
with by other agencies. … Action is dislocated, diffracted, re-dispatched
and redistributed, not to mention that it has to rely on successive layers
of mediations piled on top of one another. (pp.198-199).
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Words, objects, buildings, tools, certificates, laws, clothes, etc. form ‘the crowd of
non-human, non-subjective, non-local participants who gather to help carry out the
course of action’ (p.201). This version of ANT offers a pragmatic way of observing
mediation at work, which keeps into account the accumulation of identifications in
subjects’ behaviours, and of connotations in non-subjective agencies. From this
perspective, cameras and screens relay the relationality performed by the artist, and
translate it to viewers by adding connotations accumulated in their history of uses
and technological transformations. In the context of relationality and
videoperformance, this analysis of mediators complements psychoanalytic and
post-psychoanalytic theories of subjectivity and intersubjectivity.
Having surveyed the key approaches that inform the interplay of subjectivity,
relationality, performativity and mediation relevant to this research project, in the
second chapter I will trace the interwoven histories of practices and technologies
that converge in the contemporary relationality of videoperformance.
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Chapter Two:
The Practice Context: Videoperformance
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This chapter offers an overview of videoperformance art practices that employ
relational strategies. It does not survey the well-documented history of
videoperformance, but maps within it practices that engage in relational dynamics
(for the history of videoperformance see for example Gever, 1983; Fagone, 1987;
Hill, 1997; Gigliotti, 2000; Biesenbach, London and Eamon, 2003; Berghaus, 2005;
Salters, 2010). Contemporary ideas of relationality inform the reading of historical
works, and of the interwoven history of technologies, practices and concepts in
dialogue with videoperformance. This chapter also reviews contemporary
performance, moving image and networked practices to map the contemporary
relational context of this research project and of my videoperformance work.
The American term videoperformance describes live and recorded performances
incorporating video cameras, monitors and/or projectors. The term appears to have
been coined by American artist writer and curator Willoughby Sharp, although the
Italian videographer Luciano Giaccari also claims to have been the fist person to
adopt it (Meneguzzo, 1987, p.60). The terms performance to camera and Body Art
are also used to describe art practices that combine performance, video camera,
screen and viewer (Jones, 1998; Warr, 2000). The practice of performing for the
camera to create a moving image artwork intended to appear on a screen has a
well-documented history and predates the use of video as an art medium. In the
1960s in the United States, Richard Serra, Nam June Paik and Carolee
Schneemann, among many artists and filmmakers, started to engage with the film
camera as performers. With the increasing availability of video equipment, which
allows artists to see the work on screen without waiting for lengthy film processing,
more practitioners from a variety of disciplines faced the video camera to perform:
‘Video had entered art through performance, sharing its concerns with real time and
the body, and developing as a “live” medium from its initial role as a documentary
tool.’ (Iles, 1995). Centres for experimentation developed in a number of countries,
fostering the conditions for international dialogue and experimental practices
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interrogating the artistic potential of the technology (Meigh-Andrews, 2006).
Videoperformance played an important part in the dialogue between artists who
perceived video as a medium in its own right and explored its specificity, and those
who understood video as offering direct unmediated access to spaces and events
(Bear and Sharp, 1974).
In the United States, between 1970 and 1974, a number of exhibitions focused on
hybrid art practices incorporating video and performance. Sharp curated two key
shows – Body Works in 1970 and Videoperformance in 1974. Sharp had already
been active as a curator, writer and artist since 1958 (Sharp and Smith-Sharp,
2006), having co-founded the magazine Avalanche in New York with Liza Bear and
produced six Videoviews – a series of interviews to camera with Bruce Nauman
(1970), Joseph Beuys (1972), Vito Acconci (1973), Chris Burden (1973), Lowell
Darling (1974), and Dennis Oppenheim (1974). Body Works (at Tom Marioni's
Museum of Conceptual Art, San Francisco, California, 1970) featured performances
by Bruce Nauman and William Wegman among others. This is the first video
exhibition held on the West Coast, and it gave Acconci the opportunity to exhibit his
first video work, Corrections (1970). In this period, he also produced seminal
videoperformances, including Claim (1971), a three hour performance in which his
image appears on a monitor in the main gallery space as he sits in the basement
threatening viewers with a metal pipe; Prying (1971), in which Acconci attempts to
pry Kathy Dillon's eyes open; Trappings (1971), in which he sits among old toys and
talks to his penis; and Centers (1971), in which he points straight at the camera and,
consequently, out of the screen at viewers.
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Figure 2.1 Cover of Avalanche  No 9, 1974.
The exhibition Videoperformance (at 112 Greene Street Gallery, New York City,
1974) included works by Acconci, Chris Burden, Ulrike Rosenbach and Richard
Serra. Avalanche magazine Issue 9 acts as catalogue for this exhibition, and in her
editorial Liza Bear describes the ‘concept of the show’ as the ‘interface of video and
live performance’: ‘the work implied a very close and multileveled rapport with
audience consciousness. This made the performances very far removed from a self-
referential display situation.’ (Bear and Sharp, 1974, p.3). The artists’ own texts in
the catalogue show distinct approaches to videoperformance, ranging from playful
to relational, representational and political. For instance, Rosenbach exhibited her
first live videoperformance – Isolation is Transparent (1974) – in which she wraps
herself in white ropes behind a pane of glass in front of a video camera that relays
the images to a monitor. She describes the work as ‘psychological feedback’, and
the virtual space inside the video monitor as her ‘inner space’:
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‘[t]he recipient who watches the video-feedback gets to know that the
video provides a demarcation between him and me. The monitor pane
mitigates my direct impact on him, makes it cool and neutral, so that the
view of the psychological reflection that I want to convey to him
becomes more important and primary.’ (Bear and Sharp, 1974, pp.10-
11).
Figure 2.2 Ulrike Rosenbach, Don't Believe I'm an Amazon, 1974, video still.
Rosenbach pairs issues of representation and relationality to propose the video
screen as a tool for separation and distanciation of her sexualised body. The
contemporary presence of her physical body performing live and of its image
relayed on screen articulates the grammar of this mediated relational dynamic. After
this first live videoperformance, Rosenbach continued to employ combinations of
her own physical presence and the image on the monitor to complement dynamics
of relationality and representation of femininity in Madonnas of the Flowers (1975)
and Don't Believe I'm an Amazon (1975). These works stage dialogues with
mythological female figures immortalised by male artists – Venus, Medusa, Ophelia
and the Virgin Mary. By overlapping these figures with images of herself speaking
and acting, Rosenbach makes explicit and resists the pressure these pre-existing
models exert on female subjectivity. Don't Believe I'm an Amazon (1975)
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superimposes in real time the face of the artist shooting arrows on stage and their
target – a reproduction of a fifteenth century painting of the Madonna. As the arrows
hit the target, both the painting and the living woman physically present are struck
on the monitor screen.
Acconci, on the other hand, merges performance and video equipment more
directly, and constructs a closer connection with viewers across the video screen.
Originally performed live in Naples in 1972 and developed into a two-screen work
for the exhibition Videoperformance, Command Performance (1974) includes a
monitor on the floor in front of a brightly lit stool, a video camera pointing towards
this, and a second monitor behind a column and behind the stool (Figure 2.3).
Figure 2.3 Vito Acconci, Command Performance, 1974, installation view.
The first monitor shows the artist lying on a bed with his head close to the camera,
trying to persuade viewers to take his place, while the second relays the live image
from the camera pointing at the stool. Acconci oscillates between asking viewers to
step into the light, sit on the stool and take his place, and performing his own
fantasy about what his viewer would look like and do. Command Performance
expands out of the screen into the gallery, to construct a space that can be
reabsorbed into the screen. Acconci gives himself over to viewers, and asks them to
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do the same and become his ‘surrogate’ (Acconci, 1976, p.9). At first he addresses
viewers directly, apparently unconcerned with their specific desires or with the
distinct subjectivities they might bring to the work, but as he becomes progressively
absorbed into his own fantasy, the subject he dreams into being is a woman who
will know what to do. With his eyes closed, he continues to address viewers as you,
as his instructions become explicitly erotic.
Figure 2.4 Vito Acconci, Command Performance, 1974, video Still.
Acconci describes successive shifts in the focus of his practice – from putting
‘myself in isolation for the purpose of being revealed outside on a monitor’, to ‘first
turning in on myself, then interacting with another person, then interaction with
larger groups of people, passers-by in a gallery space.’ (Bear and Sharp, 1974,
pp.21-23). Whilst for Rosenbach a political practice consists of an engagement with
her own socially constructed subjectivity, for Acconci the work becomes political
when the performance widens the range of possible relationships with others. His
videoperformance practice emerges as critically complex in its continuous focus on
modes of relationality that do not exclude a relative questioning of himself. Acconci’s
interrogation of his subjectivity and gender remains relative as he continuous to rely
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on the advantages of his position of power, both in his performed relationships with
women and in his role of self-representing male artist. Nevertheless his
representation of masculinity involves vulnerability, doubt, manipulation and
uncertainty, opening a fissure in the solidity of the male position in power relations.
Between 1973 and 1976, Acconci appeared to concentrate primarily on establishing
a relationship with the viewer through the screen of the monitor:
3. Video monitor as one point in a face-to-face relationship: on-screen, I
face the viewer, off-screen. …
9. In any case, my ground is clear: the most available showing places
for my work are museums and galleries. To show my face there, with
the hope that a viewer will come in front of it, is to make a tacit
assumption that the gallery provides a fertile ground for relationship.
(Acconci, 1976, pp.8-9).
Figure 2.5 Vito Acconci, Undertone, 1973, video still.
The four works that illustrate this 10-Point Plan for Video were produced between
1973 and 1974, and show effective strategies for activating relationality in
videoperformance. For example, in Undertone (1973) Acconci sits at the far end of a
table and constructs a visual space for the viewer. The screen intersects the
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horizontal plane of the table to form a vertical plane paralleling the position of the
viewer’s body. The screen also mediates the passage between what is part of the
image and what is part of the physical environment by belonging to both (Bolter and
Grusin, 2000). Air Time (1973) shows Acconci facing a mirror so that viewers see
both the back of his head and his face, and although he is addressing someone as
you, he is also talking about viewers as they. In Theme Song (1973), the artist lays
on the floor with his head near the camera, offering and inviting intimate proximity
while leaving visual space for another body within the image. Acconci developed
this videoperformance in Florence at Art/Tapes/22, a video production centre
created and run by Maria Gloria Bicocchi from 1972 to 1976, and connected with
Acconci’s dealer – Sonnabend-Castelli Gallery in New York (Valentini, 2003). The
centre also produced works by Joan Jonas (Merlo, 1974), Willoughy Sharp (Break,
1973) and Douglas Davis (The Florence Tapes: Clothing, Walking, Lifting, Leaving,
1974). Acconci was a guest for several months experimenting with different
combinations of performance and video, and also produced here Home Movies
(1973) and two versions of Indirect Approaches (1973). Theme Song (1973) was
shot in Bicocchi’s living room by Carmine Fornari, Alberto Pirelli (video operators)
and Raffaele Corazziari (technical collaborator) (Saba, 2007). This work is analysed
in greater detail in chapter three and four of this dissertation.
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Figure 2.6 Vito Acconci, Theme Song, 1973, video still.
Acconci himself states that the
performer on screen is face to face with viewer in front of screen – the
performer’s space is incomplete, it needs the viewer as part of the
performance area – the performer’s stance on screen, his moves, are
caused by the viewer’s position as strategic agent in interaction with
him. (Simmons and Davis, 1978, p.82).
In other words, relationality informs the performance in its making, not only when
viewers are physically present in front of the screen and engage with the work.
Acconci’s videoperformances visually suggest a position for the body of the viewer,
but this projected position has already actively determined the performance. Video
camera and screen mediate a relationship that, although asynchronous, is
reciprocal.
Whilst Acconci concentrates primarily on the potential of the monitor screen,
Douglas Davis extends his relational experiments to satellite technology and real-
time telecommunication. In 1971, Davis pioneered interactive television with
Electronic Hokkadim, proposing a participatory experience of television itself as an
alternative to commercial broadcast. A whole day event resulted in an evening
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broadcast including contributions from Nam June Paik, Bruce Nauman, Eric Siegel
and Peter Campus. Viewers were invited to take part in a live broadcast and
produce the images they would also see at home. Davis continued to explore
television as a live networked tool, and in 1976 hired a ComSat satellite for a live
broadcast performance – Seven Thoughts. ‘Apparently it was the first time that any
private citizen had done this’ (Baumgärtel, 2001, p.54). For the opening of
Documenta 6, Davis worked with Joseph Beuys, Nam June Paik and Charlotte
Moorman to produce live satellite broadcast videoperformances. Davis’ work, The
Last Nine Minutes (1977) shows a pair of hands flat on the screen, on the side of
the viewers – appearing to be inside the monitor screen – and knocking at the glass,
facing an approaching image of Davis. The artist appears to hear the knocking and
to press his hands flat against the screen from his side of the screen. This work
visually merges the space of the performer and the space of the viewer, making the
screen permeable to contact.
         
Figure 2.7 Douglas Davis, The Last Nine Minutes, 1977, video stills.
Kit Galloway and Sherrie Rabinowitz implicitly criticize this approach to networked
performance because ‘anything that was remotely utilizing realtime
telecommunications was very much a television broadcast monitor — "artist as
subject being transmitted to an audience"...’ (Galloway and Rabinowitz, 2003).
Galloway and Rabinowitz propose a radically different approach, utilising the screen
as a meeting point between people in different geographical locations. They
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developed the project Satellite Arts Project (1977) with the support of NASA to
experiment with the potential of satellite technology for collaborative performances
among artists in different physical locations. They also used satellite technology and
video screens in 1980 to facilitate conversations between Los Angeles and New
York City when they installed Hole in Space – two interconnected screens in the
‘Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts in New York City, and The Broadway
department store located in the open air shopping center in Century City, Los
Angeles’ (Galloway and Rabinowitz, 2003). These screens were not framed as
artworks and did not relay any artist’s performance, but simply focused on the
relational potential of the technology.
Davis utilised satellite technology again in 1981, connecting the Whitney Museum of
American Art in New York to the Centre Pompidou in Paris for the videoperformance
Double Entendre: Two Sites Two Times Two Sides. In this work, Davis’ and the
actor Nadia Taleb talk to each other from the two locations, and at the end of the
work they are both seen on screen in Paris running towards each other and
embracing. Davis and Taleb perform an intimate and exclusive relationship, but also
engage viewers directly, so that they are at the same time witnesses and
accomplices:
[a]t the end of the performance I say: “I can't stand the separation
anymore. I am coming across the Atlantic right now”. That related to
Barthes’s text. In it, he talks about both love and language being a kind
of leap. So I plead with her to stay where she is and run out of the
Whitney Museum. Next you see me on the video, finally moving, running
down Park Avenue. She speaks with the audience, asking them if she
should leave or if she should stay. In the end, she decides to run away.
So she races down to the Plaza in front of the Centre Pompidou, and I
land, live, right in front of her! We chase each other around, and I finally
embrace her (Baumgärtel, 2001, p.57).
Whilst Electronic Hokkadim activates direct relationships between artist, equipment
and viewers (who become also participants and users), these last two works rely on
ruses and on-screen representation to mobilise mediated relationality. Davis
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engages directly with the materiality of the screen and the connectivity of satellite
technologies as mediators of intimate relationships and desire. Yet, these
videoperformances reproduce a patriarchal pattern of active male and passive
female roles: Taleb runs away, while Davis runs after her and embraces her. This
body of work suggests stable gendered roles in a crystallised model of desire, and
does not match Acconci’s complex – although limited – questioning of male
subjectivity and gendered relations. In 2002, Davis developed a project called Moral
Pornography focused on (female) beauty. He invited women to model for erotic
photographs in which they decided which clothes to take off and how to pose. Davis
completely ignores the complexity of gender relations in this practice, and limits his
understanding of beauty and desire to an established pattern of female body as
object of desire, to-be-looked-at-ness and mystery. The resulting images are no
different from any other semi-pornographic photographs, and the text confirms his
superficial approach to these themes (Davis, 2004).
Davis considers himself part of ‘a generation raised on television rather than print,
indeed, on a medium of communication that is sensory and evanescent rather than
iconic and static’ (Davis, 1973, p.169). To interrogate this shift, the conference Open
Circuits, organised by Davis in 1974 with Fred Barzyk, Gerald O’Grady and Willard
Van Dyke at the Museum of Modern Art in New York City, examines the social,
political and aesthetic development of video art practices in dialogue with television.
In the resulting publication, Davis concentrates on issues of immediacy and
liveness, describing his performance to camera as ‘a heightened state of working’
(Simmons and Davis, 1978, p.76). For Davis, the aim of videoperformance is the
image relayed via the screen, and rendered heightened and relational by the
relationship between performer and camera:
To know that the moment the camera turns on is the moment of record
or of broadcast is to experience a heightened reality, to perform at
another level. … The end of the tapes was, and is, the image. I wanted
to act in live time first for myself and finally, completely, for the viewer –
because it achieves that end. (pp.76-77).
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The conference and publication conceptualise television as a medium with ‘a
creative force which we must learn to utilize for the benefit of all mankind [sic].’
(Simmons and Davis, 1978, p.2). Television is described both as an art and as a
medium for communication, and analysed from conceptual, technical, historical,
philosophical and political perspectives. In her intervention, Shigeko Kubota
discusses the importance of the annual Women’s Video Festival started by Susan
Milano with Shridhar Bapat and Steina Vasulka at The Kitchen in New York in 1972.
Kubota describes her video works and those by other women as ‘made from a very
different perspective’ (Simmons and Davis, 1978, p.98). Kubota counterbalances
the almost exclusively male conference – the only other women speakers were the
artist Joan Jonas and the curator Jane Livingston – by making visible female artists
who adopt the video camera as a social and political tool. Kubota discusses works
made by women, which engage and represent women – gay, single mothers, on
benefits and women who have been raped – and generally counterpoint mass
media representations of femininity. The second festival included works by ‘women
who invaded what was hitherto a preserve of male technocracy’: the specific
technical possibility of video cameras and screens, connectivity, electronic image
generation and other tools (Simmons and Davis, 1978, p.99). Kubota also
celebrates the women who organise, facilitate and generally work behind the
scenes to make the production and distribution of work possible. The problem of
visibility and legitimacy of women artists informs the history of videoperformance
despite the fact that
[women] were impatient to speak, visualise and become visible. They
gravitated towards performance and video because of their
confrontational nature and their ability to deliver an immediate message
to the audience. (Elwes, 2005, p.41).
Discussing the history of the festival, Susan Milano describes how
when Steina Vasulka organized a collection of work for a show on Video
Art in early ’72 she found that there were surprisingly few entries from
women – surprising because she knew that at least one-third of the New
York video community was comprised of women. … Portable video and
the Women's Movement had sprung up together. (Milano, 1976).
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Martha Rosler points out that ‘there was a reaction against Feminist art – which my
work clearly was – though it was covert: it took the form of exclusion, or
ghettoization.’ (Lange, 2005, p.92). Rosler continues:
[v]ideo was excluded from Documenta VII in 1982 because the director,
Rudi Fuchs, had supposedly ruled that video was a women’s form, and
therefore not really art. There were no female artists in ‘West Kunst’, a
huge survey exhibition in Cologne in 1981, and that was taken as a big
statement (p.93).
Whilst many women artists engaged with performance art in the early 1970s,
galleries and critics tended to focus on men who embraced these art
practices such as Paul McCarthy and Chris Burden (Lange, 2005). Rosler
articulated her political concerns regarding gender and power relations both
in her writing and in her artworks, combining images that expose the racial
and sexual politics inherent in intersubjective and social relations. The
videoperformance Vital Statistics of a Citizen, Simply Obtained (1977)
displays the ordeal of a woman (Rosler herself) being measured and handled
by two male scientists and mocked by three women in white coats when the
scientists remark on the suitability of the size of different body parts. A
voiceover underlines the power structures that shape scientific practices and
statistical parameters of normality. Rosler juxtaposes subjectivity and
otherness to economic power structures, management of resources like food
and energy, military practices, language and race:
I joined two things that do not go together. Ideologically speaking, the
world is divided into nontransferable [sic] oppositions: victim-aggressor,
American against the world, the family against the public world. I join the
terms of these dichotomies together (Rosler and Weinstock, 1981, p.81)
The well-known videoperformance Semiotics of the Kitchen (1975) combines the
televisual medium-shot of the cookery programme with distorted and aggressive
gestures. This work examines the power of language to shape the subject:
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I was suggesting that the signs imposed on women are extremely
diminishing. This woman is implicated in a system of extreme reduction
with respect to herself as a self. … As she speaks, she names her own
oppression. (p.85).
Rosler states that her work is not informed by any one theoretical approach, but
underlines the importance of the Lacanian concept of constructed subjectivity in the
context of dominant ideology and social relations (p.88). Rosler’s
videoperformances do not directly adopt relational strategies, but address ‘the
psychosocial … to think about real, historically grounded social relations and the
ways in which they inform the personal’ (p.89).
Marina Abramovic takes a different stance towards gender and relationality, and
with Ulay (Frank Uwe Laysiepen) produced a number of collaborative
videoperformances in which they challenge their personal and professional
relationship in symmetrical actions: breathing from each other’s mouths (Breathing
In/Breathing Out, 1977), hitting each other (Light/Dark, 1977) and shouting in each
other’s faces (AAA AAA, 1978). In these videoperformances – all part of the series
Relation Work, 1976-1979 – a relationship is performed and represented, not
activated performatively with viewers. Abramovic states that her ‘early performances
deal with the body and architecture, especially the pieces that Ulay and I made,
because we were always in relation to space and time. But not because it was male
or female.’ (Kaplan, 1999, p.15). In her statements, Abramovic foregrounds the
symmetry of her spiritual and professional relationship with Ulay and sidelines
gendered relations:
when feminism became an issue, I was in Yugoslavia. It never touched
me because I come from a family in which my mother was a major in the
army and the director of the Museum of Art and Revolution. In
Yugoslavia women were partisans, absolutely in power, in control, from
the government level to any other level’ (p.15).
This gives Abramovic more freedom to position her body as symmetrical to a male
body. This artist addresses her other as a peer, and shows her power through the
performance of a subjectivity that is not negatively positioned as the other of man.
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Yet, in three individual videoperformances produced between 1975 and 1976, (Art
Must Be Beautiful, Artist Must Be Beautiful; Freeing the Voice; and Freeing the
Body), Abramovic appears to display a level of masochism that is not gender-
neutral – she brusher her hair, screams and dances to a drum to the limits of her
physical resistance. These works appear to engage, if not with masochistic female
subjectivity, with the patriarchal positioning of femininity.
In Talking about Similarity (1976, part of Relation Work), Abramovic and Ulay
alternatively face the camera, the audience present and, by extension, the screen
viewers activating a triangulated relationship. At first, a close-up image of Ulay’s
open mouth appears on screen, then he sews his lips together with needle and
thread. After he exits the frame, Abramovic appears facing the camera and answers
questions from visitors about Ulay’s actions. The artists capture this and other
performances with great care, setting up lighting and recording equipment as part of
the performance area and often excluding from view the gallery visitors. Their
videoperformances are, therefore, works in their own right and not documentations
of live performances.
Figure 2.8 Marina Abramovic, The Artist is Present, 2010, documentation of
performance. Museum of Modern Art, New York.
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After producing very different works in the 1980s and 1990s, Abramovic re-engaged
with uniquely relational performances in the series The Artist is Present, first
performed in 2010 at the Museum of Modern Art in New York. Abramovic sits in the
gallery and looks at members of the audience who sit opposite her one at the time,
sometimes across a table and sometimes without it. In this work, she relies on the
presence of her own body and on eye contact to establish relationality. Photographs
taken during the performance by Marco Anelli (2010) capture the participants’
emotional responses to this intense exchange of gazes.
Figure 2.9 Marco Anelli, Portraits in the Presence of Marina Abramovic, 2010,
composite of photographs.
Adopting a very different strategy, in the 1970s Hannah Wilke responded to the
pressure of patriarchy by voicing the right of women to define themselves:
The pride, power, and pleasure of one's own sexual being threaten
cultural achievement ... To diffuse self-prejudice, women must take
control of and have pride in the sensuality of their own bodies and
create a sensuality in their own terms, without referring to the concepts
degenerated by culture. (Wilke, 1975).
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Wilke performs her body as desiring and free, both when it satisfies the traditional
aesthetic criteria of beauty and desirability, and when it is bloated and changed by
illness and medical intervention. Contrary to Mulvey’s assessment that ‘[t]here is no
way in which we can produce an alternative out of the blue, but we can begin to
make a break by examining patriarchy with the tools it provides’, Wilke posits the
possibility for women to ‘create a sensuality in their own terms’ (Mulvey, 1975, p.7;
Wilke, 1975, p.21). Wilke underplays the power of normativity and attempts to
reconfigure the representations of her own sensuality and relationality. Thus, in the
videoperformance Gestures (1974), Wilke stretches and squashes her face with her
hands. Although erotically absorbed in her action, she does not forget that there is
also another across the screen, and glances intensely towards viewers, appearing
to share her desire and pleasure or challenge those who might want to impose a
different gaze. The Intra Venus series of photographs (1992-1993) and videotaped
performances (1999-2003) portrays a similarly direct self-definition and challenge to
the looker when Wilke’s body, face and hair have been radically transformed by the
consequences of cancer and its treatment (Vine, 1994). Wilke challenges the
structures of power that inform capitalist, scientific, clinical and everyday practices
by questioning their aesthetics, procedures and classifications.
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Figure 2.10 Adrian Piper, Cornered, 1988, installation view.
Similarly, in the video installation Cornered (1988) Adrian Piper challenges
definitions of white and black by exposing the system of thoughts that informs
racially defined interactions. The artist addresses a presumed white viewer through
the screen with a series of questions about racial categories and associated
behaviours while maintaining intense eye contact. Piper is directly challenging
viewers to become aware of their own systems of thought, and to establish a shared
understanding of racial classification. She redeploys the relationality that produces
the concepts of black and white in the first place to redefine relationally her own and
the other’s subjectivity. Her gaze challenges the defining gaze of those who made
her black and themselves white in the first place.
Figure 2.11 Pipilotti Rist, I'm not the Girl Who Misses Much, 1986, video Still.
Whilst Piper adopts the authoritative televisual talking-head imagery to talk back to
the culturally dominant male other, the Swiss artist Pipilotti Rist (Elisabeth Charlotte
Rist) answers to the ubiquitous male pop artist in the language of the pop promo. In
I'm not the Girl Who Misses Much (1986), she dances in front of the camera with the
top of her dress pulled down to expose her breasts. The artist repeatedly sings ‘I’m
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not the girl who misses much’ in response to The Beatles’ lyric from Happiness is a
Warm Gun, written by John Lennon in 1968: ‘She is not the girl who misses much’.
In this videoperformance Rist obliterates her face and voice with electronic effects
and answers back to pop music with a strategy close to Rosler’s Semiotics of the
Kitchen, and to Adrian Piper talking back to her white other. As a woman
interpellated by incorporated mass distributed music, Rist plays with the aesthetic
and technical possibilities of postproduction, and allows her own eccentric voice to
resonate with all its morbid complexity. She describes television as a ‘family
member’ that needs to be engaged with in a therapeutic relationship (Phelan et al,
2001, p.108). Echoing Mick Hartney’s assertion that ‘[s]urely TV seduces, rather
than assaults us’, Rist appears to have a personal rapport with screen and camera,
which translates into complicit and playful relationality with viewers (Knight, 1996,
p.22). Moreover, she blends music performance, new media, sculptural installations,
archiving practices and photography in an expanded body of relational and
representational practices.
Figure 2.12 Pipilotti Rist, Open My Glade, 2000, video still.
Rist employs screens of all kinds and exposes the screen as such, in all its technical
permutations, as an important mediator of relationality – from small Liquid Crystal
Display (LCD) screens embedded in the floor (Selbstlos im Lavabad, Selfless in the
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Bath of Lava, 1994) to outdoor Light Emitting Diode (LED) screens at the top of an
office block (Open My Glade, 2000). This second piece was created for and
exhibited on the Panasonic advertising screen in Times Square in New York City,
where Rist appears to rub her face with and without make-up against the inside of
the screen leaving trails of saliva, lipstick and green eye-shadow. Despite looking
down onto viewers from the top of a building, she remains vulnerable and sensuous,
and paradoxically intimate. In Pour Your Body Out (7354 Cubic Meters) (2008), as
exhibited at the Museum of Modern Art in New York, the artist created an immersive
environment by projecting onto the walls sensuous large-scale images of body parts
fluidly moving in saturated colours. In a video interview, Pipilotti Rist discusses how
by physically embracing the architecture of the room with contiguous large
projections, the work stimulates audiences – those who ‘bring their bodies to the
museum’ – to become lighter, to stretch and to enlighten their spirit (Rist, 2008).
Both Pour Your Body Out (7354 Cubic Meters) and the three-screen video
installation Lobe of the Lung (2009) incorporate images from Rist’s feature film
Pepperminta (2009), which explores the cinematic relationship between spectators
and screen by concentrating on the plot and on the relations among the characters
(Mulvey, 1975). The artist’s signature imagery of close-ups of eyes and body parts
complements the narrative structure in which the knowing innocence of the female
protagonist and her agency drives the plot.
In the exhibition Eyeball Massage at the Hayward Gallery in London (2012), Rist
utilises a great variety of materials and technologies to display video, broadening
the notion of screen as a support for moving images and as a mediator of
relationality. In this context, some historical videoperformances are displayed
differently: to see I'm not the Girl Who Misses Much viewers had to insert their
heads into a structure attached to the wall where the image is projected, now as
large as their own bodies. Rist proposes a version of visual pleasure that integrates
narrative and characterization, colours, floating forms and strategies that encourage
viewers to engage in specific relationships to the images on screen. For example,
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Administrating Eternity (2011) consists of a number of floor-to-ceiling hanging semi-
transparent screens that moved and curved allowing the projected images to bleed
and overlap. Viewers are invited to move among the screens and become drenched
in the colours of flowing shapes of flowers, cells and body parts. In a parallel
invitation, body-shaped cushions are scattered on the floor between the screens
suggesting comfortable physical intimacy. This exhibition and Rist’s practice in
general show the importance of the availability, connotations and qualities of a
growing variety of display technologies to mediate relationality in
videoperformances. Moreover, the large majority of videoperformances produced
for CRT monitors in the 1970s can now be accessed in a variety of formats,
including on computer screens in the privacy of viewers’ homes. In the gallery
context, the latest display technologies are often used to exhibit historical works,
including LCD, High Definition (HD), LED screens and projections. Phelan attributes
a psychoanalytic quality to Rist’s use of the screen of video:
Subjecting both the code and the content to psychoanalytic
interpretation, Rist insists that if we are to come to terms with the screen
central to postmodernism, we must look very carefully at both the
content on the visual surface of that screen and at the out-takes edited
from that screen (Phelan et al, 2001, p.39).
Rist does not address viewers directly as you, but her intense way of looking into
camera captivates viewers and makes them complicit. Her works feature mostly
women, often naked and behaving in unexpected ways. These female performers
and characters offer a representation of self-determined femininity, freely expressed
desire and playful sensuality. Rist’s women drive the narrative by acting outside the
framework determined by patriarchy (Phelan et al, 2001).
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Figure 2.13 Miranda July, Miranda July, 2009, website homepage.
The artist Miranda July shows a comparable versatility in a body of work that spans
performance, music, video, film, sculpture, books and websites. In 2009, the
opening page featured the words ‘enter secret password’ (Figure 2.13). Any
password entered in the designated box will lead to the welcome message ‘you
obviously know what I’m talking about’, establishing complicity even before one
accessed any individual works. July uses this direct and personal approach in a
number of media, creating relational interfaces that could be described as the
sculptural or book equivalent of screens. The artist’s diverse practice is unified by
the use of the second person address articulated through the specific qualities of
each screen, medium and context.
Figure 2.14 Miranda July, Miranda July, 2009, website page.
In her live performance On Strangers, performed in 2007 at the School of Life
in London, July invites members of the audience to donate personal items,
which she auctions off to gift the money raised to an anonymous person
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present. The objects become an excuse to invite individuals on stage and
ask personal questions, to invite spectators to touch each other and to open
ethical dilemmas. July mixes humour and self-confession, care and
provocation, focusing on interpersonal relationships, vulnerability and the
fragmented narratives of everyday life. Similarly to Rist’s, July’s words and
imagery reappear in different artworks – stories from the script for the film
You, Me and Everyone We Know (2005) became part of the book No One
Belongs Here More Than You (2007), and the book was the motivation to
create the website of the same title (Figure 2.15).
Figure 2.15 Miranda July, No One Belongs Here More Than You,
2007, website.
Another similarity between Rist and July is an active engagement with
networks of women artists. Between 1988 and 1994, Rist was a member of
Les Reines Prochaines, a multimedia performance and music band founded
by the artists Muda Mathis, Teresa Alonso and Regina Florida Schmid. The
group proposes a fragmented and contemporary feminist aesthetic, which
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includes cooking sounds, costume making, political statements, complex
visuals and ‘democratic music’ (Les Reines Prochaines, s.d.). July, on the
other hand, founded and managed Big Miss Moviola (1995-2004), a network
of women working with moving image and performance. Reacting to a feeling
of isolation, July collected and distributed videos among makers, organised
screenings and performed live. Although these works are variously described
as movies or films, they are shot on VHS, and distributed as cassettes in the
form of the chainletter Joanie 4 Jackie (July, 2008).
Figure 2.16 Miranda July, Big Miss Moviola leaflet, 2009.
Access to networks has radically changed since the early 2000s with the increasing
availability of open systems of distribution (Myspace, Youtube, Vimeo, Vine, etc)
and communication (social networks like Facebook, Twitter, Pinterest and Bebo;
communication platforms like Skype). These have contributed to the proliferation
and visibility of solitary makers, loose organisations of collaborators, specialised
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online galleries (for example Ubuweb and the Perpetual Art Machine), as well as
different forms of screen-based relationality (Bosma, 2006). These offer women
artists alternative platforms to produce, exhibit and meet. It also encourages
expanded and hybrid definitions of videoperformance practices, as artists continue
to experiment with contiguous technologies – performances mediated by webcams,
computer screens and data projectors complement communication technologies in
practices that contest gender stereotypes and the boundaries of art disciplines
(White, 2006).
In the context of WebcamNow, a ‘browser-based webcam videochat community’
(WebcamNow, 2013) – a site explicitly associated with pornography and voyeurism
– the artist Paula Roush developed the work cctvecstacy (2009) with a number of
collaborators under the name of Webcam Operators. The group includes Paula
Roush as cctvecstasy, Marie Josiane Agossou as marie_pix, Deej Fabyc as
deedee4000, Maria Lusitano as alfazema, Lara Morais as ByME, Lina Jungergård
as opaean, Aaron de Montesse as de montesse, Anne Marte Overa as anne marte.
Roush describes the process as ‘tak[ing] up an artist’s residency at
WebCamNow.com, a popular webcam community, and investigat[ing] its potential
as a curatorial platform for digital performance.’ (Roush, 2010a, p.118). After a brief
time for rehearsal, the work was performed around a loose script by seven Webcam
Operators online (four in London, three in Malmo), and projected at the QUAD in
Derby while Roush performed live in front of a live audience that was also captured
in a live feed and streamed. cctvecstacy would have been accessed by a large
audience on computer screens, complementing the audience of the live
performance and large projection screen. The Webcam Operators address ‘the
increasing intimacy facilitated by the mainstream use of surveillance technologies
for personal video streaming and archiving’ (Roush, 2010a, p.119). Both in this work
and in her text, Roush concentrates on the relational function of web cameras,
networked technology and screens. Viewers are also interlocutors, and their gaze
(as understood by Mulvey, 1975) is expected to be male, voyeuristic and
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objectifying. The Webcam Operators appropriate this gaze by taking control of their
own representation and leading the emerging relationships by establishing their own
agency (White, 2006).
In other works, Roush and the Webcam Operators use remotely connected video
and web cameras to create composite screens with multiple images of themselves.
For example, in the series emo-lab (2010), the artists intervene more directly on the
formal qualities of the resulting moving images – as opposed to simply adopting
existing formats of communication and networked performance platforms – to
produce aesthetically sophisticated split-screen videoperformances. These works
use digital formal devices to deal ‘with the performativity of the self and the
development of a meshed multiperson identity, whilst inspired and working with the
online archive of camgirls.’ (Roush, 2010b). The Webcam Operators form a series
of triangulated relationships by addressing simultaneously each other, physically
present and remote viewers. The artist Tina LaPorta develops videoperformances
concerned with similar processes using CU-SeeMe, an early videoconferencing and
point-to-point videocall platform. Re:mote_corp@REALities (2001) mixes live and
recorded webcam images and chat texts with the voiceover of artists, curators and
theorists discussing issues connected with digital media (Sattler, 1993-2008).
Roush’s and la Porta’s strategy of combining networked technologies with
performance are two examples of a large body of practices that share a strong
interest in relationality.
In 2007, Maria Chatzichristodoulou and Rachel Zerihan co-directed Intimacy,
Across Visceral and Digital Performance – a three-day festival that explored
modalities of relationality in one-to-one, participatory, on-stage and networked
performances. In Hearten (2006-2009), Chris Dugrenier uniquely combines
technology and physical contact by inviting strangers to lean their head on her chest
and listen. Whispered words from a device hidden under her shirt combine with the
warmth of her body and the live sounds of her breath. In Held (2007) Adrian Howells
takes one individual through three domestic spaces – kitchen, lounge and bedroom
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– and holds them in his arms. In Four Images (2005) Adam Overton invites the
audience to experiment with four unorthodox intimate modes of communication –
two individuals perform a pose and attempt to communicate via their pulse, tears or
blinking. Sam Rose’s memorable one to one performance Between One and
Another: Melting Point (2007) approaches intimate relationality from a number of
angles – she reserves the right to choose her audience member, blindfolds them
and immerses them in her work in a room visible from the outside. With gentle and
seductive whispers, Rose creates a safe environment for intimacy, then places a
morsel of chocolate in the participant’s mouth and leaves them alone in the room.
Representing the opposite approach and relying on remote communication
technology for its iteration of intimacy, A Bedtime Story by Susana Mendes Silva
(2007-8) asynchronously adopts email and Skype to collect and perform bedtime
stories on request.
Figure 2.17 Avatar Body Collision, Avatar Body Collision, 2014, website page.
94
Dissatisfied with existing networked communication and performance
platforms, Avatar Body Collision (Helen Varley Jamieson, Karla Ptacek,
Leena Saarinen and Vicki Smith) developed UpStage, an integrated system
that allows them to combine on screen animated stills, chat and live feeds
from multiple locations. At Intimacy, Avatar Body Collision’s work DTN3: [Be]
Longing: a meditation on self in motion (2007) appeared as a projected
collaborative online performance with remote audience participation, utilising
all the features of UpStage. Envisaged as an open platform for
cyberformance, UpStage organise regular ‘walkabouts’ to show online
makers how to use the tool and encourage anybody to develop work in this
environment (Avatar Body Collision, s.d.). This highlights the highly
collaborative quality of this project, which resonates across the history of
artists’ use of technology-based performance, particularly for women.
Both Roush and Varley Jamieson took part in Dutch artist Annie Abrahams’s
work Angry Women (2011-2013), a collaborative networked performance
investigating women’s difficulties in expressing negative emotions
(Abrahams, s.d.). Abrahams has been experimenting with networked
collaboration and other forms of machine-mediated relationality since 1997,
when she devised the project Being Human (which she describes as ‘low
tech mood mutators / not immersive’) to explore inflections of interpersonal
relations on the net (Abrahams, s.d.). This artist employs computers,
cameras and screens as relational mediators online and within the gallery.
For example, The Big Kiss (2007-2009) offers a space where live cameras
allow visitors to produce one half of a live composite image of two people
kissing (Figure 2.18). Abrahams is concerned with exploring intimacy,
proximity and ‘contact in a machine mediated world’ (Abrahams, s.d.). She
pursues a continuous interrogation of the relational potential of the screen
and of digital connectivity, as well as challenging socially acceptable modes
of address that repress vulnerability and the desire to relate.
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Figure 2.18 Annie Abrahams, The Big Kiss. Installation view, 2009,
installation view with Mark River at OTO, New York.
Abrahams’ Theme Song Revisited (After Acconci) (2011) was performed live for
Low Lives 3 International Festival of Live Networked Performances. It reproposes
Acconci’s strategy of playing romantic songs, but this time as a catalyst for a
different invitation: Abrahams asks viewers to phone her and prove that they exist.
For great part of the piece, her hand covers the lens, transforming the screen into a
pinkish shimmering skin-like surface with the text ‘Call me’ and two phone numbers
(Figure 2.19). Abrahams plays songs in the background, while pleading, cajoling
and ordering viewers to call the numbers on screen. Eventually, the phone rings, the
artist becomes visible and expresses her relief to her new interlocutor. Her
performed vulnerability and pleading invitation are reminiscent of Acconci’s
compelling blend of questioning of his own identity while pursuing relationality. She
is both in dialogue with Acconci’s work and taking his place, but her appeal is, in the
first instance, directed to networked viewers of computer screens probably in
domestic environments, who have the means to interact. This videoperformance
operates at the intersection of live and recorded, as well as at the intersection of
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different mediators – phone and networked computers (Turkle, 1995 and Latour,
2007). Abrahams performs a sense of urgency with regard to intersubjective
relationships in the context of mediated communication and recognises in Acconci’s
work a historical precedent for these concerns. This work is analysed in greater
detail in chapter three and four of this dissertation.
Figure 2.19 Annie Abrahams, Theme Song Revisited (After Acconci), 2009,
video still.
The British duo Jane Pollard and Ian Forsyth also explicitly reference historical
videoperformances in works like Walking After Acconci (Redirected Approaches)
(2005), Walking Over Acconci (Misdirected Reproaches) (2008), Kiss My Nauman
(2007), Walk With Nauman (2006). These videoperformances restage well-known
historical works with a young female MC (Walking Over Acconci (Misdirected
Reproaches), 2008), or a rapper (Walking After Acconci (Redirected Approaches),
2005) standing in for Acconci himself to update these classics with contemporary
pop song and urban language. Forsyth and Pollard state that they reference these
works to expand the historical dialogue that the artist instantiates ‘with the camera –
the viewer, you’ to include a dialogue with Acconci himself (Forsyth and Pollard,
2006). Despite a sophisticated website that contains several of the artists’
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videoperformances, Forsyth and Pollard show no direct interest in
videoconferencing platforms, web cameras, online video distribution sites like
Youtube or Vimeo, or the specificity of networked screens.
Figure 2.20 Eva and Franco Mattes, No Fun, 2010, video still.
Conversely, Eva and Franco Mattes (also known as 0100101110101101.org) use
Chatroulette to produce No Fun (2010), an online videoperformance where Franco
appears live on screen hanging from a noose in his flat. Chatroulette is a live
platform where users are randomly connected through webcameras and
microphones to each other, and can choose if they want to chat, or look for another
user. Similarly to Abrahams’s Theme Song Revisited (After Acconci) (2011), this
work also can be seen as having two iterations. The first is the online performance
with and for the users of Chatroulette; the second is the edited video recording of
the paired images of performer and random users, who variously react with
indifference, horror, scepticism, etc (Figure 2.20). Whilst some of Eva and Franco
Mattes’s works can also exist as videos, Life Sharing (2000-2003) cannot be
reproposed as a recorded moving image piece. The artists made the desktop of
their computer accessible to anybody for three years, complementing their everyday
activities with composite digital collages and the live stream of data from GPS
devices attached to their bodies. The fact that all the actions that the Mattes
performed on their screen could be seen live on the viewers’ own screens blurs the
boundaries between everyday life and performance as art practice. It also highlights
the function of the screen as an interface that connects and separates at the same
time, and that ‘enact[s] the effective force of the performance event’ (Phelan, 1997,
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p.12). Both Abrahams’s and the Mattes’s body of work attest to a strong current
interest in the relationality facilitated by networked technologies combined with
performance practices.
Yet, the many emerging dedicated performance venues, festivals and events
confirm the continuing relevance of live performance practices that requires the
contemporary presence of performer and audience. Having taken up the task of
promoting the practice and history of performance in the twenty first century, Marina
Abramovic commissioned a new museum of performance and committed to
restaging historical works (Seven Easy Pieces (2005), including Bruce Nauman’s
Body Pressure (1974); Vito Acconci’s Seed Bed (1972); VALIE EXPORT’s Action
Pants; Genital Panic (1969); Gina Pane’s The Conditioning, first action of Self-
Portrait(s) (1973); Joseph Beuys’s How to Explain Pictures to a Dead Hare (1965);
her own work Lips of Thomas (1975) and a new piece - Entering the Other Side
(2005)).
In this acceptance of performance practices, feminist and queer artists find a fertile
ground to redefine gender relations and otherness in dialogue with mass media,
new media and postcolonial theories and practices. For example, Bird la Bird, a
persona created by the artist Kath Moonan, proposes a joyous and playful feminine
queer subjectivity by staging performances that ‘straddles comedy and performance
art‘ (Bird la Bird, s.d.). Bird la Bird wears tight dresses that highlight her large
breasts, discusses the political allegiances of her vagina, and challenges all
attempts to confine her to one definition. The research project Performance Matters,
co-directed by Gavin Butt from Goldsmiths, University of London, Adrian Heathfield
from University of Roehampton, and Lois Keidan of the Live Art Development
Agency, included Bird la Bird in the exploration of the theme Trashing Performance
(2010-2011), which ‘explored the power of creative expressions that wilfully debunk
or ignore cultural ideals and hierarchies of critical value.’ (Butt et al., 2011). The
third and last theme of Performance Matters, which brought the project to a close in
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2011, Potentials of Performance, asks a series of key questions connected to this
research project:
‘What does performance hold in store in its present-day testing of the
limits of the social, the cultural, the vital and the critical? What are its
potentials to transform civic social bodies and the production of
subjectivities more broadly? And how might the failed promise of
democracy in contemporary Europe and beyond necessitate a
rethinking of the very promise of performance? In short: what can
performance do?’ (Butt et al., 2011).
This confluence of the politics of subjectivity with wider political discourses
motivates more practices that can be surveyed in this dissertation. The next section
surveys some examples relevant to this discussion – the work of Franko B, Tino
Sehgal, Anita Ponton, and Ope Lori.
Figure 2.21 Franko B, I Am Not Your Babe, 1996, documentation of
performance.
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In 1996, Franko B performed I Am Not Your Babe, a work consisting of the artist
standing naked, his entire body painted white and bleeding from both arms onto
sheets of white paper. Trained as a painter, Franko B uses his own body as a
canvas, and allows his own blood to form pools on the paper at his feet and on the
slippery white coating that covers his skin (Franko B, 2011). Focusing on the
vulnerability revealed by his weakening bleeding body, Franko B stands (I Am Not
Your Babe, 1996) or walks along a catwalk (I Miss You, 2000) until he becomes
unsteady and has to stop, or falls to his knees. The artist also progressively
reinforces the importance of gaze and desire by purposefully making eye contact
with the audience. His titles reinforce the strong relational approach of these works
by referencing love, lovers, intimacy and partners. Relationality becomes more
central in Aktion 398 (2001) – a one-to-one performance where viewers are invited
to enter an empty room and spend time with Franko B, who looks into their eyes,
naked, coated in white, wearing a dog’s surgical collar and bleeding. In I'm Thinking
of You, first performed in 2009, the artist, accompanied by a pianist, sits naked on a
golden swing looking into the eyes of spectators. In a durational version of the same
work at The Nunnery Gallery (part of Performance in the Nunnery: Move Me!, 2010,
curated by myself), Franko B selected 15 volunteers – professional performers,
models, actors and others with no related professional experience – to take his
place on the swing for twenty minutes each and make eye contact with the
audience. He only performed for the last section of the work, establishing a number
of complex relationships – with the performers, with the absent you in their and in
his thoughts, directly with viewers and between performers and viewers. The
participants had a number of different reasons to take part, but they all reported a
desire to redefine themselves in relation to a different kind of visibility. I Am Thinking
of You created a context of intimacy in public, where they could be in charge of their
own gaze and desires, constructing a returning transformative gaze.
In contrast with Franko B’s intensely autobiographical practice – the recurring
allusions to love and presence of red crosses referencing his childhood in a Red
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Cross orphanage, but also his HIV status and homosexuality – Tino Sehgal’s
calculated ‘constructed situations’ are regularly enacted by employed performers to
create autonomous relational possibilities (Herbert, 2012). This Progress (2006),
performed at the Institute of Contemporary Art (ICA) in London and at the
Guggenheim Museum in New York, starts with a child taking the
viewer/participant/interlocutor by the hand across the empty gallery, lightly
conversing about progress. After a few minutes, a teenager takes over as the child
walks away and the conversation continues with an anecdote. A young man and an
older woman conclude the cycle as the visitor reaches the end of the space. Sehgal
prohibits all forms of documentation of his work, and even sales are conducted
through verbal agreement witnessed by a number of legal representatives. This
Progress reduces performance to pure interaction – one really has to be there and
take part for the work to exist at all.
Figure 2.22 Anita Ponton, Company, 2002, documentation of performance.
Anita Ponton’s live and recorded performances reference cinema, religion,
mythology and the representation of women in these systems. Her works frequently
feature a single troubled female character bound (Perdut (Lost), 2008), struggling
melodramatically (Unspool, 2003-5) or trapped in some way (Still, 2004, and Dies
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Irae, 2000). In Company (2002) Ponton dances with a full size projection of herself.
The two figures – one projected and one physically on stage – mirror, challenge,
question and court each other until they appear to embrace and merge. The
symmetry of the two bodies faces the audience, but it also engages them directly as
both Ponton and her recorded image ask them questions.
Figure 2.23 Ope Lori, Moving Image, 2009, video still.
Ope Lori’s videoperformances approach the issues of gender in conjunction with
racial and sexual identity. The explicit performance of vulnerability and racialised
power relations characterises Lori’s early body of work – for example, the
videoperformance Deracination (2010) juxtaposes an image of Lori in her
underpants dancing provocatively to images from pop promos in which white
women and black men reproduce stereotypes of power, to-be-looked-at-ness and
racially inflected patriarchy. The sound of a music box underlines Lori’s vulnerability,
as she stares out of the screen. Moving Image (2009) also confronts stereotypes
within gay inter-racial relationships, in which black women are generally depicted as
the dominant partner. In a similar way to Adrian Piper, Lori challenges viewers to
take responsibility for their own internalised racism. By exposing her own
constructed subjectivity, her gaze dares viewers to confront the fundamental
prejudice that informs their position within normativity, demanding reciprocal
redefinition. In the relational performance of her gaze, Lori also exposes the
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paradoxes of her own internalised position within normativity, highlighting the
complexity of inter-racial intimate and social relationships.
Figure 2.24 Ope Lori, Re-Birth of a Nation, 2010, documentation of performance.
During the opening of the exhibition 1916 at Chelsea Triangle Space (2010,
London), she complemented the videoperformance Re-Birth of A Nation (2010) with
a live performance. Lori was behind the bar serving drinks with her face blacked out
and wearing a wig and white gloves. A white woman beside her stopped her from
interacting with visitors by telling them ‘don’t talk to her!’, and ordered Lori what to
do in an authoritative and hostile manner. The unexpected presence of extreme
racial prejudice and exploitation where conviviality is expected made all those
present complicit in racism. This work overturns the mechanisms of performativity
and participation by explicitly making the viewer/interlocutor powerless to engage in
the social and personal interaction that is defining her.
A series of practices that stretch definitions of performance and conviviality are
described by Nicholas Bourriaud in his book Relational Aesthetics (2002). Although
not directly related to videoperformance, this approach to art practice produces
emerging relationality mediated by ‘relational device[s]’ (Bourriaud, 2002, p.30). In
the 1990s, Rirkrit Tiravanija, Philippe Parreno, Dominique Gonzales-Foerster,
among others, initiated convivial encounters as artworks (Bourriaud, 2002). In this
context, playing table football (Tiravanija, Surface de Réparation, 1994), cooking
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and sharing food (Tiravanija, pad thai, 1990), sharing a party (Parreno, Snow
Dancing, 1995) and collective radio broadcast (Tobier, Radio Printemps, 1996)
produces ‘social interstices’ and ‘micro-utopias’ in which artists and viewers can
interact directly (Bourriaud, 2002, p. p.14 and p.70). Felix Gonzales-Torres adds a
distinct ethical dimension to his practice – in Untitled (Portrait of Ross in L.A.)
(1991), he exhibits a pile of wrapped sweets and invites viewers to take them. As
the installation is a portrait of his partner who died of an AIDS related illness, the
diminishing pile represents the fading body. Although gallerists are instructed to
replenish the pile, by taking a candy a viewer takes the responsibility of making the
work disappear. In a sense, this initiates a dialogue between artist and viewer
informed by an ethical questioning of their respective positions, and of
complementary roles in intersubjective interactions more widely. In general, these
relational practices initiate possibilities for relationality that can only be fulfilled by
the presence and actions of viewers/participants.
This description could also apply to a series of practices that produce alternative
social relations as a form of activism. For example the organisation The People
Speak aims to offer ‘tools for the world to take over itself’ (The People Speak,
2014). This collective creates structured opportunities for people to talk to each
other in familiar formats like chat shows or game shows. They also collaborate with
institutions and organisations to help communities to influence policy, contribute to
decisions and shape services. The People Speak use microphones, lights and
cameras to facilitate and mediate conversations that otherwise would not happen.
From this perspective, they belong to a long tradition of media activism stretching
back to Ant Farm in the United States (founded by Chip Lord and Doug Mitchels)
and the Institute for Research in Art and Technology (IRAT) in the United Kingdom
(John Hopkins and Sue Hall) (Meigh-Andrews, 2006, p.64 and p.66). These highly
politicised practices operate at the crossroad between art, technology and politics,
adopting different devices (the new media of the time) to act on interpersonal
relationships and influence social relations. Contemporary media activists tend to
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utilise networked tools and platforms to intervene in the politics of proprietary
software (for example, the Free Libre Open Source Software movement, or
FLOSS), copy right (Creative Commons and Copy Left) and peer-to-peer file and
information sharing. These approaches come together in the work of artists who use
open source video editing and publishing software to facilitate access to otherwise
expensive tools. In this framework, Larisa Blazic developed the project Mezzo
Moderno, Mezzo Distrutto. Half Modern, Half Destroyed (2010) with the residents of
GiIlett Square in Hackney, London. The participants were invited to shoot, edit and
archive video works focused on their local area with software developed around
their needs. The resulting installation in the square itself was a true collaboration
between the artist and the residents, which also delivered non-proprietary tools
suitable for similar projects in this and other communities.
In summary, contemporary media activism shares important features with its
historical precedents – groups of individuals with shared goals come together and
use available technologies to counter their invisibility or misrepresentation in the
dominant media and mainstream contemporary culture. Activist works often share a
key aspect with videoperformance: subjects address camera and viewers directly,
suggesting a shared lived experience relayed by the screen. In this context,
representation shifts into performativity, gathering political significance as it
influences intersubjective and social relationships beyond art practice.
Using a contemporary concept of relationality to analyse historical artworks reveals
a legacy of concerns and strategies dating back to early experiments with video and
performance, which also extends to recent networked practices. The artists and
artworks examined in this chapter activate relationships that mobilise the gaze, and
bare the dynamics of power that structure it. Gender, race and economic status are
defined within active relations that continuously produce subjectivity and unstable
identities – these practices intervene in these relationships. This overview also
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shows that video technologies historically span broadcast, communication and
representation, sharing the same legacy of networked tools. In this context, the
screens of video and of networked computers also share technologies and contexts
of use. These factors have been significant in fostering the current growing interest
in relational practices and the recent revival of performance and videoperformance
practices from the 1970s. The possibility of migrating across platforms and screens
enabled by new developments in digital technologies adds a new layer of relational
potential to the contemporary practice of videoperformance, and opens the historical
body of videoperformance work to fresh readings. This overview of the context of
historical and contemporary relevant art practices complements the review of
theoretical concepts in chapter one and offers a clear context for the analysis of




The second part of this dissertation addresses directly the emergence and
relevance of mediated performative relationality in videoperformance art practices. It
interrogates the relational offer of the performer, its performativity, the mediation of
the screen, the addressee and their relevance. It is structured around the first
person account and in-depth analyses of three videoperformances: Vito Acconci’s
Theme Song (1973), Annie Abraham’s Theme Song Revisited (After Acconci)
(2011), and my own work Before You Now (2013), part of the body of work
Intimations (2007-2013). Chapters three and four complement each other by
analysing these encounters in two ways: from a first person perspective
(performative writing) and through critical analysis. This introduction contextualizes
the choice of these videoperformances, the use of performative writing as a method
that suits the instability and performativity of relationality, and the complementary
functions of my five videoperformances, and of chapters three and four.
Intimations – the practice
This section expands on the description of my videoperformances in the introduction
to this dissertation, and contextualises these works in relation to each other and to
the research questions:
• How do videoperformance art practices contribute to debates on
relationality?
• Whom does videoperformance address relationally, and what are the
dynamics of this address?
• What account of relationality emerges from the analysis of these practices?
What is their ethical and political relevance?
It demonstrates how the five pieces come together as a coherent and unified body
of practice as research. Regardless (2007) and Before You Now (2013) bracket this
project both chronologically and conceptually by confronting mediated relationality in
its complexity. Both these works approach relationality in videoperformance as a
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mediated intersubjective encounter and question its dynamics. The Other Person
(2010), Are You Talking to Me (2010) and  Wish You Were Here (2011) confront
and experiment with more specific questions such as intimacy in a public space,
denied relationality and liveness.
Regardless deploys vulnerability and emotional manipulation to interrogate power
relations in intimacy, calling attention to the ethical and political relevance of this
practice: how are gender-specific dynamics of power activated in mediated
relationality? How can relationality in videoperformance activate moments of
awareness of these processes? Consequently, how does this practice inform face-
to-face intersubjective relationships and power-relations themselves, thus
contributing to the wider debates on relationality? The work suggests some possible
approaches by challenging viewers to take a position – visual and emotional – in
response to the performer’s plea. It acknowledges the inherent paradox of a
videoperformance that offers an intersubjective relationship on the basis of the
physical absence of the performer. Regardless exerts emotional pressure on
viewers to respond to a univocal interpellation from a specific physical perspective:
the performer calls them while looking up from the floor and they are inevitably
positioned above the screen. The glass screen of the monitor connects performer
and viewer while separating them, and the chronological gap between the
performance and the viewer’s response offers a pause for reflection within which
awareness has the opportunity to emerge. This work begins to interrogate how the
mediation of video affords a specific potential ethical and political valence for
videoperformance – as viewers participate in the mediated relationship without
needing to act, their emotional and cognitive responses can briefly become
conscious and, perhaps, influence their future awareness in intersubjective
relationships.
The Other Person explores further the dynamics of the relational address in
videoperformance, and how these position viewers both spatially and relationally.
Whilst Regardless forces viewers to look down at the screen and performer
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assuming a position of power, The Other Person offers a more open invitation. As
the image is projected and not displayed on a monitor, the performer shares more
directly the physical space with the viewer. The bedding lying on the floor in front of
the image suggests the possibility of an intimacy that might feel uncomfortable in
the public space of the gallery. On the other hand, because of the height of the
projection, by standing towards the back of the room viewers can engage directly
with the performer’s gaze. From this perspective, lying down in close physical and
emotional proximity can remain a pleasurable imagined possibility. In other words,
this work does not pressure viewers into an intense intersubjective relationship, but
intimates concentric zones of proximity, as well as the possibility of closeness, trust
and intimacy. The quality of the on-screen address also suggests an open invitation
to relate, as in the performance I close my eyes or remain silent for several minutes
at a time. This suggests trust and acceptance, and aims to afford viewers more
choice and responsibility in the way they occupy this relational space.
Are You Talking to Me directly questions who is being addressed as you in the
mediated relationality of videoperformance. Based on the theoretical perspective
that subjectivity is continually produced in relationality, this work questions how the
others of past relationships shape the present address. The two sections of the
screen show incomplete versions of the same subject – myself – attempting to
dialogue with each other. Viewers are not addressed directly, but the continuous
use of the second person implicates them in a triangular ambiguous relationships.
Are You Talking to Me suggests that when the dynamics of past formative
relationships overwhelm the relationality emerging in the present, the influence of
the current interlocutor is diminished and the relationality that could emerge is
deflected. At the same time this work demonstrates that videoperformance can
produce a temporary awareness of the close connections between the other
addressed in the present and the others of past relationships. In other words, in
combination with the two first person accounts in chapter three, this work
interrogates the complexity of the addressee in the second person address and its
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implications for an understanding of the dynamics of relationality in
videoperformance and in face-to-face encounters.
Wish You Were Here examines more closely the paradoxical liveness, sense of
presence, and connectivity specific to screen mediation. This work directly
interrogates mediated intersubjective relationships by reproducing the window of a
Skype conversation. Although the recorded performance takes the form of an
answer phone message (for example: ‘I’m sorry I am not here …’), the visual
reference to a networked platform evokes a conversation taking place in real time.
This highlights the conditions that all the works in this series have in common and
that is crucial to the emergence of mediated relationality in videoperformance. In
other words, the combination of the chronological gap between performance and
viewing combines with the perception of real time created by the screen to evoke
asynchronous asymmetric intersubjective relationships.
Finally, Before You Now condenses the research questions into one intense and
intimate mediated relationship. This work addresses directly videoperformance’s
specific potential for ethical valence by openly asking viewers to reflect on how their
encounter with this work will inform their future face-to-face relationships. To
achieve this, it makes full use of the mediation of the screen to evoke a moment in
real time (‘Before I start the performance …’). In the final section of chapter three, I
give a first-person account of the process of evoking significant others within me in
order to explore in depth the question of who is being addressed in
videoperformance.
The exploration of the research questions conducted by making these artworks
informs and complements the last two chapters of this dissertation to offer a
thorough examination of mediated relationality in videoperformance and its
relevance beyond the confines of art practice.
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Acconci and Abrahams
Acconci’s videoperformances explore different permutations of interpersonal
relationships and employ visual and verbal strategies to activate the screen of the
monitor as a relational mediator. His body of work from the 1970s uses the monitor
screen and the gallery space to build intimate relationships. He also questions the
representation of masculinity by displaying vulnerability, doubt, manipulation and
uncertainty, opening a fissure in the solidity of the male position in gendered power
relations. Acconci describes successive shifts in the focus of his practice – from
putting ‘myself in isolation for the purpose of being revealed outside on a monitor’,
to ‘first turning in on myself, then interacting with another person, then interaction
with larger groups of people, passers-by in a gallery space.’ (Bear and Sharp, 1974,
pp.21-23). For a decade, he consistently interrogates the potential of performance
and video to construct mediated relationships. Acconci complements the second
person address with introspection in intimate intersubjective relationality that also
questions social and power relations.
Contemporary ideas of relationality that have become central to art practice and
discourse since the 1990s encourage a fresh reading of Acconci’s
videoperformances in dialogue with practices and concepts emerging around
screen-based networked technologies. The videoperformance Theme Song (1973)
in particular constructs a visual space for another body to occupy a complementary
position on screen while addressing another subject in a variety of tones. Despite
being in control of the performance, Acconci already waived the centrality of his
position by framing the work in relation to the body of the viewer. He is my other as I
watch: he confirms that I was already there as his other when he performed
(Simmons and Davis, 1978). This address is supported by the ruses of romantic pop
songs, which expose the established positions that genders occupy in language and
in intimate relationships. In other words, not only am I already there, I am already
positioned in the relationship. The complexity of this address, its modulations and
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the strategies that materialize it offer an ideal situation to test the interplay of
subjectivity and mediated performative relationality.
In Theme Song Revisited (After Acconci) (2011), Abrahams re-interprets the
premises of Theme Song (1973) – playing pop songs in the background and
addressing another – in the context of the festival of networked performance Low
Lives 3, and invites viewers to take advantage of the live connection and their ability
to reciprocate. Her performed vulnerability and pleading invitation are reminiscent of
Acconci’s compelling blend of questioning of his own identity while pursuing
relationality. She is both dialoguing with Acconci’s work and taking his place, but her
appeal is, in the first instance, directed to networked viewers of computer screens,
who have the material opportunity to interact. This work offers the opportunity to
examine different modalities of videoperformance and their implications: live and
recorded, video and networked screens, as well as the intersection of different
mediators: phone, video/web camera and networked computers. Abrahams
chooses romantic songs from Acconci’s selection, making her gendered address
more ambivalent. Moreover, she exposes aspects of her subjectivity she cannot
control by deliberately and directly making herself vulnerable to the actions of
viewers.
The different genders of the two artists, the performance strategies and
technologies they adopt, and the gap in the production dates of these two works
offer to examination a range of issues that covers the scope of this research project.
Examining my own videoperformance Before You Now (2013) completes this set of
case studies with the perspective of the performer and with the interplay of her
subjectivity, of the video camera and of the other evoked beyond it. This offers
insight into my methodology, into how my recent body of work operates as a
research tool, and into the coherence of this project across practice and text.
In the first two sections of chapter three, I occupy the position of the addressee –
Acconci’s and Abrahams’ you – to examine directly two encounters between one
viewer and one videoperformance. This approach aims to evoke an account of the
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relationality that emerges in the encounter between a subject and a
videoperformance. Making explicit how these works affect and produce aspects of
my subjectivity from a first person perspective reveals dynamics of the emergence
of relationality that could not otherwise be researched. I adopt my own subjectivity
as a tool to investigate relationality – not as the subject of research, but as a point of
access to the interplay of subjectivity and relationality. The method of performative
writing allows the relay of the ‘living performative encounter with art’ wherein both
subject looking and artwork are reconfigured and emerge anew in the encounter
(Phelan, 2001, p.45). The I of chapter three is a temporary fragment of my
subjectivity performed as text in relation to a videoperformance. Separating the
elements that emanate from one subjectivity and from the other in an instance of
relationality is made impossible by the dynamics of the gaze, and performative
writing allows this contradiction to remain productive. Subjectivity and relationality
emerge performatively together between subject and videoperformance, between
subject and writing, and between writer and reader – not in causal relation or
chronological order. In other words, chapter three concentrates on instances of
representation and performativity in relation to me – a performing and viewing
subject – in order to examine the interplay of the dynamics of the gaze, awareness,
reflection and transformation that characterise videoperformance.
In this context, the relationship that emerges in the encounter between this viewer
and a videoperformance is re-performed as writing (different fragments of
subjectivity are evoked and performed through writing), and extends into the
performance of the relationship between writer and reader. This written performance
relays and echoes the performative exchange of the encounter with the artwork
without faithfully reporting, representing or reproducing it. Similarly, it evokes and
continues the performance I enact for the camera and for future viewers,
complementing and maintaining the integrity of my methodology of practice into a
form of writing that does not contradict its values. Although it is a compromise,
performative writing maintains the fragmentation and instability of the performative
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emergent phenomena under scrutiny in this project. It is a compromise as this mode
of writing also remediates the encounter as the subjectivity of the writer is
performatively transformed again (Bolter and Grusin, 2000). In other words,
performative writing does not report, describe or represent, but mediates again and
performs again (differently) the performative exchanges between viewer and
videoperformance, performer and imagined viewer, and the relationality that
emerges.
Chapter four makes explicit the critical voices that resonate in the previous chapter:
the theoretical constructs examined in chapter one shape the configuration of
subjectivity that emerges in the first person account in combination with my past
encounters. Similarly, my past experiences as a maker and viewer of
videoperformances inform my responses to the works examined and to the making
of Before You Now (2013). The I of chapter three returns as the grammatical subject
and as the object of analysis of chapter four. The subjective and fragmented
knowledge that emerges from the first person accounts is examined in light of
relevant theoretical concepts and rigorously expounded.
Whilst chapter three endeavours to maintain the liveness and performativity of the
relational encounter, chapter four focuses on critically analysing the different form of
knowledge that emerges from the first person account. In a sense, relationality
remains unwritten, but the combination of the first person account as viewer and as
performer with the conceptual and theoretical overview of mediated performative
relationality offers an overall picture of performative mediated relationality and
addresses the research questions. By acknowledging the interplay of the dynamics
of the gaze and of academic analysis in this discussion, I also acknowledge the
openness of my argument as a contribution to knowledge that does not foreclose
the possibility of debate. Performative writing allows for a rigorous critical analysis
that respects the positionality of subjectivity. The reading of mediated performative




Performative Accounts of Relationality.
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3.1 Vito Acconci, Theme Song (1973)
I respond differently to different interpellations. Some modes of address and
invitations offer me a complementary position into which I slide easily. Others offer
enticing moments of discomfort that I want to experience for a time. Others seem to
address someone else.
When Acconci’s image fades in and his face appears on the screen in Theme Song,
those eyes are looking at me and asking me to lock gaze. He starts singing: ‘I can’t
see your face in my mind’ (see Appendix One). Or is he saying ‘I can’? He looks
uncomfortable lying on the carpet in front of the stripy sofa, and reaches clumsily for
cigarettes and for a tape player outside the frame. This discomfort appeals to me. I
stay, look and listen.
He can’t see me – he says he does not know what my face looks like, but he knows
that I am here. “Don’t you want to come in here? Sure! Sure you’ll come in here”. I
have not been asked, so I cannot refuse. As I watch closely and listen carefully, I
feel attracted and repelled; manipulated and made aware of my own thoughts;
intrigued and rejecting. I swing back and forth with his language – this is me
becomes this could be anybody; a question becomes a matter-of-fact statement,
then an offer that makes me feel uncomfortable; I don’t want you to feel alone, but I
don’t want you to wrap your body around mine. And I don’t want you to find
something that can win me over.
He is talking about his and my body as if they were of comparable substance, but in
this relationship they are not. I am not invited into a physical or geographical space,
but into a web of thoughts that reach out to include me. These threads seem to form
partial shapes that require my presence to become complete; at the same time I feel
cajoled into taking a particular position. I am not only watching, but also contributing
to something happening – by spending time with this image that is already another
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subject I am a complicit interlocutor, a different I produced and absorbed in this
exchange. I did not choose to shift from my position of viewer to this, but as I start
watching, as Acconci’s gaze fixes itself on me and calls me you, something in me
responds and becomes active – I am doing something that goes beyond looking. I
have stepped into another space not with my physical body and not for the duration
of the work, but in a much more fluid way what I call I, the position from which I act
and speak, takes on a perceivable elasticity and appears permeable in a way I am
not generally conscious of.
This face on a screen is as real as any other subject, and materialises as an
interlocutor as I watch and relate to him/it. Not a representation or a portrait of a
subject that is somewhere outside the screen, but a subject that emerges from the
flow of these electrons inside the glass of the screen (Jones, 2006). It is connected
with the artist Vito Acconci, his physical body and his body of work, but it is not just
an image of a man who really exists somewhere. His desires and my desires are
evoked in our meeting at this glass surface. This image of the artist and performer
Vito Acconci comes to life the moment he addresses me. The relational event that
takes place with me activates the image on the screen as a living subject and
activates me as an interlocutor. He seems to be addressing a subject who will
complement his relational offer, but he also seems to be pushing me to become that
subject. In a paradoxical way, I do not stop feeling that I am myself, yet I become
aware that feelings, thoughts and particular parts of my complex and fragmented
self emerge from this encounter already active: not one the consequence of the
other, but performatively as one. Act and subject emerge together from and within
this relationship on either side of the screen.
Sentence after sentence, he performs a series of ruses that delimit a position for me
to occupy. I recognise a frisson between what could be described as my will (or my
conscious desire or my sense of self or my present self) and other selves that are
brought into being by this exchange. He repeats some tricks with slight variations,
insisting on his loneliness, on wanting to take care of me, on wanting to be taken
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care of, on how good it would feel. At each return, the pull of a particular manoeuvre
seems more apparent and less effective, and I can see more clearly the difference
between the echoes of some of my own relational memories and the aspects of my
subjectivity that generally prevail in this present phase of my life.
The shape of the you that Acconci is working so hard to evoke seems malleable to
his manipulations as it shrinks and expands with the changing songs and lines. This
conjured you appears to have a will of some sort, but a weak one, which is swayed
by what he tells me and by what they are telling me. Acconci seems to imply that in
me there is an ongoing internal dialogue that he seems to know and understand –
the voice of desire is already arguing with the voices of culture and society, and
Acconci tries to insinuate himself between the different voices to give more weight
to one side of the dispute against the other. He seems to have something in mind,
and he seems to know that he needs to make it palatable to me. He seems to be
trying to convince me that I am, and I want to be, the one to ‘fulfil all the dreams’,
but that the voices of social norms, my upbringing, my feminist friends, the priest
and my parents are stopping me from listening to my own desires. I get the feeling
that what is being asked of me is not to occupy a clear role, but to offer a sense of
availability and flexibility to whatever may come up for him. Even when he appears
to turn the tables by saying that whatever I do is the right thing …
I have been writing that he seems and appears to be doing and wanting all this. I
see in this performance of Acconci these relational dynamics amplified because of
my own layered memories, desires, fears and internalised norms. Although I am the
result of a unique mix of influences from specific environments, I can also recognise
elements that are shared with many other subjects and form the basis of political
movements and philosophical enquiries: the gender, class background and religion
that I did not choose, the language that shaped and shapes my thoughts, the
heterosexual family structure I was born into. This probably means that although
other subjects will evoke and perform differently nuanced relationships with slightly
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different Acconcis, some of these larger themes will resonate for most subjects who
share some foundational elements of their living psychic structure.
Acconci proposes a series of invitations that appeal to features I share with many
subjects, and I feel some of them more clearly than others: I have not been asked,
so I cannot refuse – is this what makes me feel manipulated? Now I want to see
where he will go next and what else he will try. I can feel the emotional blackmail
and manipulation I felt as a teenager: I feel interpellated and implicated by his
address. Is it recognition? Does this remind me of how other men have addressed
(did I allow them?)? Is it our shared Italian background I recognise? The shifting
shape of this relationship floats between the screen and me, and bonds me with
Acconci for a time. I am aware of Lacan’s warning about the illusory reciprocity of
the gaze – am I confusing my desire with Acconci(’s), and does this amplify my
blindness to this other? I cannot objectively say that Acconci is being manipulative,
vulnerable, duplicitous, revealing or honest, but I can confidently say that with me as
an interlocutor the relationship takes these forms at certain moments. I guess this
happens with some other women too. And some men? He never mentions any
gender.
My desire – my conscious and unconscious desires shaped by a web of memories,
prohibitions and influences of role-models – contributes to the interpellation of this
instance of the artist’s represented and performed subjectivity, this black and white
Vito Acconci, and taints his contribution to this relationship. It is my desire that
brings forth some aspects of the artist’s persona that in turn I respond to. Desire
emerges in me in the present, but colours the present with the voices and smells of
the past. I want to be needed and desired, to form a unique pattern of desires with
another subject. Instead, he tells me ‘You can look like anybody; I’ll take anybody.
I’ll take anything I can get’. The shape between the screen and me shifts again – I
remember feeling like this and feeling very vulnerable. This vulnerability and fear of
not being loved for who I am emerges now, yet I do not walk away.
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He changes the song on the tape player and launches into another cliché (yes, I feel
irritated):
‘Oh I need you, I mean I need you YOU, I need you to take care of me.
Oh, come on, I need you to show me that, show me that I matter, to
show me that you remember my name, you know who I am … [sings]
Oh come on, I need somebody to remember me, somebody to take care
of me. Come on, you can do that’.
Of course I can. And I continue to swing between attraction and aversion at the
transparent attacks and retreats (‘Ah, that wouldn’t work, uh? Come on, look, I try
this trick with you: I’ll be really honest …’). The subject that seems to emerge on the
screen is of a vulnerable insecure man whose desires, like mine, have also been
shaped by successive layers of pressure and interpellations. Yet, he seems to have
ways of turning this fragility into a tool to exercise power over me. His relational
stratagems re-deploy the lack of coherence and continuity in his subjectivity as
levers to shift my position towards the position he desires me to occupy: ‘I won’t
impose my way on you, but sooner or later you’ve got to be here’.
I can see my own fragmentation and vulnerability reflected in his, and I feel this
connects us. On the other hand, he seems to be trying to take control not only of his
own fragmented subjectivity, but of the complexity of our encounter and of my own
subjectivity as well. I think this might have something to do with the way I am
conditioned to see male interlocutors, but I cannot put my finger on how it works. I
can only see this other from my own present perspective. I am not familiar with most
of the songs he is playing (I was five in 1973), so his own words have more
resonance than the voices, melodies and lines that he plays. I have a vague
understanding of the way he picks songs and lines to suit his monologue. The
transparency of his tactics reassures me that I know quite clearly what is going on. I
wonder how clearly I would have been able to see this if he had been physically
here.
We come to this moment moulded by our histories yet incomplete, carved into
representations of our momentary selves. The ebb and flow of relational modalities
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mirrors the complexity and fragmentation of our shifting subjectivities. This intimacy
that crosses the screen amplifies the waves of vulnerability and the power games
that modulate face-to-face intimacy, allowing me a closer look at my own desires,
hesitations and ruses. But what am I really seeing? Face-to-screen-to-face. Yet, the
face is also a screen (Lacan, 2004). You are saying that if I were there you wouldn’t
be able to see my eyes: I would be too close for you to focus. Without the screen we
would be too close to see each other. Instead, ‘look how close we are! Sure I can
see you, I can see you right up against my face, up against my body. Oh linger on,
stay with me. [smokes] there is no reason to go away! Come as close to me as you
can get’. The screen creates a comfortable distance: it is barrier and bridge. It
reveals memories, desires, fears and habits that are already there and mediate
face-to-face encounters. When you are in front of me without a screen, we respond
to each other so quickly and our subjectivities become so confused that all these
mechanisms become transparent and we forget they are at work.
In this mediate encounter, the screen is transparent and subjectivities emerge. The
relationship exists before us, like a musical scale ready to be used as a system for
composition. We improvise and repeat, fishing possibilities out of our reservoirs of
memories and models:
Your eyes would have to be pale because I couldn’t see you clearly –
you’d be too close. Too close to see any clear image. I couldn’t focus on
you. Oh, the world would really be strange. When I see you it’s really
strange. I don’t have to put you on the mirror – I see you right before
me! I don’t have to put a mirror in front of me in order to see you.
I am not sure anymore if this you is me. He moves on quickly and I don’t have time
to think this through. Although I recognise Acconci’s position of power as the
speaker in this instance of relationality, I also recognise his blindness to himself and
to me, his vulnerability, his lack of coherence and his failures. I perceive Acconci’s
fragmentation as a mirror of my own and a possibility for reciprocal relationality. Is
he trying to put me in this position so that I am the mirror? Is he going to use me to
see himself? I am in front of a shifting performance and partial representation of
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Acconci’s subjectivity on a screen, and I feel interpellated to perform a function.
Even if I do not understand what function, I engage fully in trying to decode this
engagement. Perhaps, this is all that is asked of me.
To some extent, I can see performative relationality unfolding and pulling me along,
shaping me and being shaped by me and by this shifting iteration of Acconci’s
subjectivity. Yet, each instance of the subject Vito Acconci is evoked both by his
performance and by my engagement with this videoperformance. My partial
awareness of this dynamic and of my part in it creates a fissure in the gaze – I am
already fragmented; he is already absent; he cannot confirm me in my existence; he
cannot fulfil my psychic desire, and I cannot fulfil his. I am myself interpellated as a
particular iteration of this subject – for example the woman who does not want to be
respected as much as all that – I can observe myself responding with irritation to
this interpellation. And I can observe myself evoking the artist as this particular type
of man, with these intentions, these feelings, these desires, these memories. We
emerge as these specific subjects, as the performative products of each instance of
this mediated relationality as we summon our histories.
My awareness of the absence of his physical body does not leave me alone in front
of a video screen. Quite the opposite – I am with him and with myself. I respond and
write as if I were in the presence of another, but I can watch myself relate as I
relate. I notice the pull of some ruses and how others leave me disconnected. This
humming (black-and-) white man of an age I cannot guess won’t be able to wrap his
body around mine, he can’t take advantage of my vulnerability, of my memories, of
the conditioning left over in me by past relationships, of my desires. I can’t smell his
heavy smoker’s breath and I am free to explore my own feeling in the safety of this
mediated intimacy. The screen is warm both with his presence and with the safety of
his absence.
When he says again ‘come into me’, I see that he is the screen and his invitation
shifts again. What would it mean to join him into the screen? Had Acconci been a
woman, this might have evoked a very different position for me within imagined
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vagina and womb. Instead, the image of his male body lying in front of the stripy
sofa leaves visual space for another body within the frame of the screen. He has
carved out a space for me and gives voice to this space: ‘come into me’. When
Acconci speaks in the first person in Theme Song, this I that speaks emerges from
the whole picture – not only Acconci’s face and body, but also the songs he plays,
the sofa and the portion of carpet in front of it. Acconci emerges in this
videoperformance as a mould for a position I could take within another’s living
psychic structure: he carves a space for me to occupy in (relation to) him. To go into
him would mean to accept the boundaries he is laying out by addressing me
through the rehashed words of carefully selected songs: ‘be this, do that, tell me
this, be that for me’. He is asking me to let his desires – or my own evoked image of
his desires – interpellate me as the possible object of his desire, mould me and
shape me to fit this image that he is, with my complicity, layering and modelling.
As I speculate on desire and its interlocutor, other questions come to the surface of
my consciousness: whom are you talking to? Whom do you think you are talking to?
His address seems to allude to presences that precede me. Even as an informed
viewer and maker of videoperformance, I cannot with any certainty state whose
place I am taking when I respond to this videoperformance that addresses me as
you. Is there an original other? Who is Vito Acconci singing and speaking to in
Theme Song? Mother, lovers, himself, women who rejected him, a particular woman
who responded in a particular way, his latest partner, his son or daughter? I can
only engage from my own position, determined by a vast number of factors,
including being an Italian heterosexual woman of a specific age, an artist focusing
on videoperformance, an academic analysing performative relationality, a daughter
with two younger brothers and other more ineffable splinters of recognisable
identities. I shift to questioning which relational memories shape this Acconci: he is
echoing past exchanges, just as past exchanges echo in me.
The number of interlocutors has been multiplying between the screen and me: this
momentary and shifting Acconci, this momentary and shifting Cremona are joined
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by parents, partners, lovers, friends who come forth and retreat. These voices
merge, their interpellations echo and overlap, and the fault lines between present
and past become less clear. Here I do not need to make a decision or act, but how
did I act in the past, how will I act in the future in front of similar provocations? Did I
do what he seemed to need? Or did I find a way to say no? Was I able to say yes, I
need it too, but not with you? I think I remember thinking I can’t really say this – it
would hurt him. From where I am standing now (this moment, but also this age,
marital status, profession, ability to reflect) I cannot imagine not standing firm on
what I need, but those feelings are vivid and clear. So vivid that I wonder in what
situations and with which interlocutors these aspects of my subjectivities are evoked
most powerfully in my present life.
I respond differently to different interpellations, but interpellations rarely stop at ‘hey,
you!’: they shift and slide evoking different yous. Unexpected interlocutors emerge
every moment from the splintered subjectivities of all others we encounter. Nothing
about others stays fixed outside and inside my own living psychic structure.
Writing this encounter and reading my own words reveals to me that my subjectivity
is not my own, but a composite of remembered gestures and inflections reinforced
with compliments, rejected, suggested and imposed. Acconci’s voice and
corrugated forehead entice to the forefront versions of me that surprise me for their
permanence: why are they still part of me? I thought I had vanquished them with the
end of adolescence, with the conscious choice of living in a different country. In a
different language, similar desires still haunt me and shift my present English-
speaking confident mature womanhood into the uncertainties of gendered
exchanges to be negotiated anew.
Is this what I do to viewers and interlocutors when I slip into seduction? Do I protect
myself from my fears by tempting little boys and little girls out of their shells?
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3.2 Annie Abrahams, Theme Song Revisited (After Acconci) (2011)
The screen is briefly filled with white and grey striped fabric (Abrahams’ dress?) and
a superimposed text: ‘call me’ and two phone numbers. Soon the pink-red hue of
skin (at first I think it might be part of her face, but then I recognize the palm of a
hand) fills the screen and her voice asks if I can hear her. ‘Are you there?’ (see
Appendix Two). The image remains vaguely abstract and shimmers with large
coloured pixels and the quality of skin that is too close to see (White, 2003). I am
mesmerized by the slow rhythm of the movement and by the pace of Abrahams’ soft
voice. The atmosphere is warm and intimate, and I feel lulled into letting go to this
visual caress. Occasionally, I catch myself moving my head to see between the
fingers – I can only glimpse the fabric’s pattern, but not her face.
She is speaking in the present tense: this is happening now, but I also know that it
has already happened. The low quality of the image on the screen reminds me that
this moment happened live in front of many people, in their houses and on the
screens of their portable computers. It is happening on the screen of my laptop now,
at my desk, in my house. Now it’s a recording being played, whilst then it was an
event being broadcast. I have to remind myself that this is the case, because
Abrahams’s voice is addressing me now, and something in me is responding – I am
her present you. I am with her skin and with her voice. She does not face me the
way I am facing the screen and this asymmetric intimacy absorbs me in an
impalpable engagement.
She says she knows I am there and asks me if am real. Then I hear the song and I
am reminded that there is another she is also in dialogue with – Acconci is in the
title and The Velvet Underground’s Pale Blue Eyes (1969) is one of the tracks he
plays in Theme Song. She voices some selected lines as if they were her thoughts,
like Acconci did in 1973, but he seemed so sure about my existence and my
position. Acconci addressed me in the certainty that I was there and this built a
strong bind between us – strong enough to allow him to ask for me to step into his
desires completely. Abrahams keeps asking me if I am there and if I am real.
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Because my substance is less defined in her address, I feel less present to the
relationship: the I that emerges from Abrahams’ interpellation wonders who she is
and what she is supposed to do. Of course I am real – I am your real viewer and
interlocutor. You interpellated me and brought me into existence, just like I bring you
into existence as an interlocutor by watching, listening, relating and feeling this
encounter. Yet, you are telling me that this is not enough and that unless I call you,
you will not know if I am real.
Abrahams asks me questions that demand actions and answers. Her voice
becomes more determined and I feel the weight of a sense of responsibility that I
did not ask for. She is talking to m e and evoking something that is part of my
everyday life: dialing a number on a phone and speaking with someone I may know
or not, usually for a purpose.  I have to do something to activate this relationship,
and my present incapacity to respond and prove to her that ‘I am real’ involves me
in a direct way. I desire her presence more than I desire making my own presence
felt. I am real to this real relationship because she is calling me you, yet not real
enough for Abrahams to offer me any confirmation of my reality in the present state
of our relationship. The I that Abrahams seems to evoke in me is a subject who
desires to be confirmed in its existence and stability. She has no doubt that she is
real and repeatedly states it with emphasis. Her demands and offers do not seem to
come from a position of need or unconscious desire, but of self-sufficiency and
certainty. She seems to say: I am real, it is you I am not sure about.
This paradox puts me in an impossible position: I am real to this relationship as the
you that she evokes and affects, engaged with my own and her thoughts, feelings
and desires, yet she is asking me to shift to another I, who will move away from this
screen-intimacy to dial a number and hear her voice. I can already hear her voice –
the desire that is awakened in me is to see her and be the one she is relating to
directly. By loosening this bond in order to move to another mediated relational
practice (connecting through the phone) I would have to stop being real to the
relationship that Abrahams herself has produced. This paradox produces tangible
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relationality as I am completely absorbed in trying to decode this paradox and my
unstable position within it.
I cannot find any position for myself in this situation, but I do recognize a relational
pattern coming to life and unfolding as Abrahams speaks: I have to withdraw in
order to engage. This contradiction keeps me bound to the shimmering screen and
to Abrahams’s voice, which is becoming more and more categorical: ‘Come on, do
it. Do it! Don’t hesitate, go on! Call! Take your phone and call me. I’m waiting’. I
cannot separate the various levels at which I relate to her – the appeal of her
invisible presence, my empathy for her discomfort, her dependence on the action of
strangers, the sense of exposure, the sense of impending failure ... She seems both
fragile and self-assured. I imagine her feelings from the way her voice resonates
within me: I evoke Abrahams as in need of others’ action, in control as she set up
this situation herself, but vulnerable and unmasked in her desires for others to
confirm her existence and relational presence. The fragments of her subjectivity
multiply in my imagination to correspond to the parts of my subjectivity evoked in
this exchange.
Abrahams’ shifting tone affects me for its firm and authoritative quality; it becomes a
little too brusque for seduction and for a sense of intimacy. The inner other it evokes
in me is closer to mother than to friend. I hear the voice of my mother stating what
needs to be done. An aspect of me emerges with the temptation to rebel to these
injunctions, and jostles with the desire to please her and myself. As I so directly
respond to this interpellation with my mother in mind, I recognize that Abrahams’
request for intimacy usurps the place meant for conversations with my (m)other,
physical or symbolic (Berlant, 2000). In the knowledge that in this interpellation I
hear the ghost voice of my mother, I do not rebel to Abrahams’ firmness, or harden
my response to her performed need. I am complicit in her performance of presence
and absence, desire and rejection, intimacy and distance, present and past.
I also hear the voice of a performer and colleague whose work does not seem to be
developing the way she hopes, the voice of a friend who asks assertively for what
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she needs and the voice of another subject who asks me to satisfy her desires even
if I am not sure what they are. I do not abandon her in the hands of unsympathetic
viewers, but join forces as a performer who also experienced an unresponsive
audience. This awareness opens me to accept what I do not see of Abrahams –
whom is she really addressing? Whose place am I usurping? What other
conversations and interlocutors resonate in this relationship on both sides? What
emerges is not a utopian blanket acceptance of all forms of otherness, but a
pragmatic acceptance of another who ‘mirrors’ my lack of consistency and
univocality in the accounts I give of myself (Butler, 2005).
‘Mostly, you just make me mad! But now, please call me’. This affects me deeply,
and leaves open the space for my inner dialogue to resonate and for my
unconscious desire to cloud my responses in this relationality evoked in complicity.
We both emerge in this encounter fragmented and full of contradictions: strong and
weak, generous and demanding, evoked and denied. By not being visible and
through the tone of her voice she feeds my own desire to relate and holds it
suspended in its possibility. The mixture of demand and vulnerability holds me in a
compelling bond as my desire to relate remains suspended and unfulfilled. The offer
is open to all but she delegates the responsibility to make a move to me. I’m
touched and irritated. I just want Abrahams to show her face and look at me, to hear
her tell me that I am here, that I am what she needs.
What is she doing to me by engaging me so intimately, then telling me that this is
not real unless I do something else? She is evoking a relationship in which being
the recipient of a relational offer and responding at a performative relational level is
not enough. Whilst my relational engagement in itself makes this relationship come
into being, Abrahams compels me into a practical, physical act involving my whole
body in the world, which goes beyond this screen and takes this instance of
relationality into a wider sphere of action. I can see myself desiring that this other
relates to me and becoming unnerved by being asked to come out of this emerging
relational pattern to activate a different one. If I phoned Abrahams, I would start a
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different performance in which I am making a relational offer within an engagement
that someone else has already framed. As I become aware of the discomfort that
the emergence of this I causes me, I wonder how this aspect of my subjectivity
plays within other relationships.
The screen says ‘call me’, but I cannot, as the performance is not live. As I was not
a viewer of the work during the festival, the invitation to phone Abrahams does not
address me, yet when I am in front of the screen and I hear her voice, the request is
addressed to me too: ‘This is not video! This is not television! This is real! This is not
imagination. You are there, I am here!’. What if I had called her? Now that I can only
access a recorded videoperformance, Abrahams is no less real to me, and no less
real than me. I cannot separate the appeal of her invisible presence, her imagined
discomfort in a performance that has its own dynamics, our vulnerability to and
dependence on the action of strangers, the sense of personal risk.
As a second song starts, the phone rings loudly and Abrahams answers. I finally
see her face, but she is not looking at me anymore (I imagined she was looking at
me when I could not see her). She is smiling broadly and thanking the caller: ‘I’m so
glad you called me’. I met Abrahams in person in the past and when I can finally see
her face I am not surprised at how she looks. Do the wrinkles and grey hair of this
older woman surprise other viewers? Her tone towards the caller resonates with
relief and warmth. A very different subject from the one who had been offering and
denying a relationship through the living screen is evoked. The pragmatics of asking
‘who are you’ and ‘what did you say’ pull Abrahams into a different relational mode,
but do not completely break the spell of Abrahams’ bond with me – she appears
torn between her different interlocutors and stumbles between ‘OK yeah, I’m very
far’ and ‘no, I’m very close in fact’. Abrahams is now more directly caught in the
paradox she herself initiated, and I feel her split loyalties to the caller present to her
ear and to the viewers just beyond the camera.
She is walking away, and I am left to watch her as she relates with someone else
and becomes disinterested in my existence. Would I have called? What would I
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have said? Would she have greeted me as warmly as she greeted Helen? This shift
in relationality retrospectively taints her performance with desire, trust and
friendship. She really needed someone to call her – I wasn’t sure because of what
feelings her request evoked in me. I was blinded by my desires and unable to see
Abrahams’ desire (Lacan, 1998). I am surprised and annoyed by the confused
mixed reactions that this brief relational situation has evoked in me. I look for
excuses: it all happens so quickly! Acconci takes more than 30 minutes to modulate
our relationship, whilst Abrahams concentrates this situation into six very fast-
moving minutes. I barely had the time to become aware of what was happening to
me (and between us) and something else was already happening.
I evoke both Acconci and Abrahams as subjects who are, in these
videoperformances, exposing inconvenient aspects of their subjectivities and
instrumentalizing their vulnerability to intensify their relational offers. Yet, Abrahams’
perceived and performed honesty lulls me into an impression of stability and
coherence of Annie Abrahams as a subject, and allows my desires to surface and
demand to be satisfied: You do not need me – let me need you. It is uncomfortable
to become aware of this aspect of my response to this interpellation, and my
thoughts move away from this work towards my relationship with my mother, to
questions about the men I have fallen in love with and to the relational power of
videoperformance. I immersed myself in this apparently simple work without thinking
about where it would lead me and now I feel surprised and transformed. I have
become aware of something that in my face-to-face encounters with Abrahams and
intimate encounters with others I had no opportunity to question.
This is a very intimate relationship, even more intimate than a sexual encounter. My
desire to relate has blinded me to Abrahams’ desires. I cannot imagine how this
relational encounter would have changed if I had been encountering this performing
subject at the time of her live appeal to a networked audience. Even when replayed
from a recording, her address to the you she knows is there maintains the qualities
of happening in the present, but its asynchronous condition is highlighted. Would
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the mediation of the screen have given me the same space to reflect on the
resonating layers of this encounter? Would I have been able to call her and say
simply Annie, I just wanted to see you? Maybe my awareness of the pull of these
different desires would have been accentuated by the material possibility of making
my own desire manifest. Or maybe it would have disappeared behind my capacity
to act.
As I engage again with Abrahams in Theme Song Revisited (After Acconci) by
writing and reading my shifting I, different facets emerge both on and in front of the
screen. This continuously emerging and transforming relationality builds on the
awareness already activated by engaging with Acconci’s Theme Song, and more
complexities come into view. I am interpellated not only as lover, daughter, sibling,
partner and friend, but also as maker of videoperformance and provocateur of
intimate relationships. I recognize patterns that emerge in my videoperformances as
I invite others to relate and reflect. I feel a heightened sense of responsibility that I
am not able to examine as a viewer in front of the screen of the set of works that
form Intimations. But I can write as the emerging subject who faces the camera and
interpellates viewers into relating.
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3.3 Cinzia Cremona, Before You Now (2013)
I adopt different modes of address to complement the position of my interlocutors,
but here it appears that I am speaking first, inviting someone to become something
in a situation I create. I have in mind a relational atmosphere, a sense of how this
shared moment should feel. I associate words to this mode: real, warm, authenticity
– this is the possibility I want to offer. What do I need to offer and ask the other to
make this happen? It is my responsibility to produce this interpellation, but I am
already part of an ongoing conversation. My desires move me towards making this
work and towards finding more interlocutors for something that already exists in me.
In a sense, I evoke others as I already perceive them and my address is shaped by
their continuous presence. I was never and will never be alone.
In the first instance, fragments of subjectivity emerge as me in relation to the
powerful voices of others who are not here now. This means that it is not enough to
plan a videoperformance, write a script, set up the camera and shoot. In this
ongoing polyphonic dialogue an I that can steer my internal ongoing conversation
towards this work emerges slowly. It is not a part I can act, but an orchestration of
aspects of myself that I can perform in this setting. Mothers at various ages,
brothers, teachers, friends, lovers, encounters echo, emerge, renew their emotional
colours. In a way I cannot describe, an impression of order emerges. I draft a script
that I know I will not follow. I choose a room, an angle in relation to the natural light
from a window, a chair, a height for the tripod, a framing.
I face the camera with its dark receding lens (which leads my gaze to you, who are
already there) and its small side screen showing me the image of me now. This is
the image of my face that represents me at this moment, but also the tool for this
relational venture. This parallel relationship between my sense of self and the image
of my own face is a constant source of surprises – my image on screen rarely
corresponds to what I expect and is radically different from what I saw in the mirror
just before switching the camera on. This needs to be settled before I can start
focusing on the lens and the other beyond it. Tiredness, age, anger, sadness, and
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other feelings I was unaware of, take me by surprise in these facial marks. The little
screen frames them, and charges them with meaning and importance. I briefly
wonder if others see me like this face-to-face and how I read what I see on other
faces. Approaching the moment of shooting I had an impression of order that was
just that – an impression. Now, a compelling internal dialogue about the enormous
significance of the area of skin around my eyes dominates the proceedings. You are
aging. Are you sure videoperformance is still a good idea? I don’t feel sad – why do
I look sad? Why do I look this tired? People must feel sorry for me all the time. This
is not about feeling sorry for me. This will not do. You will not do. How can you offer
anything when you seem to be pleading for something? Maybe this is all this is
about …
Nevertheless, I press record and start addressing you and as I make myself yours,
for you, I don’t like me – I don’t sound right. How should this sentence sound? Did I
pronounce that right? I forgot to smile – Am I smiling? What was I going to say
next? I’m biting my lips again … I persist until I get where I wanted to get and I can
stop recording. The internal dialogue about the way my physical face becomes an
image is so loud that I cannot concentrate on addressing you, and this is both part
of my psychic structure and of the making of the work. Representation to
performativity: the balance shifts from seeing and making sense of the image, to
doing something else, and back again.
Watching back is painfully frustrating. I know that I cannot see what you see, but I
have to do this anyway. Adjusting how I feel and how I am represented to become a
sharper tool for relating is part of the relationship that will emerge. This dialogue
cannot be avoided or ignored, but becomes centre-stage until it is more balanced
and can merge with the background. In the meantime, I am visibly not concentrating
on you. My eyes are a little vague, as if I was trying to focus at different distances at
the same time. I stare into the depth of the lens, but these other interlocutors hold
me back onto my chair and I cannot reach you. Your gaze and your voice are a
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whisper compared to the loud presence of what emerges from the doubts and
criticism of my accumulated shards of subjectivity.
I work at taming this aspect of my performance, as I become more aware that this
background chattering gives body and substance to my desire to be in relation to
you. If you were taking the place of just one of those others, it would be easier to
address only you, but you are not mamma or my love or you bastard – all of them
float beyond the lens with all those other me I have been and I can be at different
times. I cannot quite see where the criticisms are coming from, so I cannot reply or
stand up to them. They are just me, and completely convincing because of that. I
am at once straining to decode this cacophony, and to numb its most powerful
affects, to find you and to become able to address you. I seek within this tangle a
thread of conversation you can be part of. We can only do it together and to get this
going I need to do my part and offer you the best I have. I need to move from
portraying myself on screen to becoming a living open relational possibility.
Time and space away from this setting and the camera help me to prepare thoughts
and appearance, and achieve a sense of wellbeing aimed at feeling ready to step
out again towards beyond the lens. I come back to the camera looking and feeling
better (a little make-up, a brighter smile, more flattering lighting). I have given in to
this pressure without challenging it and without understanding its precise source,
but I have to avoid those questions for now – this is not therapy, but a deep outward
engagement. I have more space to feel the presence of another subject and I am
focused on addressing it now. My gaze, my will and my intentions converge on the
lens and on this other, who is already there, materialised by my attention ‘before I
start the performance’. Fragments of myself resonate in my words and in my gaze,
and strengthen the presence of this temporary subject: by repeating you as if
performing an incantation, I conjure it here now. It is not your response I seek, but
your presence in my address, so that you can, with me, make this relationship
happen.
136
I am making this videoperformances because all I think about is how people relate
to each other and to me, how relationships work, how ‘I’ changes in response to
dialogue with any Other past or present, internal or external, face-to-face or
mediated. I make relational work because I desire to relate with all these me and
with all these you.
Who is this Other? I do not evoke any one individual, but an amalgam of all the
people I have met, read about, encountered and imagined in person, in films and in
artworks. It is the ultimate responsive subject, who can be anything at anytime, a full
being. This complex aggregation of subjectivities is able to resonate with the
possibilities of disparate interlocutors without taking refuge in a standardised set of
responses determined by one identity. Not a mirror to reflect, reassure or confirm
anyone, but another as alive and real as I am, with a long complex history,
contradictory desires and believes, emerging different at each interpellation. We
depend on each other to exist in this dynamic state and I come to life as it
materialises here beyond the lens. It is the other I aspire to be and to be with. It is
the living possibility of openness and otherness. Our encounter is charged with
open erotic possibilities and genders emerge and evaporate. It is a unique form of
intimacy with all the possible others, but also with all the subjects I can emerge as.
It matters to me that this other subject is fully engaged, eyes widening with
responsiveness, feeling and thinking, absorbed in paradoxical desires. This ideal
imagined subject resonates with my interpellations, and a variety of inflections of
subjectivity emerge out of this vast reservoir of potential ways of being with another.
Not the instantaneous response of subjects sharing my physical presence, but a
delayed mediated psychic engagement. This loop of interdependence is made more
tangible by the physical absence of the other subject: I cannot think you and I
separately. I am not sure which desire is evoked in you or in me, which function I
think you are going to fulfil, who is going to provoke what, what space we carve out
for each other. It would be easy to slip into a superficial explanation: this other is not
there, but just another side of me. This narcissistic shortcut ignores your existence
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in me and that I emerge in relations with others in a continuous process that makes
it impossible to think me without you.
My performance acknowledges your presence in the making of my subjectivity now,
in the past and in the future. I make you tangible so that I can resonate with more
ways of being, so that I can see more of me emerge, so that others can also expand
their possible ways of being. As I perform, I am both aware and unaware of this
state of being. I let the words lead me to the next sentence, and the guessing game
of what you are feeling and thinking thrills me into different ways of being me. I shoo
away traces of other dialogues to stop them getting in between you and me and I
lose track of time. It all happens now so that this now can perpetuate itself and
continue to happen in the present tense every time the images cycle.
The magic does not last long – I am feeling tired and I start moving towards the end:
‘I’ll have to go soon’. Few more words and I look into your eyes.
I press stop and gasp – I was holding my breath. I am drained and in a state of pain
I cannot describe. I feel it acutely now as I write and I have to keep stopping to clear
my thoughts. Desire and delusion … me as a delightful six-year-old adored by my
grandparents … loss, conflict, anger … The conscious selection of internal
dialogues and internalised others has left me with all these other voices clamouring
for attention. The roots of this moment of magic run deep and different every time;
this is what nurtures me into reaching out for you. Now your presence and your
absence burn at the same intensity and I cannot think.
I am drained and empty and elated. Numb too. I have to go now.
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Chapter Four
Analysis of the First Person Accounts
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The performative writing of the previous chapter employs my subjectivity as a tool
for research, but also performs it differently from the subjectivity that emerges
viewing Acconci’s and Abrahams’s work. Writing in the first person produces a
particular configuration of a multi-faceted subject, which does not necessarily exist
outside the text, and offers an opportunity to reflect on the fragmented subjectivities
performed in the encounters with the videoperformances and the other evoked
beyond the video camera. In other words, subjectivity is produced and examined in
the same action. Although a differently configured subject emerges in the text,
something of the performative relationality produced in the making of and engaging
with videoperformance also persists. This writing practice holds open the
contradictions produced in videoperformance and articulates them in forms that
remain unstable, but which can now be more easily examined, although not
exhausted, by critical analysis (Phelan, 1997; Jones, 2006).
In this chapter, I make explicit and critically analyse the key processes that emerge
in the previous chapter. The first person performed in the writing of chapter three
returns as the grammatical subject and as the object of analysis here, as I examine
the positions I assume by participating in mediated relationships with Acconci and
Abrahams. My analysis focuses first on the psychic dynamics of power that inform
the process of interpellation (Butler, 1997c). Butler proposes contiguous processes
of interpellation, citation and performativity that confirm normative models of
subjectivity while remaining open to renewal and transformation. Since in the
mediated encounters of videoperformance the subject represented on screen
remains materially unchanged, the subject in front of the screen has the opportunity
to recognise some of the dynamics at work, and the opportunity to redefine its
position in relationality. In this context, both performer’s and viewer’s subjectivity
emerge differently configured in shifting relational moments, and, to some extent,
the viewer can develop and maintain some awareness of this shifting (Butler, 2005).
At the same time, the screen’s perceived transparency (immediacy) allows the
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image of the performer to affect viewers performatively, while also mediating and
informing this performativity (Bolter and Grusin, 2000). From this perspective, the
screen is an effective mediator that encourages safe iterations of intimacy while
negating the distinction between subject and other: the performer is both on screen
and evoked within the viewer. This resonates with Lacan’s definition of ‘extimacy’ as
a set of dynamics that operate at the same time inside and outside the subject,
making the distinction between inside and outside, other subject and the Lacanian
Other (language, culture, the law, normativity) unnecessary (Lacan, 1992, p.139).
From this perspective, the other mentioned in this chapter evokes the complexities
of subjectivity discussed in chapter one, and signposts the fluctuation of the role of
the other between bearer of the gaze, imaginary other that confirms the wholeness
of the subject (objet petit a), symbol of the unassimilable radical alterity of the Other,
and representative of the symbolic order itself – the Other understood as language,
the law and those structures that precede all subjects and mediate all relationships.
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4.1 Interpellated as a woman: Vito Acconci, Theme Song, 1973
A videoperformance that activates a ‘scene of address’ by summoning a you
activates an asynchronous asymmetric process in which performer and viewer
interpellate each other and become each other’s interlocutor (Butler, 2005). This
process functions as a reciprocal negotiation of relative positions within available
models and tests the limits of performable variations (Butler, 2005, p.50). In this
productive and transformative process, subjects are performed and renewed in
relation to each other, to previous interpellations and to new possibilities. Whilst the
performer interpellates the viewer through images and words relayed by the screen,
the viewer interpellates the performer in ways that remain invisible. Additionally, the
subject performing to camera is already informed by the presence of a viewer
evoked in and by the performance (Acconci, 1974). The first person accounts of my
own encounters with Acconci in Theme Song (1973), with Abrahams in Theme
Song Revisited (After Acconci) (2011) and with the other beyond the camera in the
making of my own work Before You Now (2013) manifest the contradictions and
complexity of this reciprocal asymmetric address. The interpellation activated in the
work meets the interpellation performed by the viewer as she addresses the
performers on screen with her gaze and participation, evoking him and her as
subjects in these exchanges.
The first person accounts unravel three encounters that affect my subjectivity
differently, but also reveal some common elements. My first responses as a viewer
of Acconci’s and Abrahams’s address exposes aspects of my subjectivity that are
well established and not in question. In the first instance, even if neither artist
mentions gender, as a viewing and writing subject my sexualised subjectivity
emerges as feminine – I appear to have accepted that I am addressed as a woman.
I assume a position that has been rehearsed in interactions that, since birth, have
been guided towards acceptable gendered behaviours (Grosz, 1991). These
behaviours are regulated by power relations inscribed in laws and norms (Butler,
1993). This dynamic becomes evident in relation to both Acconci’s and Abrahams’s
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work: in Theme Song (1973), Acconci addresses his other with lines from pop songs
that reproduce heterosexual romantic relationships and something in me responds.
Abrahams adopts a similar mechanism, thus appearing to address chiefly a male
viewer. In this second case, I understand that I may not be the primary addressee of
those lines, yet I am directly implicated as a participating viewer by Abrahams’s
address, although in different ways. A sense of camaraderie emerges, mixed with a
desire to help and be accepted. When in the position of the viewer I am addressed
as you, I am interpellated as a heterosexual woman, as this process re-performs
social norms that continue to inform and reinforce gendered subjectivity and the
power relations that demarcate it. In other words, ‘[o]ne individual (nine times out of
ten it is the right one) turns round, believing / suspecting / knowing that [the call] is
for him [sic]’ (Althusser, 1971, p.118).
Acconci implicates me as a female viewer more directly and clearly than Abrahams
as his counterpart in the heterosexual relationships evoked by the songs and by his
address, and in this sense I am already accepted and confirmed as a subject with a
complementary role. His stance calls me into action with an attitude that is already
familiar to me, and I perform my role in this scene. Even before uttering the first
word of Theme Song (1973), Acconci implicates me by appearing on screen and
looking at me. The directionality and intensity of his stance is already informed by
the knowledge of the presence of a viewer in front of the screen (Acconci, 1974).
When I take the position of the viewer of this particular work, I am the subject that is
addressed and that responds. This process is animated by a number of generative
contradictions as different fragments of my subjectivity emerge and shift their
positions, but I also remains throughout the encounter the active grammatical
subject of the statement: I respond and, in turn, interpellate (Lacan, 2006, p.677;
Butler, 2005, p.84). The subjects involved are always already interpellated and
participating in the gaze, but new possibilities of subjectivity continue to emerge,
and the flow of interpellations and desire remains largely unpredictable (Althusser,
1971; Butler, 1990). As in videoperformance unconscious desires and the gaze are
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mediated by the screen, the encounter is asynchronous and asymmetric, deflecting
the direct correspondence of call-and-response and affording a space for
awareness to emerge.
Figure 4.1 Vito Acconci, Theme Song, 1973, video still at 00.06.00.
On closer analysis, in the formal composition of the first image that appears on
screen at the beginning of Theme Song (1973) (figure 4.1), the perspective of the
image with the sofa in the background shows that this male face, which fills the right
half the screen, is looking up from the floor. This causes his forehead to corrugate
and his eyes to point upwards in an expression that evokes uncertainty and
pleading. Within a few seconds he looks sideways and reaches out of the screen.
As his hand comes back into the frame holding a cigarette, his eyes turn again
towards me with some determination. He holds this steady and intent look, turning it
almost into a stare, as both his hands move outside the frame again. This is the first
instance of direct address in the work: the first glance could have been read as just
looking forward, but this second look is directed outside the screen towards the
viewer. By fixing his eyes towards the viewer in the middle of an action, Acconci
performs an explicit act of looking at and looking for. This shifts the image from the
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representation of a man’s face to a performative that produces the subjects on
screen and off screen. The viewer is now interpellated as an interlocutor, as
Acconci’s eyes perform the equivalent gesture to calling out ‘hey, you!’ (Althusser,
1971).
As an active viewer, I promptly respond as an interlocutor by engaging in an
intimate exchange of thoughts and emotions, more or less visible behaviours, and a
transformative set of responses. My eyes also fix him intently, ask and offer – the
knowledge that my look does not change the performance does not stop me from
engaging fully with his and my gaze. Each moment of relational activity affects the
inflection of the artist’s next expression, evolving the encounter into a unique
configuration of subtle interactions. Acconci’s performed subjectivity relayed by the
screen is more than a representation and it is self-consciously fragmented: it
transcends representation to activate performative relationality, and it performs its
own fragmented status and bond with the other by adopting the words of pop songs,
by shifting relational strategies, by revealing unconscious desire and by
acknowledging his dependence on another. Despite being in control of the
performance, Acconci has already given up the centrality of his position by framing
the work in relation to the body of the viewer. He is my other as I watch; he confirms
that I was already there as his other at the time he performed in front of the video
camera (Simmons and Davis, 1978).
This first exchange already contains all the complexities of mediated intersubjective
relationships – a look on a screen seems to be enough to move subjectivity towards
a certain configuration and evoke situated responses. These in turn reveal ‘a history
of identifications, parts of which can be brought into play in given contexts and
which, precisely because they encode the contingencies of personal history, do not
always point back to an internal coherence of any kind.’ (Butler, 1990, p.331). My
encounter with Theme Song (1973) evokes a powerful sense of intimacy that
evolves with the progress of the performance. In the mediated relationality of this
videoperformance, echoes of power structures inform the gendered address and
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responses in the production of the performance and of the relationality that
emerges. Similarly, vulnerability is produced and read within normative codes,
desire is steered towards acceptable forms, and acceptance and rejection of
different instances of otherness are informed by social, historical and cultural
parameters.
As it informs the first interpellation (‘It’s a girl!), gender remains in the foreground of
subjectivity and structures ‘the attributes socially designated as appropriate for men
and women.’ (Butler, 1997c; Grosz, 1991, p.148). The artist on screen also offers
himself as a subject to relate to and to look at, creating opportunities for the each
viewer to actively conjure the performer in a particular configuration of subjectivity.
This is the result of the encounter between the subject performed on screen and the
history of the viewing subject in the particular scene evoked by the artist. In this
encounter, the processes of the gaze are exposed. In 1975, Laura Mulvey proposed
a determining male gaze that ‘projects its phantasy on to the female figure which is
styled accordingly’ (Mulvey, 1975, p.11). This gaze is rooted in the unconscious
desires of spectators and refers directly to scopophilia as delineated by Freud, but it
does not correspond to the Lacanian gaze. Mulvey’s male gaze is transitive and
mono-directional: it originates in the (male) cinema spectator to end with the on-
screen representation of the (female) character. Instead, Lacan defines the gaze as
a process that returns to the subject originating it: it is the subject’s unconscious
desire that causes it (he or she) to load with meaning the way the other looks at the
subject itself (Lacan, 1998). In other words, as the unconscious is formed in
relations with others, unconscious desires determine how the subject believes other
subjects perceive it in relationality.
The process of watching Theme Song (1973) while paying close attention to my
own subjectivity is an important method of analysis of emerging relationality and of
the dynamics of the gaze in this context. Acconci’s address is materially fixed (as a
recorded performance Theme Song does not change every time a different viewer
approaches it), but fluid in its relational possibilities, as words and actions resonate
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differently in every encounter: each viewer temporarily transforms the iterations of
subjectivity performed on screen in relation to elements of their own subjectivity,
which are in turn transformed by the encounter with the subject on screen. This
dynamic circularity activates both conscious and unconscious responses. From this
perspective, both gaze and awareness inform relationality, and the asynchronous
and asymmetric qualities of the screen-mediated encounter amplify their oscillation.
The first person account offers some examples of how unconscious responses
emerge, become conscious and shift:
He can’t see me – he says he does not know what my face looks like,
but he knows that I am here. “Don’t you want to come in here? Sure!
Sure you’ll come in here”. I have not been asked, so I cannot refuse. As
I watch closely and listen carefully, I feel attracted and repelled;
manipulated and made aware of my own thoughts; intrigued and
rejecting. I swing back and forth with his language – this is me becomes
this could be anybody; a question becomes a matter-of-fact statement,
then an offer that makes me feel uncomfortable; I don’t want you to feel
alone, but I don’t want you to wrap your body around mine. And I don’t
want you to find something that can win me over. (see Chapter Three).
Although immersed in the encounter as a participating viewer, I question the source
of thoughts and emotions that appear, at the same time, to emerge in and from me,
to be caused by the artist’s address, to be rooted in my past, and also to be rooted
in the artist’s past and referencing someone who was there before me. This is a
direct account of the gaze at work, but also a testimony that other dynamics have a
bearing on the emergence of performative relationality in this context.
Acconci appears to purposefully appeal to well-established gendered forms of
address, and to steer the emerging relationality towards an active role for himself
and a passive one for the (female) viewer. I insist on this appearing to be the case
on account of the intrinsic difficulty of separating out the tightly woven elements that
inform this passage: the gaze originates in formative relationships, themselves
shaped in and by language (the Other). When I attribute to Acconci an address that
casts me in a particular role, my perception of the address and of my reactions is
filtered by the unconscious, by language, by social norms and by other formative
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elements of subjectivity. In other words, because the gaze is a continuous
‘movement outwards and back in’, like a Moebius strip, I can acknowledge that both
Acconci’s and my subjectivities are being affected (Lacan, 1998, p.177).
Nevertheless, I can only speculate that he might be actively attempting to exert
power over me, or that he is counting on my unconscious attributing authority and
power to his address as the boundaries of our subjectivities are blurred in the gaze.
From this perspective, Lacan denies that the subject can truthfully state: ‘I see
myself seeing myself’ (Lacan, 1998, p.80, emphasis in original). He posits that the
place of the Other (and therefore of desire and the unconscious) is between
perception and awareness (Lacan, 1998, p.45). From this perspective, as a viewer
of Theme Song (1973) I can aspire to describe how I see myself seeing Acconci
seeing me (awareness of the dynamics of the gaze), as opposed to how I see
myself seeing myself (illusion of awareness), or how I see Acconci seeing me (the
gaze).
Of course, as the viewer of Theme Song, I know that the Acconci cannot see me,
yet at the beginning of the first person account I wonder if, with the words that open
the work, he is establishing a scenario in which at some level he can see me: I
question if he is inviting viewers to engage with him as if he could see them. Once
he states ‘I don’t know what your face looks like’ I feel liberated: although I
objectively knew that he could not see me, knowing that this work is not about
seeing me made me feel more relaxed (see Appendix One). For me, from that
moment the gaze does not overwhelm the emerging relationality, but becomes only
one of the dynamics that inform this encounter. Although this will certainly affect
other interlocutors differently on the basis of their own subjectivity and unconscious
desires, the mediation of the screen makes possible this oscillation between a
straightforward representation – recorded and displayed image – and a live,
performative, two-way real-time encounter (Bolter and Grusin, 2000). Consequently,
the role of the viewer oscillates between passive watcher and active interlocutor, but
148
even in the most passive moments the use of the pronoun you as a form of address
implicates and activates the viewer.
Paradoxically, Acconci is also offering himself as an image to-be-looked-at,
subverting further Mulvey’s analysis of active male gaze and passive female ‘to-be-
looked-at-ness’ (Mulvey, 1975, p.11). His performance highlights his availability as
an object of desire by lying down on the floor and voicing his need for another. From
a Lacanian perspective, Acconci is also performing his own gaze in its movement
outwards and back in, and he is positioning me so that I can make him the object of
my desire. In other words, as a viewer of this work I hold the symbolic power (the
phallus) in relation to the performer’s gaze. From both sides of the screen, the gaze
is continuously activated and deflected, and in these circumstances awareness can
emerge. Once I become aware that my gaze is defeated by Acconci’s incapacity to
see me – material and fictional – I can start wondering how I see him seeing me. I
can also begin to perceive the ‘history of identifications’ that has shaped my
unconscious to respond in specific ways to specific modes of address (Butler, 1990,
p.331). Although the line between the artist’s actions and my perception of them
remains blurred, I also become aware that the videoperformance retains the power
to relay his gaze, and I perceive the pressure to respond to his unconscious desire.
In turn, it is partly my active relational engagement that redeploys Acconci’s
performed gaze in light of my responses in a relational loop. Even if my relational
engagement does not materially change the recorded performance, it changes
Acconci as a subject in this relational encounter.
From a Lacanian perspective, reciprocity of the gaze remains illusory, as the
unconscious desires that inform the gaze are never shared, they never coincide and
never meet: ‘the level of reciprocity between the gaze and the gazed at is, for the
subject, more open than any other to alibi.’ (Lacan, 1998, p.77). However, as
subjects connected and separated by the screen, ultimately performer and viewer
cannot act for each other as the objet petit a (the other with a small o) that satisfies
the subject’s desire for recognition in the gaze, but only as the Other (the completely
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separate and different other with a big o). Acconci cannot see me, this subject,
nevertheless I remain his interlocutor as long as I engage with Theme Song as a
viewer. I cannot attribute to him the function of responding to my unconscious
desires, and this, paradoxically, creates the conditions for my desires to become
conscious. The address and availability of the performer affect viewers in an
intimate and profound way. These processes remain largely invisible and only
known, from different perspectives, to artist and viewer. Even if the encounter takes
place in the public space of an art gallery, relationality remains invisible, providing
viewers with an intimate scene of intersubjectivity, in which each viewer retains the
privilege to engage at a different depth or intensity. This combination of processes
affords viewers the conditions for some awareness of the gaze and of their most
intimate responses. A videoperformance structured by relationality affords
opportunities for transformative encounters based on a newly gained, even if
temporary and partial, awareness of desire, gaze and the dynamics of
interpellations.
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 4.2 Machine mediated intimacy: Annie Abrahams Theme Song Revisited
(After Acconci), 2011
First performed live as part of the Low Lives 3 festival of networked performance,
Theme Song Revisited (After Acconci) (2011) reproposes Acconci’s strategy of
playing pop songs as a catalyst for a different invitation: Abrahams asks viewers to
phone her and prove that they are real. She is both dialoguing with Acconci’s work
and taking his place, but her appeal is, in the first instance, directed to networked
viewers of computer screens, who have the material possibility to interact with her
via their telephones. Abrahams is attempting to show that ‘we are a bit further now –
[machine mediated] “intimacy” can become real’ (Abrahams, 2012a). The
contemporary presence of Abrahams and viewers on either side of the screen is the
premise of her appeal: if you are there, you will phone me now! Abrahams’s
performance builds on the relationality already present in the active connection of
the networked screen.
The screen itself is, in this case, the last element that links the viewer to the
performer in real time (Manovich, 2002). Whilst in Acconci’s Theme Song (1973) the
screen suggests liveness, based on the notion that television could be live, Theme
Song Revisited (After Acconci) (2011) takes place in the first instance in a materially
shared present (Auslander, 1999). The first person account of the previous chapter
recounts my encounter with the recording of Abrahams’s videoperformance and this
leads me to speculate on how I would have responded to the live appeal to call her.
The knowledge that this is a recording and not a real time networked performance
frees me from taking any decisions about telephoning and allows me to become
immersed in the emerging relationality. This is a response that emerges from the
encounter between my subjectivity and the videoperformance, but the reaction of
other viewers is also revealing. During the networked performance, only one person
contacts the artist – Helen Varley Jamieson, herself a performer and member of the
collaborative performance group Avatar Body Collision. Abrahams compares
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viewers’ reactions to the live and recorded videoperformance in a post on the
discussion list Curating New Media:
To my surprise nobody called but Helen Varley Jamieson when the
performance was almost over. Of course, I thought later (and reading
Sherry Turkle's book Alone Together confirmed this) telephone has
become an intimate, almost private and dangerous way to contact
people. … Later when I showed the video of the performance in the
show Training for a Better World in the CRAC in Sète, I had about two
to three calls a week (Abrahams, 2012b).
Abrahams mentions Turkle’s analysis of the telephone as a mediator that ‘reveals
too much’ and with which it is too hard to end a conversation (Turkle, 2011, p.11).
The teenagers and adults interviewed by the author seem to associate a telephone
call with an important or urgent message, practical arrangements, affective intensity
and vulnerability. Whilst the videoperformance allows the viewer to choose how
deeply to engage and how long to stay, the telephone traps interlocutors in a
reciprocal exchange that requires one party’s initiative to conclude it. Moreover, the
purpose of calling Abrahams remains unclear – the phone conversation that might
ensue is full of uncertainty and even more danger: will my voice be heard by other
viewers? What will she ask of me? What part will I be asked to perform in this
situation I have no control over? Calling would constitute the unconditional consent
to participate in an unknown intimacy. These themes and dynamics recur in
Abrahams’s work, as the artist offers her vulnerability, affect and authenticity often
in collaboration with other performers and participants. Co-performers accept to
expose their own vulnerability as a means of achieving ‘machine-mediated
intimacy’, whilst for viewers, adopting this role would constitute a radical shift
(Chatzichristodoulou, 2010b). In Theme Song Revisited (After Acconci) (2011), the
artist withholds her visibility and only offers her voice to ‘tempt people to phone’
during the performance (Low Lives 3 Networked Performance Festival, p.80). In
other words, she maintains a safer position in this visual absence while asking
viewers to expose themselves by calling her.
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Several viewers did telephone Abrahams when a recording of the videoperformance
was exhibited in a gallery. It would not have occurred to me to call knowing that the
performance was not live, but it is important to speculate on why others did. On the
one hand, this supports the idea that viewers might have felt safe from exposing
their vulnerability in public. On the other hand, it confirms that the screen holds the
power to relay the liveness of videoperformance. The artist discusses the
importance of liveness in networked performance in relation to contradictions in her
own practice: even if it is important that her work is live to function as research, the
recordings of her experiments in machine mediated intimacy ‘are as real as the
performance moments were, but they are different.’ (Abrahams, 2012b). Although
Abrahams is addressing webperformance, this statement applies to
videoperformance too – in fact, this distinction might be obsolete as the uses and
functions of screens in networked, live, recorded, broadcast and communication
situations shape the connotations of all screens. Hence, screen-based
communication platforms like Skype, networked performance platforms like
Upstage, and the growing synergy between television and web-based news all
contribute to enhance the relational power of the screen in videoperformance. To
some extent, this applies to webcams and videocameras too (White, 2006). From
this perspective, Theme Song Revisited (After Acconci) (2011) produces
relationality as a performative both as a real time networked and as a recorded
videoperformance, activating intersubjective dynamics and a potential for self-
awareness in both cases. Even if I could be a materially active interlocutor by
phoning the numbers on the screen, the oscillation between conscious and
unconscious desires already constitutes activity in itself, and makes it unnecessary
for me to act further in relation to this videoperformance.
I also engage with Abrahams’s work as a maker of videoperformance and with
some knowledge of her practice, which adds a different dimension to the
relationality that emerges in my encounter with this work. From this perspective, I
recognize her desire to interrogate modes of performance of the self (Goffman,
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1959) and of self-representation (Jones, 2006). I also recognize her pursuit of
authenticity in networked performance and online exchanges, and her aim to show
the ‘“banal” reality of everyday life, time passing by, two people temporarily crossing
paths in fractured, desperate or indifferent, successful or futile attempts to
communicate, to (be) together, to love – in shared presence, but also shared
absence.’ (Chatzichristodoulou, 2010b). Creating a privileged engagement with
these quotidian aspects of intimacy, Abrahams offers a further opportunity to
recognise the gaze at work, as these moments become charged with unconscious
desires.
In the previous chapter, I describe how I become aware of the voice of my mother
overlapping the voice of the artist, and how I appear to respond to both. Even
though I cannot see Abrahams’s face and eyes for a large part of the work, I am
evoked, in Lacanian terms, as a subject who is looking and being looked at. The
boundaries between what emanates from Abrahams and what surges from my
memory are blurred from the beginning of the encounter. Desire informs the gaze,
and ‘[i]f one does not stress the dialectic of desire one does not understand why the
gaze of others should disorganize the field of perception.’ (Lacan, 1998, p.89).
Abrahams’s gaze disorganizes my field of perception both with regard to my
subjectivity and to the scene of address. I am asked insistently to fulfil her need, but
I perceive that there is more to this than it seems. I feel out of control as my
responses emerge, and I cannot quite say how or why. As with Acconci’s insistent
requests to join him, it seems to me that the desires of the performers act on me
beyond their explicit appeals. I can state with some certainty that I become aware of
their gaze trying to position me in roles that I cannot always decode. Yet, the desire
to fulfil their desires is a perceivable driving force in my responses.
The asynchronous and asymmetric encounters mediated by the video equipment
produce a slower pace of intersubjective interaction than face-to-face encounters. In
my engagement with Acconci’s and Abrahams’s work, I do not need to act in order
to move the relationship forward, but can wait for the performer to make their next
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move. Acconci fills some time with pop songs, humming and repetition of words and
lyrics; Abrahams adopts a similar strategy with the added element of repeatedly
asking viewers to call her. Performative relationality and awareness emerge
between screen and viewer in these gaps, which in face-to-face relationships are
filled by continuous reciprocal responses. As a performer, I allow time for the other
to think, feel, expect and become aware. In front of Acconci’s and Abrahams’s
performances, relieved of the responsibility to sustain the relationship, I find myself
becoming acutely aware of my shifting subjectivity with changing emotions,
thoughts, desires and fears. Although I recount relationality from the perspective of
this subject (me), relationality itself does not reside only in subjectivity, but it
emerges outside of myself, between me and the camera, and between the screen
and me. It produces me – it produces the subject of the actions and reactions that
emerge in me. In other words, it is not the synchronicity – or lack of – of performing
and viewing that determines the emergence of performative relationality, but the
mediation of camera and screen. I oscillate between conscious and unconscious
responses, between gaze and awareness, as the mediation of the screen oscillates
between immediacy and hypermediacy (Bolter and Grusin, 2000).
I cannot perceive the Other’s gaze, because of my own gaze at work, but I can
develop some awareness of these interweaving dynamics because of the mediation
of the screen. Lacan warns against the dangers of seeking reciprocity of the gaze,
as this offers subjects an opportunity for misrecognition: ‘You never look at me from
the place at which I see you.’ (Lacan, 1998, p.103, emphasis in original). In other
words, you look at me from your unconscious and from my unconscious, making our
encounter full of opportunities for misrecognition and loaded with the voices of other
intimacies (Berlant, 2000). Abrahams employs the opacity of her and viewers’
subjectivity to test modes of address and of mediated intimacy that suspend
interlocutors in complete uncertainty about themselves and the other. Butler frames
this opacity not as an obstacle to relationality, but as the ultimate foundation of
subjectivity in relationality:
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The opacity of the subject may be a consequence of its being conceived
as a relational being, one whose early and primary relations are not
always available to conscious knowledge. Moments of unknowingness
about oneself tend to emerge in the context of relations to others,
suggesting that those relations call upon primary forms of relationality
that are not always available to explicit and reflective thematization.
(Butler, 2005, p.20).
Whilst Lacan doubts that reciprocity is possible and charts the opacity of the subject
and the dynamics of the gaze as obstacles to reciprocity and responsibility, Butler
recasts unconscious desire as one element of ethical responsibility in relationality.
This repositioning of the function of the unconscious determines the foundations of
an ethics of the encounter with the other: ‘[a]n ability to affirm what is contingent and
incoherent in oneself may allow one to affirm others who may or may not “mirror”
one’s own constitution.’ (Butler, 2005, p.41). In other words, in my limitations lies the
formula for accepting otherness and for engaging in a productive ethical relationship
with the other/Other. Furthermore, it is within relationality that we are invited and
enabled to engage in self-reflection – to give an account (or accounts) of ourselves:
‘When the I seeks to give an account of itself, it can start with itself, but it will find
that this self is already implicated in a social temporality that exceeds it own
capacities for narration’ (Butler, 2005, p7-8).
Butler’s work provides an establish vocabulary to support the evidence emerging
from the practice of making my own videoperformances and from the practice of
performative writing. In this context, the relationality of videoperformance emerges
as productive of meaning and awareness, and, therefore, as potentially
transformative for the subjects involved. Before You Now (2013) illustrates this point
directly, as it is partly the product of the insight emerged from my close engagement
with Abrahams’s and Acconci’s videoperformances. This work manifests my
growing awareness of the processes of my own gaze and, compared to the other
videoperformances in this project, it shows a deeper capacity to deflect my gaze in
my address to the other.
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4.3 In front of the camera: Before you Now, 2013
In this next section, the first person account of developing my own work, Before you
Now (2013) becomes the starting point for an analysis of these transformative
processes. Lacan’s terms encounter and tuché are utilised here to explore the
pulsation of unconscious desire and awareness that inform the ethical
transformative potential of videoperformance art practice in the framework of a wider
discourse on relationality (Lacan, 1998; Butler, 2005; Phelan, 1993).
In Before You Now (2013), the relational thrust starts in my subjectivity (and its
history) and leads directly to the emergence of performative relationality between
viewer and videoperformance. The first person account of the making of this work
reveals aspects of my making strategies that mirror elements of my accounts as a
viewer. As the text unveils my methodology of making, it becomes evident that the
other I evoke echoes past relationships with formative others. These include
parents, teachers and other figures of authority, siblings, lovers, friends, but also
artists and fictional characters, as well as less defined subjects present in my
neighbourhood, in advertising and in the media. In making Before You Now, I offer
myself to the other I address and, in turn, interpellate this other in roles
complementary to those relationships. I adopt the ruse of exposing my authentic
self, and invite viewers to engage in a moment of trust and intimacy in which their
own unconscious desire can safely surface. As interpellations and the modulations
of desire shift, the fragmentation and inconsistencies of both subjects also come
into the foreground. In Lacan’s terms, unconscious fragments of subjectivity can be
described as that which ‘resists signification’ and as ‘something unresolved’ (Lacan,
1998, p.129 and Lacan, 1992, p.244). As such, their becoming conscious is a
pulsation of the real, and the encounter is a form of the reappearance of the real
itself: just as the unconscious behaviour has an ‘accidental origin’, ‘[w]hat is
repeated is always something that occurs – the expression tells us quite a lot about
its relation to the tuché – as if by chance’ (Lacan, 1998, p.54, emphasis in original).
In other words, chance occurrences resonate with qualities of the missed encounter
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and the real pulsates into consciousness, but it ‘always comes back to the same
place – to the place where the subject in so far as he [sic] thinks, where the res
cogitans, does not meet it.’ (Lacan, 1998, p.49).
In the first person account, one statement in particular captures the complexity of
this set of processes: ‘it is not your response I seek, but your presence in my
address, so that you can, with me, make this relationship happen.’ (see Chapter
Three). In this statement, you addresses both the other already present in my
subjectivity and the other approaching the screen accepting to relate. This
polyphonic address implies an understanding of subjectivity as formed in
relationality, and informed by unconscious desire mediated by language and social
norms. From a Lacanian perspective, the subject is already implicated in the gaze
as given-to-be-seen and as ‘speculum mundi’’ (mirror of the world) (Lacan, 1998,
p.75, emphasis in original). The gaze is often interpreted as the projection of one
subject’s desire onto another subject, whereby the object of desire is required to
confirm the illusory wholeness (ideal ego, produced in the mirror phase) of the
gazing subject. Lacan specifies that ‘[t]he gaze I encounter […] is, not a seen gaze,
but a gaze imagined by me in the field of the Other.’ (Lacan, 1998, p.84). In this
sentence, the gaze has its origin in the subject, who attributes it to the other, who is
therefore imagined to be the active gazer: the one who carries the gaze of the Other
(the law or, in Butler’s terms, normativity).
Lacan (1998) makes clear that the gaze enacts unconscious desires based on the
lack that has not (yet) been understood. In other words, the gaze does not dominate
the whole of the subject’s relation with the world and does not impede awareness in
its totality, but appears where a chance encounter (tuché) offers an opportunity for
the repetition of elements of primary experiences (Lacan, 1998). Relationality and
subjectivity emerge as performatives in these encounters, which share the quality of
being ‘radical points in the real” (Lacan, 1998, p.55). As a viewer, I approach the
videoperformance and I am implicated as an interlocutor and accomplice – my
subjectivity is implicated in the relationality that emerges, and oscillates between
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unconscious responses, evoked memories, intense affects and moments of
awareness. I can state with some confidence that, for me, the encounters with
Theme Song (1973) and Theme Song Revisited (After Acconci) (2011) resonate
with primary encounters and evoke the real as ‘that which always comes back to the
same place’ (Lacan, 1998, p.49). The elements of subjectivity and relationality that
emerge in the previous chapter recall and repeat (but do not reproduce) ‘an
encounter, an essential encounter – an appointment to which we are always called
with a real that eludes us’ (p.53). Lacan connects the encounter in the present with
an original and missed encounter – a transformative past event that remains
unresolved and becomes inscribed in the unconscious.
I am evoked as a subject at the place between perception and awareness, where
the missed encounter produced a fragment that remains unconscious as it has not
yet been elaborated. In its unpredictable oscillations, that fragment of the real
emerges into consciousness, but it disappears as I am about to touch it (Lacan,
1998). In relationality, the completely alien Other is always in danger of becoming
my other – the illusory counterpart who colludes with my desire and perpetuates the
return of the past in the reproduction of these primary relationships. Conversely,
when the other subject remains on screen, the real can continue to pulsate in and
out of consciousness and leave me with a glimmer of awareness. In this context,
repetition does not reproduce relational dynamics that belong in the past, but
evokes missed encounters (formative of the unconscious as primary processes) in
the framework of a performative and transformative tuché (Lacan, 1998, p.53).
Lacan argues that these qualities are not exclusive to transfer and to the therapeutic
psychoanalytic encounter, but that ‘[w]e can, at any moment, apprehend this
primary process’ (p.56). Videoperformance has the potential to be transformative as
it proposes intimate encounters with another subject, who offers relationality and
provokes desire.
In Before You Now (2013), I offer myself on screen as the imaginary bearer of the
gaze for the viewer. As I am not physically present to this other subject, this
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situation has the potential to make viewers aware that I cannot be the active
producer of the gaze that reaches them – I cannot see them, and it is not them I am
addressing. This affords the viewer the opportunity to reclaim the gaze as
something that has roots in its own desire, lack and history – in other words, in its
subjectivity, which is itself formed in relationships, failed encounters, norms,
language and memories (Grosz, 1991; Butler, 1990). Recognising one’s own
fragmentation and owning one’s gaze (acknowledging the presence of the Other
within one’s subjectivity) is the foundation for a more ethical relationality (Butler,
2005). In this paradox, Peggy Phelan locates ‘the productive power of facing the
inevitability of annihilation, castration, misrecognition. For if one could face these
features of psychic life, a different order of sociality might be possible.’ (Phelan,
1993, p.25). In other words, instead of reducing other subjects to objects of desire
and bearers of the gaze – to the function of fulfilling the subject’s desire to be
confirmed in its ideal wholeness, reassured from its fear of castration, etc – subjects
could recognise each other’s fragmentation and relate on this basis. My insight into
making Before You Now shows that accepting one’s own fragmentation and
incoherence creates the foundation for better relationality.
In making Before You Now (2013), relationality emerged first when I evoked another
subject beyond the camera. The internal dialogue unraveled in the previous chapter
attests to a combination of interpellations and desires at work in the first instance in
my address. These are relayed by the screen to viewers, who become implicated
when the address reaches them. Having evoked in the performance to camera a
future viewer whose response will not reach my subjectivity, the screen can then
activate and suspend the gaze. From this perspective, videoperformance offers the
ultimate Other: a subject that does not see, yet is able to address. The gaze is still
at work, but, although viewers can still attribute it to the performer, ultimately reveals
itself as a shared responsibility: the gaze originates in the relationality that forms
subjectivity and is activated in the encounter. The viewer is afforded the possibility
to become aware of its active part in originating the gaze and attributing it to the
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other on screen. This pulsating awareness is the foundation of an ethical sense of
responsibility towards the other as it transforms the subject from the victim of the
other’s defining monodirectional gaze into an active and responsible interlocutor.
Before You Now (2013) emerges from the power structures that touch me as a
distinct subject. The issues that come to the forefront in this videoperformance are
inevitably limited to dynamics accessible to my subjectivity at a certain time, but are
also features of the social and cultural environment that produce me as a subject.
From this perspective, the ethical and political engagement of this work is limited to
facets of relationality that I am able to recognise and face in this phase of practice
and research.
To summarise, this chapter analyses the dynamics of interpellation, the gaze,
desire, the encounter and fragmented subjectivities of three relevant
videoperformances. The processes of performativity, mediation and awareness
emerge as transformative for subjectivity and suggest the potential ethical and
political value of this practice. This analysis shows how in videoperformance the
viewer is evoked both as the other (small o), to be the bearer of the performer’s
gaze and to confirm her wholeness, and the Other (big o), which is radically alien to
the subject on screen, and also the bearer of social norms. In this complexity, the
performer can initiate and co-produce a more ethical performative relationality
based on a shared growing awareness of subjectivity’s fragmentation and
incoherence. Similarly, although videoperformance offers a subject/object for the
desire of the viewer, it also continuously refuses to confirm the viewer’s gaze,
offering instead the representation of the performer as radically other. This radical
difference and fragmentation is common to performer and viewer: in Before You
Now (2013), as I evoke others that are already part of me, I suggest that these
others are already part of viewers too. In other words, I perform an address that
evokes the presence of the other/Other to make it tangible in the viewer. Similarly,
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as the viewer of Acconci’s and Abrahams’ work, I recognise the other/Other made
tangible in me by the relational offer of the performer.
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Conclusion
This project interrogates the processes of relationality in the framework of the art
practice of videoperformance. It demonstrates that videoperformance can activate
intersubjective asymmetric and asynchronous relationships mediated by video
camera and screen. It also proposes that this process has ethical and political
valence. My videoperformances, the mapping of conceptual and artistic historical
and contemporary contexts, and the first person accounts and critical analysis of
encounters with videoperformances evidence the mechanisms of these relational
processes, address the research questions and support my proposition.
The review of relevant concepts that opens this dissertation establishes that
subjectivity and relationality are always already mediated by language and the law
(normativity). In videoperformance, subjectivity and relationality are mediated again
through performance strategies and video equipment. The screen emerges as an
effective mediator in the combination of familiarity, accumulation of uses and
transparency. Bolter and Grusin theorize this phenomenon in light of ‘our apparently
insatiable desire for immediacy’ (Bolter and Grusin, 2000, p.5). The logic of
transparent immediacy manifests a desire for an interface ‘that erases itself, so that
the user is no longer aware of confronting a medium, but instead stands in an
immediate relationship to the contents of that medium.’ (p.24, emphasis added).
Applied to videoperformance, this statement would suggest an immediate – or
unmediated – relationship with the performer on screen. The logic of hypermediacy,
however, makes viewers and users aware of the medium, and ‘expresses the
tension between regarding a visual space as mediated and as a "real” space that
lies beyond mediation.’ (p.41). Media-literate twenty-first century audiences of
screen-mediated moving images are able to shift between awareness of the
medium and a – more or less direct – relationship with the reality it conveys. This
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shifting between a perception of mediation and a sense of immediacy is one of the
key mechanisms of videoperformance: it creates a situation in which viewers can
engage and disengage with mediated relationality. This is critical to the specific
ethical valence of videoperformance in the context of wider discourses on
relationality.
To conduct this research with rigour, it was important to review some key Lacanian
concepts relevant to this mechanism: the subject, the other/Other, the gaze and the
encounter with the real in particular. This project establishes that in
videoperformance the viewer is evoked both as the other (small o) – to function as
the bearer of the performer’s gaze and to confirm her wholeness – and the Other
(big o), which is radically alien to the subject on screen, and also the bearer of
social norms. This radical difference and fragmentation is common to performer and
viewer – in Before You Now (2013), as I evoke others that are already part of me, I
suggest that these others are already part of viewers too. In other words, I perform
an address that evokes the presence of the other/Other to make it tangible in the
viewer. Similarly, as the viewer of Acconci’s and Abrahams’ work, I recognise the
other/Other made tangible in me by the relational offer of the performers. This
primary dependence on others reveals the permeability of the boundaries of the
subject and exposes dynamics of reciprocal definition. In this complexity, the
performer can initiate and co-produce a more ethical performative relationality
based on a shared growing awareness of subjectivity’s fragmentation and
incoherence. Similarly, although videoperformance offers a subject/object for the
desire of the viewer, it also continuously refuses to confirm the viewer’s gaze,
offering instead the representation of the performer as radically other. These
processes are specific to videoperformance as the mediation of the screen and the
asynchronous asymmetric relationships that emerge may produce temporary
awareness of this interdependence, of the impossibility for the interlocutor to
become the answer to desire and, consequently, of the subject’s responsibility for
desire itself.
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The complementary theoretical constructs of Lacan (other/Other, desire, the real,
encounter, extimacy and the gaze) and Althusser (interpellation) converge in the
post-psychoanalytic approach of Judith Butler (ethics and performativity). The
integration of these modes of analysis supports a reading of videoperformance art
practices that confirms its value for the interrogation of relationality. This practice
evokes the Lacanian concept of extimacy – an understanding of intimacy with the
other as carrier of the Other (language, culture, social norms, etc.) that defies the
distinction between interiority and exteriority, and that highlights the subject as a
loose, distributed entity (Lacan, 1992). The Other informs the unconscious of the
subject, and lies at the same time inside and outside the subject, making this
distinction (inside/outside) unnecessary. This understanding of intimacy is
fundamental to a concept of relationality that does not reside in the subject, in the
videoperformance, between subjects or between subject and screen, but that
emerges as a performative in encounters that are intimate, mediated and
ephemeral.
The first person accounts in chapter three demonstrate that the subjects active in
videoperformance (performer and viewer) emerge as the unstable products of
successive relationships, and as always already plural. As the subject continuously
emerges in relation to the other/Other, relationality also continuously emerges
between and within subjects. Relationality itself is performative because it is
produced as it produces the subjects who relate in an ongoing process of
interpellation, citation and renewal. On the basis of these observations, the
mediated relationality that emerges between viewer and videoperformance informs
the subjects that perform it, activating the gaze, dynamics of power and self-
awareness via the mediation of technology. In this framework, positions such as
gender, race and class are defined within active relations that continuously produce
subjectivity and unstable identities. The same mechanisms mediated by language
structure the unconscious and its desire. From this perspective, there is no
separation between a psychoanalytic investigation of relationality and political
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discourse (as also observed by Butler, 2005, 2009). Unconscious responses have
roots in established social structures that produce subjects in power relations. Past
interpellations emerge as established patterns integrated in subjectivity and in an
individual’s sense of self.
Relationality precedes subjectivity in that the subject is formed in interpersonal
relations. The proposition that videoperformance can foster more ethical forms of
relationality is a political gesture that intervenes in dynamics of power active in
language and in interpersonal relationships. The work of Butler (2005) and Phelan
(1993) offers a relevant conceptual framework to recognise and analyse these
processes. For example, the fact that some aspects of the subject that emerge in
relationality ‘are not always available to explicit and reflective thematisation’ does
not exclude the possibility for agency and ethical responsibility in intersubjective
relationships (Butler, 2005, p.20). As relationality and subjectivity emerge as one,
the boundaries between them can only be drawn artificially. Consequentially, facing
the structures of power that inform psychic life is a transformative process aimed
towards ‘a different order of sociality’ based on a more open, respectful and
accepting approach to oneself and to the other (Phelan, 1993, p.25).
This project demonstrates that the oscillation between awareness and unconscious
is rooted in relationality and, therefore, a fundamental element of its ethics. In other
words, subjects are fragmented in interdependent and complementary
configurations. In this framework, accepting, nurturing and protecting the other is in
the interest of the subject’s own survival. In other words, the subject is able to go
beyond appearances and acknowledge its dependence on the Other who cannot be
assimilated or reduced to the object of its unconscious desire. Butler suggests that
this could form the basis, not only of different social and ethical relationality, but also
of political and international relations (Butler, 2009). This project demonstrates that
videoperformance can make a significant contribution to this process by revealing
the dynamics of the gaze at work in intersubjective encounters and by offering an
opportunity for change. In this context, it is important to recognise that the gaze
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originates in the subject and is attributed to the other: for instance, I see myself
seeing Acconci seeing me. This awareness emerges from my encounter with the
representation of Acconci in Theme Song (1974) and transforms my capacity to
offer a more ethical relationality in Before You Now (2013). Compared to other art
practices with similar ethical and political valence, videoperformance produces
specific dynamics of relationality interrupted and slowed down by the mediation of
the screen, and the paradoxical relational presence and physical absence of the
performer. For instance, whilst live performance has the potential to involve viewers
in very powerful relational situations, moments of self-awareness are likely to be
postponed to after the event has concluded. My own experiments with different
iterations of the work Before You (2008-2013) test combinations of live, mediated
and asynchronous relationality. The speed and reciprocity of relational offer and
response in live performance engages the gaze and makes self-awareness unlikely.
Similarly, the intimacy evoked by Sam Rose during her one-to-one performance
work Between One and Another: Melting Point (2007) absorbed me so completely
that, as a participant, I could not separate the artist’s desire from my own.
Videoperformance practices make possible encounters that favour an expanded
sense of ethics: the mediation of camera and screen both nurtures and interrupts
the gaze, underlining the chronological and geographical gap between the subject
on screen and the subject in front of the screen. Each different viewer temporarily
transforms the iterations of subjectivity performed on screen as they interpellate
aspects of the performer in counterpoint to elements of their own subjectivity, in turn
interpellated by the performer. This dynamic circularity constitutes the mediated
performative relationality of videoperformance. Each iteration of subjectivity
produced remains ungraspable – just as mediated relationality is produced, but
remains uncapturable. Documenting or re-inserting relationality into the work (for
example, in Acconci’s Command Performance, 1974) also abandons relationality by
translating a dynamic performative into a fixed representation. Re-absorbing
viewers into the work (for example, in Douglas Davis’s Electronic Hokkadim of 1971)
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also freezes relationality and blocks the process of reflection by closing the loop –
viewers’ are now invited to look at themselves and their position within this work, not
at the other and at themselves relating with the other. In other words, the possibility
of engaging in relationality and becoming, even briefly, aware of the dynamics of
one’s relating affords ethical and political valence specific to videoperformance.
In this context, relationality is defined differently from Bourriaud’s concept of
relational aesthetics: Bourriaud (2002) focuses on the formal structure of the
artwork, does not acknowledge reciprocal influences with the practices and theories
of new media emerging in the 1990s, and touches only superficially on subjectivity
and the gaze. Nevertheless, Relational Aesthetics (2002) makes a strong case for
relationality in the ‘constructed situations’ of performance and moving image works
(p.84). Bourriaud seeks out historical art movements and practices that materialise
the ’philosophical tradition’ that underpins relational aesthetics (p.18). He finds
precursors to relational aesthetics in twentieth century avant-gardes and in all
artworks that ‘can not be reduced to the “things” … artists “produce”’ (p.20).
Conversely, examining videoperformances and networked practices developed in
the 1970s reveals a much more direct legacy of relational concerns, which are
inherent to these practices from the beginning (see Chapter Two). This approach
reveals that video technologies historically span broadcast, communication and
representation, sharing the same legacy of networked tools. In this context, the
screens of video and of networked computers also share technologies and contexts
of use. These factors have been significant in fostering the current growing interest
in relational practices and the recent revival of performance and videoperformance
practices from the 1970s. The contemporary possibility of migrating across
platforms and screens enabled by new developments in digital technologies adds a
new layer of relational potential to the contemporary practice of videoperformance,
and opens the historical body of videoperformance work to fresh readings.
The interplay of representation and performativity, of subjectivity and relationality, of
autobiography and politics are already present in early videoperformances by
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feminist artists concerned with redefining women’s representation and positioning
(for example, Ulrike Rosenbach, Martha Rosler, Hannah Wilke, Gina Pane, Eleanor
Antin and Lynda Benglis). Early experiments with networks (satellites, telephone
and networked screens) anticipate the longing for real time telecommunication (Kit
Galloway and Sherrie Rabinowitz), media activism (Ant Farm) and the potential for
mediated intimacy (Douglas Davis). These are closely connected with the
technology of television, and concerns with the media and broadcast in particular
inform many early video and performance practices (for example, works by Martha
Rosler, Douglas Davis, Nam June Paik, Dara Birnbaum, General Idea and TVTV).
The work of Vito Acconci references and transcends these concerns and stands out
for its relevance to contemporary videoperformance practices. The emergence of
Internet platforms for video communication and distribution has enriched the range
of possible readings of his body of work and has enticed contemporary artists to re-
perform some of his strategies (for example, in the work of Annie Abrahams, and
Jane Pollard and Ian Forsyth). Acconci concentrates primarily on the potential of the
video camera and monitor screen to mediate a relationship that, although
asynchronous, is reciprocal. His videoperformances visually suggest a position for
the body of the viewer and this projected position has already actively determined
the performance. In other words, relationality informs the performance in its making,
not only when viewers are physically present in front of the screen and engage with
the work.
Acconci’s videoperformance practice emerges as critically complex in its continuous
focus on modes of relationality that involve an interrogation of his subjectivity,
representation of masculinity, vulnerability, doubt, manipulation and uncertainty,
which open a fissure in the solidity of the male position in power relations.
Each iteration of subjectivity produced on screen and off screen, each past
identification, encounter, model or norm that comes to the forefront interpellated in
relationality remains ungraspable, just as mediated relationality itself emerges as a
performative, but remains uncapturable. Subjects repeat gestures and mannerisms
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gleaned from their separate past encounters, informed by the Other that precedes
them (understood as culture, language, the law), and continuously reinforced within
a set of relations shaped by these socio-linguistic mechanisms. Relationality
emerges from this set of repetitions and variations as an intersubjective tangible
temporary performative. In this framework, relational videoperformances invite
viewers to shift from an intense engagement with the innermost aspect of their own
subjectivity to a deep engagement with a shared intersubjectivity in extimacy. This
project shows how videoperformances can achieve different levels of intimacy and
intensity as they afford viewers room to engage and disengage with the subject on
screen. Intimacy itself is always already mediated and constructed, performed and
cited, but the (re)mediation of the screen offers a qualitatively different opportunity
to feel (affect) and think (cognition), recall and repeat (not reproduce) become
aware and forget (oscillation).
In this dissertation, performative and analytical writing complement each other
without resolving these contradictions. Producing the videoperformances for this
project and analysing them in light of the discourses of Lacanian psychoanalysis,
feminism and performativity has radically influenced my subjectivity and my
awareness of how I engage relationally both in my practice and in my everyday life.
Similarly, performing the encounters with the intimate videoperformances of
Abrahams and Acconci has made me aware of aspects of my subjectivity that I had
not been able to recognise before. The voices and words of Althusser, Lacan, Grosz
and Butler resonate in the first person accounts in chapter three, and feminist
discourses offer me the tools to analyse the dynamics of my responses. As a viewer
and active interlocutor, I complement the performance with further voices gleaned
from the history of my subjectivity, and I remould the subject on screen as I receive
its address and participate in co-producing shared relationality.
The complementary accounts of encountering a historical videoperformance such
as Acconci’s Theme Song (1973), Abraham’s contemporary Theme Song Revisited
(After Acconci) (2011), and of producing Before You Now (2013), map the key
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processes of relationality as they happen. The productive strategy of examining
these works from a first person perspective has allowed me to uncover mechanisms
of subjectivity and the gaze not accessible via other methods of analysis. Although
these remain case studies and do not exhaust the possibilities of these encounters,
the resulting insight has been indispensable to make explicit the fundamental
processes at work in the mediated relationality of videoperformance. In particular,
the oscillation of awareness and unconscious responses that I seek to evoke in the
viewers of my work has now become a tangible occurrence available to critical
analysis and ethical scrutiny. Although other moving image, performance or
photographic practices can also produce this oscillation, videoperformance offers a
unique combination of direct address and mediation that directly engages and
deflects the gaze, constructing modes of relationality that can encompass
awareness and reflection. This project demonstrates that the direct affective and
cognitive involvement of viewers in the processes of mediated relationality,
activated by interpellation in the first instance, has the potential to produce a
transformative effect that is not afforded by spectatorship alone.
On screen, the performer shifts between awareness and the unconscious, and this
offers viewers opportunities to do the same within an intersubjective relationship.
Thus, the image of the performer on screen oscillates between the functions of
image/artwork and of other/Other, shifting in and out of the gaze, and fluctuating
between awareness and the unconscious. More importantly, as the performer is
evidently not present and not responding to the viewer, the gaze is exposed as a
loop that originates in the subject to return to the subject itself. This possibility
eludes most live performances. The case studies in chapter three demonstrate that
as a subject and viewer I question if the affects, thoughts and responses that
emerge in me have their origin in Acconci or in my own subjectivity. Although this
partial awareness is momentary, it has an enduring transformative effect on
subjectivity and on relationality. The mediation of the screen makes this reflection
possible during the emergence of relationality itself.
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Videoperformance exceeds the gaze and desire by unsettling the continuity of the
subject and by producing a mediated relationality that integrates reflection. The
repetition and relative discontinuity of subjectivity established by each
videoperformance offers viewers a short-term counterpoint for relationality. Whilst
cinema, for instance, constructs continuous stable subjects through narrative and
point-of-view, videoperformance produces temporary fragments of subjectivity
available to viewers to confront relationally. The performer denies these fragments
as stable by offering shifting iterations of subjectivity and shifting opportunities to
relate with other aspects of viewers’ subjectivities. This is closer to embodied
subjectivity with its (relative) continuity in body and identity, and its psychic
discontinuity and instability. Moreover, viewers physically and psychically move
towards and away from the representations of the performer, whilst performers offer
shifting opportunities to relate and reflect.
The performer’s gaze may or may not be animated by narcissism – the desire to
confirm the wholeness of their subjectivity – or by an acceptance of fragmentation
(Krauss, 1976; Phelan, 1993). If I read Acconci’s performance as informed by self-
doubt or by an inner dialogue with another other, the performance alludes to a
radically unstable and fragmented subject. From a feminist perspective, it would be
easy to attribute to Acconci the desire to complete his fragmented self via the
possession of this other – me, the woman he is clumsily attempting to seduce. I
speculate that this artist is performing a split subjectivity that is already informed by
being someone’s other, and not by the desire to possess the other who lacks the
phallus in order to confirm that he does not. The loop of gaze and desire is open
towards the desire to reach the other within the limitations of our (already accepted
as) fragmented subjectivities. In this instance, the performer Acconci declares his
desire and asks me, his viewer and interlocutor, to confront both his and my desire.
The mediated nature of videoperformance, its lack of artist’s and viewer’s
contemporary physical presence and response loop, its asynchronous and
asymmetrical qualities keep open the ethical and political potential of relationality.
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As my awareness of my own unconscious responses becomes possible, I become
enabled to keep past relationships into account as I respond to interlocutors in the
present. This may diminish my need to position the other as the object of my desire
and may increase my capacity to perceive the other as an equally fragmented and
desiring subject. In other words, the potential for reciprocal respect and acceptance
increases, whilst the need for aggression may decrease.
These mediated relationships are as psychically and politically charged as face-to-
face relationships that are part of the everyday life: the affects and thoughts that
emerge intertwined in my encounters surprise me for their relevance to my
subjectivity. In the encounter with the videoperformances and in writing the
encounter, I become aware of previously unconscious responses and psychic
mechanisms that are dominant in my ways of relating to others. This directly
supports the central argument of this project: the opportunity for mediated
relationality produced by videoperformance is relevant to the awareness, reflection
and transformation of subjectivity and intersubjective relationships beyond the
context of art practice. What is at stake in my encounter with Theme Song and
Theme Song Revisited (After Acconci) is a shift, however small, in the structure of
subjectivity, the dynamics of the gaze that affect intersubjective exchanges,
unconscious desires, self-awareness and the powerful impact that these
transformations can have on interpersonal relationships. Here, subjectivity and
relationality function as performatives in that they exceed the artworks that cause
them, and have consequences in and beyond the field of art practice. In other
words, this practice questions the authority of the subject and the power of
unconscious desire in a transformative process that increases self-awareness and
responsibility. It recasts the gaze as a process that contributes to a critical
understanding of the limitations of subjectivity and it confirms experientially that
subjectivity is a product of relationality – a series of continuously shifting momentary
performatives.
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To conclude, the art practice of videoperformance produces the conditions for
modulations of relationality that are personal and social, psychic and political,
ethical and selfish. Videoperformance practices activate these contradictions and
evidence the impossibility of limiting relationality to any of the subjects involved.
Thus, the account of videoperformance that emerges from this analysis is of a
relational, transformative practice with ethical and political valence. When
videoperformance engages viewers relationally, it re-invests the other and the gaze
with a constructive political purpose by offering an opportunity to unmask the
processes of the gaze and use them as a basis for a more ethical approach to
relationality. This post-psychoanalytic ethical stance supports this project’s
proposition that the practices of videoperformance are capable of intervening in
intersubjective relationships and social relations. This project demonstrates that
when subjects are able to accept their own psychic features, they are less likely to
reduce the other to a function of these features and more likely to perceive the other
as a peer, who is as complex and fragmented as themselves. Videoperformance
facilitates this acceptance by engaging subjects in mediated asynchronous
relationships within which they can become aware of how those features are
constructed within a continuously flowing series of relationships, interdependence
and reciprocal subject formation. A growing awareness of the fundamental role of
relationality in the constitution of the subject could weaken the need to protect the
boundaries of subjectivity even further. The possible consequences of this
transformation include a reduction of aggression towards the other, who is now
more likely to be perceived as radically other, but as non-threatening to the integrity
of the subject (already understood as illusory). This constitutes a solid basis for
equality and supports my claim of the ethical and political relevance of
videoperformance and of this project.
I have evidenced directly that videoperformance can activate performative
relationality, raise ethical questions, produce awareness and nurture a sense of
responsibility towards the other one relates with. Consequently, videoperformance
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contributes a specific transformative practice with relevant political valence to the
wider discourse on intersubjective relationships and social relations.  This
constitutes an original contribution to knowledge as this project focuses attention on
mediated relationality as a performative, and on videoperformance as an effective
transformative practice with political and ethical valence in the context of
intersubjective relationships and social relations. It also highlights how the screen
can act as the key mediator for the continuous shifting of subjectivity between
unconscious desire and awareness. This produces asymmetrical and asynchronous
intersubjective relationships that activate the processes of interpellation and of the
gaze, but which also produce moments of awareness and reflection. This set of
connected dynamics is unique to videoperformance and does not occur in live
performance practices (where contemporary presence closes the loop of desire and
sustains the gaze), interactive networked practices (where the possibility of
contributing and informing the emerging relationships focuses subjects on the flow
of actions and does not foster awareness) or representational practices (where
spectatorship renders viewers passive and relationality does not emerge).
Although my own accounts as a viewer of videoperformance offers valid and original
knowledge of these processes, this project does not formally interrogate other
viewers’ relational, emotional and cognitive engagement with videoperformances.
The analysis of the three case studies conducted from a first person perspective
could be seen as relevant only to an exploration of my own subjectivity. Although
this is strictly speaking the case, it is also true that the dynamics revealed in these
encounters are rooted in a culture and in social constructs that I share with many
viewers and performers. Yet, this leaves open key questions about the agency of
viewers who accept or refuse to participate in mediated relationality. It appears that
this participation can have a transformative effect on a willing party, but how do
videoperformances affect viewers who resist relational engagement? And from
which perspective could the agency of those who engage relationally be analysed?
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Having acknowledged that this project raises important and relevant ethical
questions, I also have to acknowledge that I have only been able to consider a
limited political perspective. For example, whilst feminist discourses allow me to
recognise the psychic, linguistic and social mechanisms that position me as a white
woman in this culture, I am in danger of positioning others according to a normativity
of which I am not fully aware. Future research might focus on some of the ethical
and political questions that this project raises, but could not investigate: in the first
instance, questions of racialized relations of power brought to my attention by the
work of Piper (1988) and Lori (2009 and 2010), but also questions inherent to
religion, class and economic status, and access to technology. This project
constitutes a valid examination of the processes of interpellation and the gaze, and
a solid basis to investigate these relevant political questions.
The key questions that this research generates concern the relational dynamics and
uses of networked and screen-based technologies that activate and complicate the
processes made visible in this project: how do the relational dynamics that affect
subjectivity and generate reflection shift in networked performance practices? Which
strategies could produce a space for reflection in the real time response loop of
interactive technologies? How can awareness emerge in synchronous asymmetric
relationships? How does relationality change with networked and distributed
technologies? These questions are hinted at in my account of engaging with
Abrahams’s work and in the references to Skype in some of my own
videoperformances. They are relevant questions within the critical context of art
practice, but they also have ramifications that can affect the politics and ethics of
intersubjective relationships in the framework of increasingly mediated interpersonal
relationships.
I developed this project aware of the increasing everyday and artistic uses of
screen-based technologies to mediate relationality. The lasting effects of this direct
engagement on my subjectivity, on my relationships and on my practice are only
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just beginning to show. Similarly, I have only started to explore and reflect on the
specific political and ethical valence of screen mediated relational practices, and I
aim to research this aspect in more depth and in its wider context.  What emerges at
the end of this process is that this analysis has the potential to clarify the
fundamental relational dynamics of networked and distributed performance
practices as well as of face-to-face relationships. I am now keen to develop a new
body of work that adopts different screen-based technologies and interrogates the




Appendix One: Further Information about the Practice
Regardless, 17’, 2007.This work was not scripted, but improvised in front of the
video camera in one take. The illusion of the screen moving forward is created with
a scratched sheet of Plexiglas. I positioned the camera so that it pointed downwards
towards the area where I would be performing. This is mirrored in the angle of the
monitor screen, which locates viewers above my image in the same position the
camera occupied.
It was exhibited at Fieldgate Gallery as part of the group exhibition Analogue and
Digital curated by Chris Meigh-Andrews and at the Nunnery Gallery as part of the
annual exhibition Visions in the Nunnery, both in London.
Before You, various durations, 2008-2013.
It was first performed for an audience and to video camera at the same time as part
of Gary Stevens’ Performance Lab in April 2008, and again in the same format in
May 2008 as part of Scenes in the Making curated by Lee Campbell and Frog
Morris at the Nicholls and Clarke Building, both in London. In October 2008, I
repeated the performance live on stage as part of Live Art Part 2 curated by Frog
Morris at the Montague Arms in London. Finally, I tested a different combination of
performance and video in 2009 at the James Taylor Gallery in London. On this
occasion, I was invited to curate an event and I proposed the With Love? From Me
to You, which allowed me to invite a number of artists to share practice and ideas
(these included Mark MacGowan, Deej Fabic, Lee Campbell, Marty St James and
Gary Stevens). The brief of the invitation was to engage with the artworks already
i n s t a l l e d ,  a n d  t o  ‘ c o n t r i b u t e  t o  a  p r o g r a m m e  o f
talks/performances/readings/conversations’ (Dorian, 2010). Edward Dorian devised
the umbrella programme that included this event – Interrupted
Correspondence/Vice-Versa: Five Years Fragments. The two installations in the
exhibition space were Max Mosscrop’s House, a one third scale reproduction of an
abandoned farmhouse, and Michael Curran’s Saint Jerome in his Study by
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Antonello da Messina, both 2009. I performed inside House, and the screen was
positioned on the equivalent of Saint Jerome’s desk in Curran’s installation. The
audience sat between the two works, and could see cables linking the camera
inside House to the screen.
After this event, I worked on completing this series by focusing on the recorded
videoperformance and the viewer evoked beyond the video camera. I performed the
work again in a domestic environment with the sole purpose of recording it. After
having experimented with addressing a live audience, it was quite difficult to reach
out for an interlocutor who was not present. Finally, in 2013 I performed exclusively
for the video camera and recorded Before You Now (duration: 5’30”). This last
version was exhibited at the Minories Gallery in Colchester in 2014.
The Other Person, 29’30”, 2010.
The Other Person was commissioned by Edward Dorian for the series of events
Field Recordings at Five Years Gallery in London. It was also exhibited at the
Minories Gallery in Colchester in 2014.
Are You Talking to Me, 5’, 2010.
This is a short videoperformance produced by positioning two laptops beside each
other and connecting them via Skype. It was exhibited at the Nunnery Gallery in
London during the event Performance in the Nunnery: Move Me! and at the
Minories Gallery in Colchester in 2014.
Wish You Were Here, 3’, 2011.
Wish You Were Here was produced on the invitation of Chris Meigh-Andrews, who
curated the exhibition Light and Dark / Motion and Stasis for the Gooden Gallery
24SEVEN project space. It was also exhibited at Benham Gallery, Colchester, 2013.
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Appendix Two: Vito Acconci, Theme Song, 1973, 33.23’ Transcript
[Acconci fades-in; the rest of the screen is filled with a stripy sofa in the background;
a very large face in the foreground. He looks up slightly. He lights a cigarette, looks
into camera, blows some smoke out and starts humming a melody. Stretches out of
the frame and music starts playing. Acconci sings over the music] ‘I can’t see your
face in my mind …’. Of course I can’t see your face. I have no idea what your face
looks like. [smokes] You can be anybody out there. There’s got to be somebody …
There’s got to be somebody watching me, somebody who wants to come in close to
me.’. This is the moment when I am sure that he is talking to a female interlocutor.
He says: ‘look, look I can just wrap myself around … [moves his bent legs to the
side, so that his body frames a welcoming area for the body of the viewer] Don’t you
want to come in here? Sure! Sure you’ll come in here.’ The words of the song lead
the words of the performance. Sung by The Doors, it references the end of a
relationship – the male singer asks the female leaving partner not to cry so that he
can hold on to a different image of her face. The gender of the partner is not made
explicit. Am I projecting? ‘Ah no don’t cry! Why would you cry? I should be the one
who’s crying. I don’t know if there is anybody there. I don’t know if you want to come
in here. Look at me with your eyes … I’ll look at you … see you. I can’t find he right
line …  I can’t find the right line with you … I don’t know what things you like. I
mean, I don’t know what kinds of things win you over. [smokes] There’s got to be
something that can win you over … Sure sure I might be crazy I might be crazy
trying to get you here … of course not! No, I’m not crazy! Of course you can come in
here … But why not? Is that the right line? Why not? Why don’t you come here?
Why don’t you come here with me?’ Smokes, hums. ‘Come on!’ Hums ‘Look, I’m all
alone!’ Hums ‘I don’t have to know your face. I don’t have to know your face. How
will I know there’ll be a beautiful face?! Can be any face. Don’t worry, don’t cry! I’ll
take care of you. I’ll take care of youuuu … [wriggles sideway with his bent legs and
body] You come here … Come in to me … Come in close to my body! Don’t cry …
No, I don’t need your picture … I don’t have to know what you look like. We haven’t
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even said hallo yet. You can look like anybody; I’ll take anybody. I’ll take anything I
can get …’ Presses a button on the tape player off frame and smokes. ‘What can
convince you? What can convince you to come over to me, eh? Oh, I’ll try anything!
You just wait and see …’ Stretches out of the frame and presses play. Another song
starts (The Doors, People are strange). Hums ‘Strange … People are strange ...
Sure, look! Look, look how alone I am. Everybody looks ugly – I’m all alone! You
don’t want me to stay alone like this, do you? No, you can’t live me alone! Look how
down, how depressed I am! I don’t have you yet, of course I’m depressed! Oh you
can’t leave me like this … [smokes] and look how lonely I am … [sings] Everything
everything closes in on me. Oh I need you, I mean I need you YOU, I need you to
take care of me. Oh, come on, I need you to show me that, show me that I matter,
to show me that you remember my name, you know who I am … [sings] Oh come
on, I need somebody to remember me, somebody to take care of me. Come on, you
can do that … Come oooooon …. [stops music] Come on, would that work? Would
it work if I tell you how lonely I am? I just need somebody … Ah that wouldn’t work,
uh? Come on, look, I try this trick with you: I’ll be really honest … Sure, sometimes
I’m lonely, but sometimes I’m not. I’ll be honest with you, OK? [turns the tape] Look,
you’ll have to believe me if I’m really honest, right? [music starts. Hard Rock. Sings]
OK, look, I’m not lonely, right? Look, I wouldn’t try to kill you, I wouldn’t try to pull
you … [sings] OK, no lies right? This is what I really need: I just need a … I just
need a body next to me; that’s all I need! I mean, that’s lots to me; It’s not so much
to you. I need it! You need it too, right? I mean, look – look how my body wraps
around you. You need it as much as I do! Come on, don’t try to hide it! We both
need it! I just need a body next to mine! Maybe that really is all you need. All you
need is just a little bit, just a little bit of this. Come on, put your body next to mine –
that’s all both of us really need. Look, we don’t have to kid each other – we are both
grown up, right? I mean, you need it, I need it … Come on, it’s so easy here! Look
how easy it is! [wriggles with his body] Come on, just throw that into me! [makes a
thrusting movement with his hand towards his own body] Come right up against me.
It’s so easy! It’s no trouble, no problem … no problem, no one will just even know
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about it! Come on, we both need it, right? Come on … [stretches out of the frame
and stops the music] Ahhh. Come on, I know you need it as much as I do. [Music
starts. Sings:] dododo that’s all you need! Come on. Come on. dododo that’s all you
need! Come on. Come on. [lies lower with his head on his forearm on the floor.
Voice becomes almost a whisper] dododo that’s all you need! Yeah, yeah! I know
you need it; you know you need it … Don’t deny it … We won’t kid ourselves. Sure,
it is not, it might not be anything important, but it doesn’t matter, does it? I mean, we
don’t have to kid ourselves … we don’t need to say this is gonna last! All that counts
is now, right? My body is here, your body can be here … That’s all we want.
[stretches out of the frame. Music starts. Country. Hums] You don’t have to worry
about a thing. [sings:] I’ll be your …. Baby tonight … I can really be your baby. I’ll
give you anything you want … I’ll give you everything you need. Look – right here
[makes a repeated disturbing thrusting gesture with his open hand toward his body]
Right into me. Oh look, come on, this body is waiting for you to wrap me around you
… it’s as if you were here already. [sings:] I’ll be your …. Baby tonight [smokes] Why
should this remain alone? [sings] I’m gonna let you go into me. You’ll never regret it
… yeah, come oooon … Look, look at the way my body is ready to spring out! to
spring out around you! [sings:] I’ll be your …. Baby tonight [smokes] Right now, right
this minute, I’ll really be your baby … You’ll really be my baby … We don’t have to
worry about tomorrow; it’s nothing to do with forever … It just has to do with now.
[smokes] We don’t need any illusions, we don’t want any illusions, right? [stops the
music] Oh I’m pushing you, uh? I’m just pressing you. OK, OK, I can understand
that. I can understand that you think I’m moving too fast. [smokes] I know what you
need. I mean I realise that you need a little more than that. I mean, you need some
fantasy, you need some dream, OK. I know that, maybe we need to kid ourselves a
little bit. If that’s what you want, that’s what I’ll do … [stretches out of the frame.
Music starts. Rolling Stones] I understand that we can’t be without dreams, we can’t
be without illusions, we can’t be without fantasies … [smokes] [sings:] All you gotta
do, is step right out … I know, I know I’m not close to you now. Of course, I can’t be
close to you now. How can I be close to you – you’re in another world! It’s as if you
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are an angel. Of course! Look, there’s nobody beside me. And you are not beside
me, I realise that. I know that. I know I have to wait for you to come to me. I know
that I can’t make the first move myself because I’m just not up to you; I’m just too far
below you. But it is getting late … How long, how long do I have to wait for you? I’ll
wait. I’ll wait as long as I have to, because … because I’ve always dreamed about
you! Of anyone I was ever been with … I was really thinking about you, though I’ve
never even met you. I don’t know you now, but I had this vision of you … I had this
real vision of somebody ideal, somebody special. I realise that nobody can live up to
that dream, but that dream was really you. You can fulfil all the dreams, all the
dreams I have. Ye, here comes the man – I’m the man! I’m the man, and I’m waiting
for the show to go on, I’m waiting for you to come clean. All you have to do is ring
the bell. I’ll answer it. I’ll answer the bell anytime, anytime you ring. I’ll just be here
waiting for you, OK? I can’t reach out to you. I can try, I can try, try to reach out to
you, try to reach out to you, but it’s empty! My arms are empty. There’s just air. I can
just grab at air. Ah, you are so far above me, so far away from me. But I’ll keep on
trying [smokes]. I’ll keep on trying, I’ll keep on waiting for you. And maybe, maybe
sooner or later … Sure you can be on stage! You can be on stage with me. I’ll put
you in the spotlight! I mean the spotlight is all yours! I’ll just go back far away into
the darkness. You can be in the spotlight baby. It’s all yours! I’ll admire you, I’d love
you [pauses and moves his head to the music] I’ll watch every move you make. I’ll
love every move you make. I’ll act as if I’m an audience. I’m an audience. I’d have to
applaud at everything you did. Oh I’ll keep on pushing, I’ll keep on pushing till I
deserve you, till I can win you over. I know I know, I’m steps ahead, but I can step
lightly. I know I’m heavy handed, but maybe you’ll forgive that. Maybe You’ll forget
how heavy handed I am and maybe you’ll realise that … maybe maybe you can
come into me. [wriggles]. Maybe if I just sloooowly, graduuually pull myself around
maybe then, maybe then you’ll come into me. [gestures towards his body]. Maybe I
have a chance, eh? [smokes. Changes music] Maybe that’s just too far away for
you. I am sure you want to be admired, you want to be respected, but come on, you
don’t want to be respected as much as all that … I mean, I mean there’s still flesh,
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you know that. I mean, there’s still your body, here’s still my body. We can’t always
be in the air … We have to come down to hearth. You want that as much as I do.
Oh come on, I really want to come down to earth, I want you to come down here
with me. I mean, you can’t always be in the air. [smokes] We can’t always be up in
the clouds [shakes his head]. Sure it’s fine for a while but every once in a while, now
and then we have to realise that I’m a body and you are a body, right?! [stretches
out of frame. Clicks of player. new song]. Dudududu. [smokes] I mean, anything you
dooooo … I mean, just watch for what I’m gonna say, just listen to me. I’ll try to love
you. Sure, I can’t do anything right. I can’t do anything right, but I will. I will do
something right. [seems distracted: listening to the song? Smokes, looks into
camera with raised eyebrows. Sings] Dudududu. [sings] It’s not the thing to do!
Don’t stay away from me! I mean, you know the thing to do, I know the thing to do –
wrap myself arououound, come around you, that’s the thing to do, that’s what we
really wanna do. Take your time! Take your time. Anything you are doing, whatever
you are doing, you are doing the right thing. I mean, just listen to what he is saying -
he is saying exactly what I’m thinking: whatever you do is the right thing. You wanna
take your time? Just take your time! [sounds patronising?] Dudududu. [sings] Just
take your tiiiiiiime … Dudududu. Oh whatever you are doing baby … Do you want
me to stay like this? Do you want me to stay apart for a while? Sure, I’ll stay apart.
[sings] Anything you dooooo … whatever you dooooooo … You do it the right way
… I won’t impose my way on you. Just do what you want, I’ll wait. But sooner or
later, sooner or later you got to be here, right? [stretches out of frame. Clicks of
player. Sings without the music]. whatever you are doing … You are doing the right
way … Look, but I can do things the right way too, right? I mean, this is the only way
I know how. This is the only way I have to get to you. So look, let’s just say just this
once that it is the right way. It’s the right way! Come on! [wriggles] Come on into me
… You wouldn’t be up in he air, but I really do love you. I really WOULD love you.
[stretches out of frame. Clicks of player.] You just wait. Wait and see what I have to
tell you. [stretches out of frame. Clicks of player. New song] Dudududu. [puts new
cigarette in his mouth and mumbles] Sure, you are far above me, on a mountain
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top. [lights cigarette] You are the peak I just can’t reach. I’ve never had it, I’ve never
had it, but if I had you, I’d really try to keep you. [sounds earnest?] Sure, you’d be
my mountain top, but we’d still be here, we’d still be here on earth. We’d have to
linger on … oh your eyes are so pale, your eyes are so pale, of course they are
pale, I mean, I’d wrap myself around you, you’d be next to me … Your eyes would
have to be pale because I couldn’t see you clearly – you’d be too close. Too close
to see any clear image. I couldn’t [shakes head] focus on you. Oh, the world would
really be strange. When I see you it’s really strange. I don’t have to put you on the
mirror – I see you right before me! I don’t have to put a mirror in front of me in order
to see you! Oh, look how close we are! Sure I can see you, I can see you right up
against my face, up against my body. [appears to be looking out of frame, to his left,
my right] Oh linger on, stay with me. [smokes] there is no reason to go away! Come
as close to me as you can get! All wrapped up in each other. We both linger with
each other … There’d be no place else to go. No place else we wanted to go.
Dudududu. [sings] [smokes] Come on, whenever you are ready. Whenever you are
ready, I’m ready to wrap myself around you. You saw that! [smokes] I’ll linger on …
I’ll linger on waiting for you. [sounds impatient?] I don’t have anything else to do. All
I have to do is wait for you. [smokes] Oh, you don’t wanna a waste time! You don’t
wanna skip our life! Why stuff our life away? Why, why wait? We have just this
moment. I mean, no use putting it away, no use putting it on the shelf  - this is for us
now. Use it! Look at the way body can come around you … [wriggles] Why not use
it? I mean, I’m ready to use it, I’m ready to take you anytime, anytime you want. Just
stay, linger as long as you want [smokes] You are starting to get, you are starting to
get a little weary, aren’t you? You are starting to get a little afraid of me, right?
[stretches out of the frame. Clicking of player] OK, you are starting to listen to what
the rest of them are telling you … You are not jus listening to me, you are listening
to them too, eh? I mean, you don’t really trust as much. Why not? I mean, your pale
blue eyes, they’re beautiful eyes … I know they’d be beautiful if I saw them! I mean,
you can believe that! I can believe that they would be beautiful! [smokes] [stretches
out of the frame. Clicking of player. Sings] Linger oooon … Your pale blue eyeeeees
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… [wriggles] Oh, my body to linger on with you baby …! [really creepy!!!] I’d really
linger on with you! I wouldn’t just drop you! I wouldn’t just leave you! [stretches out
of the frame. Clicking of player. New song] OK, you don’t trust me! I mean, you have
reasons, you have reasons not to trust me. [looks contrived] I mean, I know, I know I
felt closed in, I felt closed in by the way you could love me. I’ve never wanted to be
mean to you. [sings] I’ve been unkiiiiiii-iiiind … You can forget, you can forget the
way I’ve been unkind. Just let it all go by. I mean, I changed! I changed later on.
You really want me to be alone liked this?! Look, look how much … [wriggles] Look
how I can wrap myself around you! I know I’ve been untrue, but this is for you now!
My body is wrapped around just for youuuu! [tone going up. Sounds really
insincere!?] It’s ready to wrap around youuuu! I know! I know, I know I was a liar in
the past [sounds earnest?] but I want be a lliar nooowww! [sings] … like a beast,
with its horns … I know, I know, it is true what they’ve said, I mean [doorbell rings]
I’ve thorn them down when they’ve reached out to me. It’s true, you are probably
right, I will thorn you. But I really swear this – I mean, all that, all that part of my life
is over. [smokes] all that part of my life is over. I’ll make it up to you. I’ll make it up to
you. Do you remember, I called you a ballerina, you were in another world. So I can
call you thee. I know, I just tried to be free, I know. I just tried to be free, that’s the
only reason why I fought with you. the only reason why I would have harmed you.
Oh, I’ve gotta ask for a lot! I got a ask for more, I wanna ask for more. Come on
baby, I keep on asking for more, come on, come on you want more too, right? You
want more than you ave out of this … Come on, it’s here! [wriggles] Come on here
to me [sings] won’t you ask, won’t you ask for a little more … Why don’t you ask for
a little more baby? I’ll give it to you! I’ll give you anything you ask fooor! [sings,
wriggles] … like a drug, I’ve tried in my way to be freeeee … But I wouldn’t have to
be free anymore, I would be free! You could really take care of me! [stretches out of
the frame. Clicking of player.] I don’t need to be free now! Look, we’d be together,
right? Right heeeeeere … Right here with me. I don’t need any freedom. [stretches
out of the frame. Clicking of player. New song. It stops again] You are not gonna
have of that, uh? I’m gonna be all alone. You are gonna leave me. You are gonna
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leave me even before we’ve had a chance to get started. [new song]. OK, I guess
that’s my fate, that’s my destiny. I just have to drift away, I just have to drift away
alone, I just have to be alone. I just have to remember [nods wit the music]
Dudududu. [sings] Oh I remember the time I remember the time, I remember the
time we were together … Ah, we could have been together. Oh, we could have had
such great times together and now, now all I have is a memory. [nods wit the music]
Dudududu. [sings] It’s all over. It’s all over before it even began! Ah, but what I have
to remember! [nods wit the music, smokes] Dudududu. [sings] I have it all to
remember now. It’s only a memory. [sings] Nothing left to me … lost a lot … I’ve lost
a lot … That is worth nothing, nothing’s worth nothing because you never came to
me. [nods wit the music] oh it would have been easy to feel good with you. Oh I can
just … I could feel your body! I could feel your body next to me now [wriggles and
gesticulates towards his body] Right next to me … Ah! [shakes head] I know I’m
only kidding myself, I’m only dreaming – there’s nobody here! You are not here. You
could have been here, but you are just not here. [wriggles] Oh but I remember … I
remember everything we had together. I know I know, we didn’t have it. We could
have had it – you could have shared the secrets of my soul. Sure, then it would
have been over. It would have been over but at least I could have remember that.
Oh, would you have wanted to be a memory for me? Wouldn’t you have wanted to
be fixed in my mind? Oh, every night you kept me from the cold … you could have
kept me, you could have kept me from the cold … you could have been right here
with me. Ah, nothing [makes emphatic gesture with his R arm] You are not here!
Could I really let you slip away? [sigh] Oh, how could I let you slip away like that?
We don’t even have a yesterday! Oh but if you were with me now, if you could be
with me now … there’s tomorrow, I could say that! [nods] I could say that! I could
say what an incredible yesterday it has been. [nods wit the music. sings] Not to let
[hesitates] You’ve given me nothing. We have nothing to remember any more
[sounds sad?] Oh feeling good would have been easy with you. It would have been
enough. [tapes stops suddenly!]
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SONGS
The Doors, I can't see your face in my mind.
I can't see your face in my mind
I can't see your face in my mind
Carnival dogs
Consume the lines
Can't see your face in my mind
Don't you cry
Baby, please don't cry
And don't look at me
With your eyes
I can't seem to find the right lie
I can't seem to find the right lie
Insanity's horse
Adorns the sky
Can't seem to find the right lie
Carnival dogs
Consume the lines
Can't see your face in my mind
Don't you cry
Baby, please don't cry
I won't need your picture
Until we say goodbye
The Doors' "People Are Strange"
People are strange when you're a stranger
Faces look ugly when you're alone
Women seem wicked when you're unwanted
Streets are uneven when you're down
When you're strange
Faces come out of the rain
When you're strange




People are strange when you're a stranger
Faces look ugly when you're alone
Women seem wicked when you're unwanted
Streets are uneven when you're down
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When you're strange
Faces come out of the rain
When you're strange





Faces come out of the rain
When you're strange




Faces That's All You Need
Sit right down if you can spare me a minute
I got a tale that's bound to break your heart
Concerns my brother who's thin and played violin
Got it in his head that an IQ was all you need
He went his way, I couldn't discover mine
I didn't worry if I ever saw him again
He's made a profit while I don't even own a pocket
And the last I heard he was sitting at the top of the tree
For a minute
Late last night reading my Underground Press
Came a knock on the door, thought it was the Third World War
Lord above, I did not recognize him
I said, "Have a cup of coke, kid, maybe that's all you need"
He said, "The smell of the city, kid, it's trying to kill me
My eyes are getting muddy, Christ, I'm aging fast
With my kind of music, I knew it wasn't gonna to be simple
But have a quick listen, kid, maybe that's all you need"
Don't stop, you make me feel much better
Tell me, my brother, do you think that's all I need?
Yeah yeah
Don't it make you happy?
Well, well, well, well, well
That's all you need
[Incomprehensible]
That's all you need
And that's all you need
And that's all you need
And that's all you need
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Come on
Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah
That's all you need
That's all you need
That's all you need
That's all you need
That's all you need
That's all you need
That's all you need
That's all you need
BOB DYLAN I'll be your baby tonight
Close your eyes, close your door
You don't have to worry any more
I'll be your baby tonight.
Shut the light, shut the shade
You don't have to be afraid
I'll be your baby tonight.
Well, that mockingbird's gonna sail away
We're gonna forget it
That big, fat moon is gonna shine like a spoon
But we're gonna let it
You won't regret it.
Kick your shoes off, do not fear
Bring that bottle over here
I'll be your baby tonight.
Van Morrison Ballerina
Spread your wings
Come on fly awhile
Straight to my arms
Little angel child
You know you only
Lonely twenty-two story block
And if somebody, not just anybody
Wanted to get close to you
For instance, me, baby
All you gotta do
Is ring a bell
Step right up, step right up
And step right up
Ballerina
Crowd will catch you
Fly it, sigh it, try it
Well, I may be wrong
But something deep in my heart tells me Im right and I dont think so
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You know I saw the writing on the wall
When you came up to me
Child, you were heading for a fall
But if it gets to you
And you feel like you just cant go on
All you gotta do
Is ring a bell
Step right up, and step right up
And step right up
Just like a ballerina
Stepping lightly
Alright, well its getting late
Yes it is, yes it is
And this time I forget to slip into your slumber
The light is on the left side of your head
And Im standing in your doorway
And Im mumbling and I cant remember the last thing that ran through my head
Here come the man and he say, he say the show must go on
So all you gotta do
Is ring the bell
And step right up, and step right up
And step right up
Just like a ballerina, yeah, yeah
Crowd will catch you
Fly it, sight it, cmon, die it, yeah
Just like a ballerina
Just like a just like a just like a ballerina
Get on up, get on up, keep a-moving on, little bit higher, baby
You know, you know, you know, get up baby
Alright, a-keep on, a-keep on, a-keep on, a-keep on pushing
Stepping lightly
Just like a ballerina
Ooo-we baby, take off your shoes
Working on
Just like a ballerina
The Velvet Underground Pale Blue Eyes
Sometimes I feel so happy,
Sometimes I feel so sad.
Sometimes I feel so happy,
But mostly you just make me mad.
Baby, you just make me mad.
Linger on, your pale blue eyes.
Linger on, your pale blue eyes.
Thought of you as my mountain top,
Thought of you as my peak.
Thought of you as everything,
I've had but couldn't keep.
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I've had but couldn't keep.
Linger on, your pale blue eyes.
Linger on, your pale blue eyes.
If I could make the world as pure and strange as what I see,
I'd put you in the mirror,
I put in front of me.
I put in front of me.
Linger on, your pale blue eyes.
Linger on, your pale blue eyes.
Skip a life completely.
Stuff it in a cup.
She said, Money is like us in time,
It lies, but can't stand up.
Down for you is up."
Linger on, your pale blue eyes.
Linger on, your pale blue eyes.
It was good what we did yesterday.
And I'd do it once again.
The fact that you are married,
Only proves, you're my best friend.
But it's truly, truly a sin.
Linger on, your pale blue eyes.
Linger on, your pale blue eyes.
Leonard Cohen Bird On The Wire
Like a bird on the wire,
Like a drunk in a midnight choir
I have tried in my way to be free.
Like a worm on a hook,
Like a knight from some old fashioned book
I have saved all my ribbons for thee.
If I, if I have been unkind,
I hope that you can just let it go by.
If I, if I have been untrue
I hope you know it was never to you.
Like a baby, stillborn,
Like a beast with his horn
I have torn everyone who reached out for me.
But I swear by this song
And by all that I have done wrong
I will make it all up to thee.
I saw a beggar leaning on his wooden crutch,
He said to me, "You must not ask for so much."
And a pretty woman leaning in her darkened door,
She cried to me, "Hey, why not ask for more?"
Oh like a bird on the wire,
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Like a drunk in a midnight choir
I have tried in my way to be free.
Me And Bobby Mcgee
Busted flat in Baton rouge, headin' for the train
Feelin' nearly faded as my jeans
Bobby thumbed a diesel down just before it rained
Took us all the way to New Orleans
I took my harpoon out of my dirty red bandanna
I was blowin' sad while Bobby sang the blues
With them windshield wipers slappin' time
And Bobby clappin' hands
We finally sang up every song that driver knew
Freedom's just another word for nothin' left to lose
And nothin' ain't worth nothin' but it's free
Feelin' good was easy, Lord, when Bobby sang the blues
Buddy, that was good enough for me
Good enough for me and Bobby McGee
From the coal mines of Kentucky to the California sun
Bobby shared the secrets of my soul
Standin' right beside me through everything I've done
And every night he kept me from the cold
Then somewhere near Salinas I let him slip away
Lookin' for the home I hope he'll find
And I'll trade all my tomorrows for a single yesterday
Holdin' Bobby's body next to mine
Freedom's just another word for nothin' left to lose
Nothin' left is all he left me, yeah
Feelin' good was easy, Lord, when Bobby sang the blues
Buddy, that was good enough for me
Good enough for me and Bobby McGee
Enough for me and Bobby McGee
Good enough for me and my Bobby McGee
Freedom's just another word for nothin' left to lose
And nothin' ain't worth nothin' but it's free
Feelin' good was easy, Lord, when Bobby sang the blues
Buddy, that was good enough for me
Good enough for me and Bobby McGee
From the coal mines of Kentucky to the California sun
Bobby shared the secrets of my soul
Standin' right beside me through everything I've done
And every night he kept me from the cold
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Then somewhere near Salinas I let him slip away
Lookin' for the home I hope he'll find
And I'll trade all my tomorrows for a single yesterday
Holdin' Bobby's body next to mine
Freedom's just another word for nothin' left to lose
Nothin' left is all he left me
Feelin' good was easy, Lord, when Bobby sang the blues
Buddy, that was good enough for me
Good enough for me and Bobby McGee
Enough for me and Bobby McGee
Good enough for me and my Bobby McGee, yeah
I let him slip away lookin' for the home I hope he finds
Enough for me and my Bobby McGee
Good enough for me and my Bobby McGee, yeah
Good enough for me and my Bobby McGee, yeah
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Appendix Three: Annie Abrahams, Theme Song Revisited (After Acconci),
2011, 6’17” Transcript
Some black and white stripes cover the screen – fabric? – and a flashy colour
shimmers over it – a hand? A text over imposed: ‘Call me’ and two phone numbers
in grey.
Are you there? Are you there? Are you there? I am here! I know you are there. You
are even more than 1. There’s a lot of you. Are you real? I know I am real. Mostly,
you just make me mad! But now, please call me. [music in the background] Come
on, just call me. You know? I am real. Are you real? I would like to know if you are
real. I would like to know if you exist. Are you there? [spoken, but with the song] You
are my mountain, you are my peak. [music. Sings] Linger on, linger on. Oh yes. Why
not, why not? Why shouldn’t you call me?! Just call me, especially if you have pale
blue eyes. Call me. Strange is what I see, indeed strange is what I see. I am here.
My body is here. Yours is there. At least, I think yours is there … Are you there? Call
me! Why don’t you call me? Please call me! This is not video, This is not television.
This is real! This is not imagination. You are there, I am here. If you’d be able to
talk, it’s not so difficult to talk together. But we can’t talk if you don’t call me. You
should call me. Please call me. Come on, do it. Do it! Don’t hesitate, go on! Call!
Take your phone and call me. I’m waiting. Time is passing. [speaking more quickly]
Time is passing. I’m waiting. Why don’t you call me? Call me please! Is it too
expensive for you? I’m real! You are real! Prove me you are real! Act! Do
something! [phone rings!] [image goes back to black and white stripy fabric] Hallo?
[a woman’s face blurred, moving, sideway. Turns the right way round as she speaks
very pleased, relieved? She is holding a phone to her right hear] Hallo! Thank you
for calling me! It’s so nice someone calls. Who are you? [listens intently] Oh Helen is
so great! Someone called me, finally! Thank you very much! [smiling broadly]
[listens and laughs] I was … I’m sorry, what are you saying? [leans forward. Looks
concerned. Leans towards the camera as she listens, but she is looking at the
screen – a bluish light reflects in her eyes] Ah, there’s not enough sound, is that it?
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[listens and smiles] OK … yeah, I’m very far … no, I’m very close in fact! [Looks up
and moves the camera. The image freezes briefly. Click of keyboard. The image
jumps to sideway, showing the edge of the laptop and Annie’s body, neck and arms
still on the phone] I stopped broadcasting, now I’m fine. [laughs] Thank you very
much for calling. No, it’s so strange that I didn’t know, but I don’t know … but you
called! [walks away from the desk] [voice off frame] I want to get … [laughs further
away] It’s great! I was afraid someone was calling first … But I preferred … [muffled
words] I’m glad you called! [chuckles] Yeah. So, the … [her body comes back into
the frame. Sits down at he desk] OK, so that’s a pity, yeah, that’s a great pity. [it
stops suddenly].
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Appendix Four: Before You Transcript
Before I start [sigh] Before I start the performance, before you start thinking, before I
start performing, I want to share something that you don’t usually see in a
performance. I want to share this moment before you become a viewer and I
become a performer and everything changes. But now we are just here, you and
me, without anything in between, in this real moment. I know you can see the
difference. I’m not used to be here like this and I’m a bit scared of what you might
think if I don’t show you what you expect … What do you expect? I know you can
see me now – can you see yourself in the screen or in my eyes? I’m a bit scared of
what you might see. I’m scared you might judge me, you might reject me. But I also
trust you. I can feel your presence. I’m not really scared. [complicit smile] But before
I start the performance I can tell you what I think. I can tell you my doubts, I can
show myself without a mask before I enter that persona that you will see in a
performance. This seems so real, so natural, so different. I’ll have to go soon, but
first I need to ask you one last thing: what are you going to do with this? With these





This is an approach to sociology developed by Callon, Law and Latour around 1986
(Latour, 2007, p.10). Its key methodology is to observe the relay of associations and
the ‘actors’ that modify them, instead of studying established institutions and social
structures. It is adopted here from Latour’s perspective as a methodology that
perceives networks of connections enacted by mediators and intermediaries (see
below) that can be human or inanimate. The network and the relations among
actors – or actants – exist only when they are enacted.
Automaton (see also Tuché and Encounter)
Jacques Lacan uses the term to indicate the compulsion to reproduce key elements
of formative events and encounters from a subject’s past (Lacan, 1998).
Awareness
The term is used as an equivalent term to Lacan’s consciousness and as opposed
to unconscious. Conscious knowledge.
Desire
Desire is understood in Lacanian terms as unconscious desire. It indicates a relation
to a lack that can be fulfilled by the object petit a. Lacan states that ‘man’s [sic]
desire is the desire of the Other’ (Lacan, 1998, p.38). In other words, the subject
desires to be the object of desire of the Other, but it also desires the recognition of
the other.
Distributed Aesthetics
This is an expression proposed by Anna Munster and Geert Lovink (2005), as an
alternative to relational aesthetics. It keeps into account the importance of
networked media, technologies and relations. It denotes ‘an aesthetics that comes
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to terms with conflict, boredom, confusion and stagnation – one that includes social
complexity (as opposed to bio-complexity)’ (Munster and Lovink, 2005).
Encounter (see also Tuché and Automaton)
Lacan (1998) describes a primary encounter with the real that gains the quality of
being missed, as its memory and legacy continue to activate desire and to bring the
real to the surface. Chance events recall primary encounters that tend to repeat as
the same and activate a return of the real. Thus the encounter becomes an
opportunity to become aware (in the pulsation between Tuché and Automaton) of
unresolved missed encounters without reproducing them.
Nicolas Bourriaud adopts the term from Althusser’s expression ‘state of encounter
imposed on people’ to describe urban living as a ‘system of intensive encounters’
(Bourriaud, 2002, p.15).
Ethics
This term indicates the set of principles and values that govern behaviour.
Throughout this project, ethics is approached from the perspective of Judith Butler’s
social and political critical theory and does not extend into moral philosophy.
Extimacy
This Lacanian concept proposes a version of intimacy that is located at the same
time inside and outside the subject – it indicates that the innermost affects and
thoughts of a subject are already determined by and shared in the life external to
the subject itself. It implies a set of dynamics that operate at the same time inside
and outside the subject, making the distinction between inside and outside, other
subject and the Lacanian Other (language, culture, the law, normativity)
unnecessary (Lacan, 1992).
The Gaze
In Lacan’s psychoanalytic thought, the gaze originates in the unconscious desire of
the subject and is attributed to the other as returning to the subject itself in a
movement shaped like a Moebius strip (Lacan, 1998). The Other precedes the
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subject and continues to act upon it through language and in the dynamics of the
gaze. From this perspective, the gaze originates in the subject being looked at, and
not in the subject looking.
In Laura Mulvey’s approach, the gaze is transitive and mono-directional: it originates
in the (male) cinema spectator to end with the on-screen representation of the
(female) character (Mulvey, 1975).
Haptic
‘Haptic perception is usually defined as the combination of tactile, kinesthetic, and
proprioceptive functions, the way we experience touch both on the surface of and
inside our bodies. In haptic visuality, the eyes themselves function like organs of
touch.’ (Marks, 2002, p.2).
Hypermediacy (see also Immediacy)
Hypermediacy ‘expresses the tension between regarding a visual space as
mediated and as a "real” space that lies beyond mediation.’ (Bolter and Grusin,
2000, p.41). Hypermediacy evokes immediacy, as multiplying the visual references
to already established formal devices makes a less familiar medium more
transparent: ‘Whenever one medium seems to have convinced viewers of its
immediacy, other media try to appropriate that conviction.’ (Bolter and Grusin, 2000,
p.9).
Imaginary (see also Symbolic and Real)
This is one of the three Lacanian orders. The imaginary is the field of imagination,
images and illusions, and it is structured by the symbolic order in the visual filed.
Immediacy (see also Hypermediacy)
For Bolter and Grusin (2000), the logic of transparent immediacy manifests a desire
for an interface ‘that erases itself, so that the user is no longer aware of confronting
a medium, but instead stands in an immediate relationship to the contents of that
medium.’ (Bolter and Grusin, 2000, p.24, emphasis added).
Interface
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‘A point where two systems, subjects, organizations, etc. meet and interact, forming
a common boundary’ (Oxford English Dictionary, 2014).
Interlocutor
It is defined as ‘[o]ne who takes part in a dialogue, conversation, or discussion. In pl.
the persons who carry on a dialogue’ (Oxford English Dictionary, 2014).
Intermediary (see also Mediator)
In Actor-Network-Theory, an intermediary ‘transports meaning or force without
transformation: defining its inputs is enough to define its outputs’ (Latour, 2007,
p.39).
Interpellation
In Althusser’s formulation, it is the process that brings the subject into being by
‘hailing’ it. It manifests the operations of ideology and discourse in positioning
subjects in systems of power.
Judith Butler reformulates interpellation as ‘a scene of address’ that functions as a
reciprocal negotiation of relative positions within available models and tests the
limits of performable variations (Butler, 2005, p.50).
Intersubjectivity
It is the condition of dependence of subjects on each other. It indicates that the
boundaries of a subject are inevitably blurred and that its formation and survivability
are woven with those of other subjects.
Intimacy
This term indicates a particularly close relationship that involves affects and evokes
the possibility of trust, vulnerability, sexual intimacy and deep sharing. Although it is
normally associated with the innermost private life of a subject, it is also informed by
internalised norms of acceptable behaviour within a social context.
Mediated
Not accessed directly, but relayed and informed by a mediator or intermediary.
202
Mediator (see also Intermdiary)
Mediators ‘transform, translate, distort, and modify the meaning or the elements
they are supposed to carry’ (Latour, 2007, p.39). In Actor-Network-Theory,
mediators ‘cannot be counted as just one; they might count for one, for nothing, for
several, or for infinity. Their input is never a good predictor of their output; their
specificity has to be taken into account every time’ (p.39).
Narcissism
In its psychoanalytic definition, it is a condition in which the subject remains bound
by its own unconscious desires and the gaze stops it from seeing others as subjects
(as Other). For Rosalind Krauss, it informs the dynamics of videoperformance as it
creates a situation of 'self-encapsulation' (Krauss, 1976, p.52). In other words, the
artist turns his gaze onto himself closing a feedback loop that excludes the viewer.
Network/networked
Munster and Lovink state that ‘[n]etworks are fragmentors. They break up strong
signs and experiences into countless threads’ (Munster and Lovink, 2005). They
describe how ‘networked existence hops from one medium to the next and then
demands that we return back to our links in order to put in the work of connecting
again and again’ (Munster and Lovink, 2005). From this perspective, networked art
practices adopt the technological tools that make connectivity possible (computers,
the Internet, satellite technology and mobile technology), but also conceptual tools
and relational dynamics informed by these.
New Media
This is a contested expression that functions as a ‘shorthand for a range of
practices and names, including [digital art,] “art and technology”, “computer art”,
“systems art”, and so on’ (Paul, 2008b, p.13). Christiane Paul states that ‘ !n !e !w !
!media art has shifted the focus from object to process: as an inherently time-based,
dynamic, interactive, collaborative, customizable and variable art form !n !e !w ! media




It is ‘the psychic operation of the norm … derived, though not mechanically or
predictably, from prior social operations’ (Butler, 1997c, p.21). In other words, is the
force of social conventions, acceptable behaviours and recognisable forms of
subjectivity that produce intelligible subjects.
Object petit a see Other/other.
Other/other
The Other with a capital O indicates the completely separate and different other,
which relays the weight of language and social norms, and which is radically alien.
As it informs the unconscious, the Other precedes the subject and continues to act
upon it through language and in the dynamics of the gaze. When the gaze is at
work, the radical alterity of the Other is reduced to a function of the subject itself and
it becomes the other with a small o, or object petit a. The object petit a embodies
the function of confirming the symbolic appearance of wholeness that the subject
perceives in its mirror image (the ideal I) (Lacan, 2006).
Performative Writing
This is a critical practice that ‘enact[s] the effective force of the performance
event again, as it plays itself out in an ongoing temporality made vivid by the
psychic process of distortion’ (Phelan, 1997, p.12). It is ‘evocative’,
‘metonymic’, ‘subjective’, ‘nervous’, ‘citational’ and ‘consequential’. (Pollock,
1998, p.80). It is performative as it produces the writing subject that is
supposed to precede it.
Performativity/Performative
This term is used from the perspective of Judith Butler in the double meaning of
'dramatic' and 'non-referential' (Butler, 1988, pp.521-522). In its stratification of
meanings, the term indicates both the ephemeral event of a performance and the
power of discourse to constitute and continually modify subjectivity. Performativity is
always impure, based on citationality and iterability, ‘conventional and relational’
(Derrida, 1988; Gade and Jerslev, 2005, p.9, emphasis in original).
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Real (see also Symbolic and Imaginary)
This is one of the three Lacanian orders. The real (or the Thing, from Freud’s 'Das
Ding') is undifferentiated as it cannot be accessed via the symbolic or imaginary
orders. It structures the unconscious and as such it pulsates in and out of
consciousness without being grasped or resolved.
Relational Aesthetics
This is defined by Nicolas Bourriaud as ‘[t]he artistic practice thus resides in the
invention of relations between consciousness [sic]’ (Bourriaud, 2002, p.22).
Relationality
This term describes intersubjective relationships (between subject and other
performer and viewer, representation and body, temporary subject and imagined
other, etc.) with psychic, ethical and cultural implications.
Remediation
In Bolter and Grusin’s words, this is ‘the formal logic by which new media refashion
prior media forms’ (Bolter and Grusin, 2000, p.273). It extends to indicate the
process by which a mediator or an interface mediates an event that is already
mediated.
Repetition
This term is adopted by Lacan to indicate the reappearance in the present of
elements of an unresolved primary experience. It does not necessarily imply a
reproduction of the original event, but a momentary recalling and pulsating of its
memory to consciousness.
Responsibility
This is interpreted by Judith Butler, on the basis of Levinas’ thought, as ‘an
understanding of the ethical relation to the Other that does not rely on causal links
between a doer and a deed’ – ‘an ethical interpellation’ (Butler, 2005, p.85 and
p.89). In other words, it indicates that as the subject is brought into being by a
relation with the other, it is always already bound to be responsible for the other.
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Scene of address
This is also described as the interlocutory scene: a ‘socially constituted relation’, or
a situation in which subjects address each other and are addressed (Butler, 2005,
p.50).
Screen
This term is used to refer to a variety of technologies developed and used to relay
moving image, communication and data. These uses mark all screens with
characteristics and connotations that inform its mediation of performance and
relationality. It references older technologies, such as the Cathode Ray Tube
monitor screen, more recent technologies, such as Light Emitting Diode and Liquid
Crystal Display monitor screens, and it extends to screens created for or by the
projection of moving images or computers’ output.
Subject/Subjectivity
From a Lacanian perspective, the subject is the subject of the unconscious:
fragmented, unstable and formed in language. For Althusser and Judith Butler the
subject is constituted by interpellation and in normativity. It is performative as it is
informed by the actions it performs. Subjectivity indicates the unique configuration of
one subject – the condition of being a subject.
Subjection
This is the process by which a subject comes into being. It indicates both the
formation of the subject and its submission to normativity and the law.
Symbolic (see also Real and Imaginary)
This is one of the three Lacanian orders. The symbolic is the order of language,
which carries the power of normativity and the law.
Tuché (see also Automaton and Encounter)
Also described by Lacan as the ‘real as encounter’, it indicates the situations that
recall unresolved – or missed – encounters to consciousness. In other words, this is
a pulsation of the real to consciousness. (Lacan, 1998, p.53-55).
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Unconscious
According to Lacan, it is ‘another place’ between perception and consciousness,
which is also the place of the Other, and where the subject is constituted (Lacan
1998, p.56). It is the locus of all that is unresolved and inaccessible, and it pulsates
into consciousness without becoming graspable.
Videoperformance
It is defined by Liza Bear in1974 as the ‘interface of video and live performance’
(Bear, 1974, p.3). It describes art practices that combine performance, video
camera and screen (Jones, 1998; Warr, 2000). The expression Relational
Videoperformance is used as a shorthand to describe videoperformances in which
artists address viewers via video camera and screen with their eyes, speech and
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